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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the viability of the concept of political liberalism. Since its emergence, the 
idea of a purely political liberalism has been the subject of a voluminous amount of discourse and 
debate. The concept of political liberalism has been presented as both a solution to the problems 
of justice and political stability troubling liberal democracies and an exemplar of all that is wrong 
with contemporary political philosophy; it has, quite literally, altered the landscape and the 
vernacular of contemporary political theory. 
Herein it is argued that, despite the significant amount ofliterature that has been devoted 
to the analysis of the idea of a purely political liberalism, the idea itselfhas yet to be subjected to 
the type of critique that is required if one is to assess its viability effectively. Though there have 
been a number of contemporary political theorists who have developed conceptions of political 
liberalism which they believe differ in important ways from those of their doctrinal colleagues, 
detailed analyses of the concept of political hberalism have and remain focussed almost exclusively 
on a single formulation: namely, Raw/sian political liberalism. This singular focus has precluded 
the completion of a comprehensive assessment of the viability of the concept (as opposed to a 
single conception) of political liberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian 
models. 
This thesis confronts this problem by expanding the scope of investigation to include a 
fulsome examination of other prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political hberalism-i1amely, 
those developed by Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar-and in so doing provides a more 
inclusive and, subsequently, thorough critique than has previously been offered Adopting such an 
approach reveals that, despite protestations to the contrary, the prominent paradigmatic 
conceptions of political liberalism are sufficiently similar in all important respects to enable their 
conflation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to a thorough analysis, the idea of a 
purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. 
Key Terms: political hberalism; political stability; justice; reasonable disagreement; reasonableness; 
equal respect; pluralism; neutrality; political power; overlapping consensus 
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CHAPTER ONE: POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND 
THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL STABILITY 
I. Introduction 
The history ofWestern political philosophy is in many respects a chronicle of the search for 
political stability. Indeed, it has been argued that the "problem" of political stability-that is, the 
dilemma ofhow to secure and sustain the conditions needed to ensure ''the smooth functioning of 
[public] decision-making mechanisms and [the] absence oflarge-scale, extra-legal opposition [to 
the existing political system]" (Klosko 2000: 7)-''is fundamental to political philosophy'' (Rawls 
1993: xvii). Certainly, as a topic of analysis the problem of political stability has exercised the 
energies and talents of a vast number of political theorists. From the dialogical investigations of 
Socrates in Plato's Republic to the dialogicalliberalisms of Bruce Ackerman and Jiirgen 
Habermas, many of the most celebrated theorists have devoted a great deal of thought to trying 
to clarify and resolve the problem of political stability. 
Political philosophy's fascination and concern with the problem of political stability has 
been especially evident-indeed, prominent-in liberal political theory. Liberalism was born out 
ofadesiretoescapefromandavoidarecurrenceoftheseeminglyintractablereligiouscivilwars 
andsubsequentpoliticalinstabilitythatplaguedmuchofsixteenthandseventeenth-centuryEurope; 
it was a philosophical attempt to confront and effectively address the problems of stability 
generated by religious pluralism, and thereby establish the basis for a stable (and just) society. For 
Thomas Hobbes, the individual whom is often identified as the progenitor ofliberal theory, 1 the 
1 
need for political stability was paramount:2 without it, there could be no security for either life or 
liberty, and thus man' s3 existence could never be anything more than a chaotic, violent and bloody 
struggle forpower-"a condition ofW arre of everyman against everyman" (Hobbes 1968: 196). 
Since its initial articulation by Hobbes, variants of this theme have commonly served as the 
foundation for liberals' theorising. 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, a number of political theorists began to argue 
that existing liberal responses to the difficulties generated by religious, moral, and philosophical 
pluralism were insufficient to address the problems of justice and stability facing contemporary 
liberal democracies. Certainofthesetheorists suggested that securing political stability under such 
conditions would require redrawing the boundaries ofliberal concern so as to distinguish between 
matters of public and private interest-between the political and the nonpoliticaf-and 
embracing a conception of justice that seeks consensus on a framework for regulating only the 
former (e.g., Rawls 1993; Larmore 1987; Shklar 1989). The school of thought associated with 
this line of argument has come to be known as political liberalism. 
According to its proponents, a purely political liberalism is animated by a ''freestanding" 
conception of justice: that is, a conception of justice that is neither derived from nor makes any 
claims regarding the truth or falsity of any particular metaphysical or epistemological view. A 
freestanding conception of justice is void of any specifically "comprehensive" or "nonpolitical" 
concerns; its values are arrived at independent of nonpolitical considerations, thereby ensuring that 
it neither demands nor presupposes a "wider commitment to any other doctrine" (Rawls 1993: 
12-13). Political liberals arguethatthepluralityof(reasonable5) conceptions of the good that 
2 
characterises many contemporary societies precludes the possibility of achieving a voluntary public 
consensus on any conception of justice that seeks to regulate all political and nonpolitical 
behaviour according to the tenets of a single comprehensive doctrine. 6 Given the ineliminable 
diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable views, attempting to enforce adherence to such a 
"comprehensive" conception of justice would require an unacceptable amount of coercion on the 
part of the state, and thereby generate an undesirable, indeed, dangerous, degree of political 
instability. The manner by which to avoid this problem is to develop a conception of justice that 
restricts its regulatory scope to uncontroversial matters-one that refrains from publicly engaging 
those "comprehensive" questions for which there can never be a universally acceptable answer. 
In order to satisfy such a criterion, the conception of justice animating a society's 
regulatory framework must restrict its concern and application to matters of public import-it 
must, in other words, be apolitical conception of justice. By restricting its sphere of jurisdiction 
to political matters, such a conception not only removes the most contentious issues from the 
public agenda, but also allows for the public affirmation and pursuit of a wide diversity of 
conceptions of the good and remains equally respectful of all (reasonable) comprehensive 
doctrines. Political liberals claim that only by adopting such a ''bracketed" approach can we hope 
to develop a conception of justice that can secure the free and willing support of the majority of 
the citizenry found in many contemporary societies, and in so doing obtain the political stability 
needed to establish and maintain a society within which all (reasonable) individuals will have the 
opportunity to pursue and realise a vision of the good life of their own choosing and design. In 
3 
other words, political liberalism offers the means by which to resolve the riddle ofhow it is 
possible to secure political stability in contemporary pluralistic societies. 
II. Existing Analyses 
Over the course of the past seventeen years, 7 the viability and attractiveness of the concept of 
political liberalism has been the subject of a great deal of analysis; however, the effectiveness of 
the various analyses has been limited insofar as they have generally tended to focus almost 
exclusively (or, at least, primarily) on a single representation of political liberalism: namely, 
Rawlsian political liberalism. 8 Certainly the most prevalent and commented upon analyses are 
those that have adopted just such an approach. 
Nowhere has this myopia been more evident than in the "communitarian'' critiques of the 
concept of political hberalism. The now "famous" liberal-communitarian debate of the 1980s (and, 
to a lesser extent, the 1990s) was in large part stimulated and fuelled by Rawls' work surrounding 
theideaofapurelypoliticalliberalism.Manyso-called(whetherbypersonalchoiceormisapplied 
attribution'1 "communitarians"-individuals such as Benjamin Barber (1984), Alasdair Macintyre 
(1981),MichaelSandel(1982),CharlesTaylor(1985),andMichaelWalzer(1983)-areamong 
the harshest and best known critics of the concept ofpoliticalliberalism as represented by Rawls' 
paradigm. 10 In essence, the principal complaint of communitarians has been that the concept of 
political liberalism fails to acknowledge adequately the unavoidable presence, influence and 
importance of constitutive attachments, 11 such as family, religion and culture, and in so doing 
negates the possibility of establishing and sustaining a "true" community. According to 
communitarians, all individuals are, in one way or another, inextricably tied to and a product of 
4 
their communities, and this fact generates certain demands that the public conception of justice 
must recognise and accommodate if those subjectto its conditions are to live personally fulfilling 
lives. Moreover, individuals are not able to, nor should they want to, ignore or suspend these 
commitments when making decisions about matters of justice, political or otherwise. For 
communitarians, the concept of political liberalism is premised upon the existence of what Sandel 
has referred to as an ''unencumbered" self(Sandel1982: 94)-a self free from constitutive 
attachments and influences-the realisation of which is neither possible nor desirable. 
A number of theorists known as "perfectionisf' liberals have also been prominent critics 
of the concept of political liberalism. Individuals such as Joseph Raz (1986), William Galston 
(1992), Stephen Macedo (1990), George Sher(1997), and Steven Wal1(1998)havearguedthat 
the establishment and maintenance of a just and stable society, a society that will provide the 
opportunity for all of its citizens to realise their full potential, requires the inculcation, continued 
affirmation and purposeful elevation of specific virtues and values-namely, liberal virtues and 
values such as toleration and autonomy. This conclusion is premised upon the belief that when 
given little direction and left largely to their own devices (in essence, the approach attributed to 
political liberalism), citizens cannot be relied upon to develop naturally the personal qualities and 
beliefs that will impel them to supportvoluntarilythetypeofpublicpolicies and programs that are 
necessary to establish and sustain a just and stable society. Perfectionist liberals suggest that 
human behaviour is too unpredictable and mistake-ridden a basis upon which to premise such an 
expectation. 
5 
Accordingly, contra political liberalism, the public conception ofjustice should not seek 
to remain neutral in relation to judgements concerning the value and desirability of certain 
conceptions of the good, but rather it should publicly support, protect, and promote those 
conceptions of the good that affirm and assign primacy to liberal values and virtues. Perfectionist 
liberals contend that the government has a duty to "act with discrimination to encourage the good 
and the valuable [i.e., the liberal] and to discourage the worthless and the bad [i.e., the illiberal]" 
(Raz 1989: 785). From this perspective, political liberalism is not nearly aggressive enough in its 
endorsement, elevation and defence ofliberal values and virtues; it is deficient to the extent that 
it refuses to" take ... [its] own side in an argument" (Neal1994: 26). 
Both cornmunitarians and perfectionist liberals, then, fault political liberals for, in effect, 
failing to acknowledge the importance and necessity of commitments, and argue (for a variety of 
reasons) that political liberalism offers an inadequate solution to the problems of justice and 
stability confronting contemporary liberal democracies. The similarity between cornmunitarianism 
and perfectionism is such that the former has been identified as a version of the latter (e.g., Sher 
1997: 156). Of course, cornmunitarians and perfectionist liberals are not the only critics of the 
concept of political liberalism. Feminists, (neo )Marxists, and postmodernists, for example, have 
also been extremely critical of the concept of political liberalism. 
Despite the diversity of evaluative frameworks-e.g., communitarian, perfectionist, 
feminist, (neo )Marxist, postmodernist-that have been employed to assess the feasibility and 
attractiveness of Rawlsian political liberalism, the end result of these efforts remains an 
unacceptably myopic assessment and understanding of the concept of political liberalism. Though 
6 
Rawls' various critics and supporters have provided a wealth of interesting and insightful analysis, 
and in so doing helped to further define and refine the concept of political liberalism, by 
concentrating overwhelmingly or solely on a single conception of political liberalism, they have 
failed to provide the evaluative scope required to address the idea of a purely political liberalism 
adequately. 
Surely political liberals such as Charles Larmore, Judith Shklar, Bruce Ackerman, and J. 
Donald Moon-to name a few-believe that their conceptions of political liberalism differ in 
important respects from Rawls' paradigm; indeed, all have made such a claim (e.g., Larmore 
1996; Shklar 1989;Ackerman 1994;andMoon 1993).Forexample, while acknowledging that 
his work shares "many of the aims" which animate Rawls' project, Ackerman identifies what he 
considers to be a number of problematic features ofRawls' conception of political liberalism. In 
particular, Ackerman takes issue with Rawls' model of public reason and his use of analytical 
devices such as the veil of ignorance and the notion of a "closed society," and criticizes the weak 
egalitarianism and "parasitic" character ofRawls' conception (Ackerman 1994: 367-75). 
Similarly, though there are certainly a number of obvious parallels between Shklar' s political 
liberalism of fear and Rawlsian political liberalism, Shklar' s conception distances itself from that 
ofRawls in a very significant way: namely, it rejects the search for or possibility of an overlapping 
consensus on a single conception of justice to regulate the basic structure of society. Hence, an 
examination, no matter how detailed, ofRawlsian political liberalism cannot be understood to 
represent a satisfactory analysis of the concept of political liberalism. By neglecting to include in 
their investigations a detailed analysis of other paradigmatic conceptions ofpoliticalliberalism, or 
7 
explaining why such an analysis is unnecessary, previous commentators have, at best, offered only 
a partial critique. 
In order to provide a satisfactory analysis of the concept of political liberalism, one must 
explain why all existing conceptions of political liberalism are unable (if such is the case) either to 
avoid or resolve the problems associated with Rawls' paradigm. Accomplishing such a task 
requires that one extend the scope ofhis analysis beyond that ofRawls' conception, and do so 
in more than merely a referential way. This is not to suggest that an effective critique of the 
concept of political liberalism demands that one conduct a case-by-case analysis of every existing 
conception of political liberalism. Rather, what is being argued is that a satisfactory analysis 
necessitates that one explain why all conceptions that can correctly be identified as models of 
political liberalism are likely to be unable to achieve their stated goal(s ). It is possible to fulfill such 
a condition by analysing a number of paradigmatic conceptions and (reasonably) extending the 
findings of these analyses to all other conceptions that are premised upon the same fundamental 
philosophical and argumentative framework. To date, such an exercise has yet to be completed. 
III. The Thesis 
This thesis has as its task an analysis of the viability of the concept of political liberalism that 
embodies a breadth of scope sufficient to enable it to be considered "satisfactory" in the sense 
described above. This is a project that has engaged my interest and been the focus of my writing 
for a number of years. My ongoing investigation into the viability of the concept of political 
liberalism is recorded in a number of essays and a book (Young 2002). This thesis represents the 
continuing evolution and further refinement of the principal ideas and claims presented in my 
8 
previously published material. The fundamental conclusion of this thesis is that the concept of 
political liberalism suffers from a number of problems that prevent it from achieving its stated 
objective: namely, to provide a conception ofjustice that can resolve the problem of political 
stabilityincontemporarypluralisticdemocracies. Whilethisassertioniscertainlynotnew,itwill 
herein be premised upon an argumentative foundation the scope of which is broader than those 
employed in the past and thus able to offer a more legitimate basis forpassingjudgement on the 
viability of the concept of political liberalism. This study will present an analysis that extends 
beyond the confines ofRawls' texts, and treats with equal concern the work of other prominent 
paradigmatic political liberals. Such an approach, I would suggest, has heretofore been 
inexplicably neglected, or, at best, under-explored and underutilised. 
Though the unquestionable importance and architectonic character ofRawls' work 
necessitates and justifies that it occupy a prominent place in any analysis of the concept of political 
liberalism, a thorough critique requires that other conceptions also be examined in more than a 
cursory or referential manner, and this has yet to be done satisfactorily.12 The majority of 
arguments attacking the viability or attractiveness of the concept of political liberalism have 
generally tended to use analyses ofRawls' conception of political liberalism as the sole or primary 
basis for their conclusions. Among other problems, this myopic approach leaves many previous 
analyses susceptible to being credibly labelled a fallacy of composition or a fallacy ofhasty 
generalisation. 
The goal of this study is both to redress the above noted deficiency and simultaneously 
reveal certain of the significant problems that undermine the very idea of a purely political 
9 
liberalism. This will be done by presenting and critiquing a conception ofpoliticalliberalisrn that 
represents a synthesis of the models developed by three of its principal and most influential 
proponents: namely, John Rawls, Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar, theorists who have 
articulated what are arguably exemplary conceptions of political liberalism. Adopting this 
approach will provide the type of evaluative scope needed to overcome the myopic perspective 
and related problems that have troubled previous analyses. The synthesised conception employed 
in this study will not attempt to incorporate every aspect of each "componenf' conception; rather, 
it will concentrate on generically detailing and aruilysing the essential features of said conceptions. 
It is believed that if it can be shown that such a synthetic concep~on is itself fundamentally flawed, 
then it can reasonably and justifiably be argued that the concept (and not simply different 
individual conceptions) of political liberalism is untenable. 
The thesis will accomplish the above task by directly and indirectly engaging the following 
questions: What, if anything, distinguishes political liberalism from, and makes it superior to, other 
forms ofliberalisrn? (Answering this question reveals the rationale behind the development of a 
purely political liberalism, and thereby helps to explain its potential importance and its value as a 
subject of inquiry.) What are the obvious and underlying noteworthy similarities and differences 
between the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism? What is the significance 
(if any) of these similarities and differences? How, if at all, does the success or failure of the 
synthesised conception under examination affect the viability of the concept of political liberalism? 
And, finally, can the concept ofpoliticalliberalism, either as it has thus far been presented or in 
10 
some modified version thereof, provide the means by which to resolve the problem of political 
stability in contemporary pluralistic societies? 
IV. The Importance of the Thesis 
In confronting the above questions, this study will consolidate and analyse the principal arguments 
contained in much of the primary and secondary literature related to the concept of political 
liberalism; in so doing, it will offer a comprehensive exploration and critique of one of the most 
interesting, provocative and influential contnbutions to modem political philosophy. Relative to the 
existing literature, this inquiry will be unique in that it will embody a substantive examination of a 
number of different conceptions of political liberalism in order to offer a detailed analysis of the 
viability of the conceptofpoliticalliberalism, as opposed to critiquing only a single formulation of 
it, as has thus far been the norm. Though the question of the viability of the concept of political 
liberalism has for years been the topic of extended discourse and debate, there has yet to surface 
an analysis that directly and fulsomely addresses the feasibility and attractiveness of the idea of a 
purely political conception ofliberalism as represented both by Rawlsian and non-Rawlsian 
paradigms.13 Such an analysis is an essential prerequisite to securing a complete understanding of 
the possibilities offered by political liberalism. 
Of course, completing the type of comparative analysis here being proposed will not 
eliminate the need for further study. Indeed, it would be arrogant and foolish to suggest that the 
project of analysing the viability and attractiveness of the concept of political liberalism will ever 
be "finished," either within the confines of this study or elsewhere. Nevertheless, an analysis that 
encompasses the type of scope that is being suggested is useful insofar as it incorporates in a 
11 
significant way previously ignored or under -examined material, and necessary inasmuch as the 
legitimacy of any critique of the concept of political liberalism is a measure of the breadth and 
depth of the associated examination. 
In addition, the topic itself is important for a number of other more "practical" reasons. 
Aside from usefully expanding the scope of the ongoing debate surrounding the viability and 
potential value of the concept of political liberalism, the text also directly addresses the issue of 
political stability, a concern that for centuries has been at the forefront of political philosophy, and 
one that seems to become more prominent and its resolution more urgent with each passing day. 
Evidence to support this last assertion is, unfortunately, all too plentiful. Indeed, with frightening 
regularity the daily news heralds the eruption of new orre-emergent ethnic, cultural and religious 
quarrels. Gradually but continuously, it seems, an ever -greater percentage of the globe is being 
consumed by sociopolitical unrest and upheaval and armed conflict. As Ted Gurr and Barbara 
Harff have noted: 
In 1993, two years after the Cold War ended, twenty-two 'hot' wars were still being fought 
around the world. Communal rivalries and ethnic challenges to states contributed to conflict 
in all but five of these episodes .... The United Nations had thirteen peacekeeping operations 
undetway, the most ever in its fifty-year history, and seven of these were aimed at 
separating the protagonists in communal conflicts (Gurr and Harff 1994: xiii). 
Rather than facilitating a better understanding and greater acceptance of the ethnocultural, 
religious and moral diversity that characterises humanity, the realisation of the "global village'' and 
the increased socioeconomic-political interaction generated by it seem to have further provoked 
and intensified the desire to establish, promote and zealously defend personal, cultural, political, 
and geographical boundaries. As a result, the age-old struggle for power-especially economic 
12 
and political power-and all of the horrors and miseries that accompany it, remains a key feature 
of contemporary life. 
Given the potential consequences of a failure to effectively address the increasing 
sociopolitical tension, conflict, and subsequent political instability generated by the ever-expanding 
diversity that characterises contemporary societies, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that 
the principal concern of political philosophers-to mention only one group-should be the 
development of a viable regulatory framework which holds the promise (or at least the possibility) 
ofbeing able to engender and facilitate the peaceful establishment and maintenance of widespread, 
enduring political stability both in and amongst the plurality of societies that presently inhabit the 
world. If such a framework cannot be developed, it seems increasingly unlikely that the world, at 
least as we currently know it, will survive to witness the end of the new millennium.14 To suggest 
that this is a melodramatic prediction is, I believe, to bury one's head in the sand and wait in 
blissful ignorance for the inevitable calamity. To fail to acknowledge the urgent need to address 
the problems of stability produced by the increasing fragmentation and polarisation ofhumanity 
is to leave a festering infection untreated and suffer the consequences of this neglect. With this 
divinationinmind,thevalueoftheprojectofpoliticalliberalism(andeffortstoanalyseitsviability) 
is clear. 
V. Development of Subject Matter 
The general outline of the remainder of the thesis will be as follows. Chapter two will present a 
brief review of the central characteristics of the liberal outlook. (The chapter will not, however, 
attempt or pretend to offer a detailed description of the evolution ofliberalism and its numerous 
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formulations; such an undertaking is both beyond the scope of this study and unnecessary for its 
purposes.) The purpose of this review is to provide the framework and context for the 
development ofthe concept ofpoliticalliberalism; this information will later make it easier to 
recognise and explain the distinctive traits of the concept of political liberalism. 
Chapter three will briefly explore the relationship between political stability, justice, and 
liberalism. The insights generated by this exploration will help to make clear the rationale behind 
developing a purely political liberalism, and in so doing provide essential background for 
subsequent chapters. 
Chapter four will identify the fundamental features of: and principal claims associated with, 
the concept of political liberalism, as expounded by some of its leading proponents. As previously 
noted, the conception of political liberalism presented will represent a synthesis of a number of 
existing paradigmatic conceptions of political liberalism. Such an approach better enables one to 
critique the concept, as opposed to a single conception, of political liberalism. In describing the 
quintessential characteristics of the concept ofpoliticalliberalism, the chapter will also reveal the 
ways in which political liberalism is said to differ significantly from its spiritual kin, and highlight 
certain of the proposed distinctions between the "component" conceptions used to develop the 
synthetic model under examination. 
Chapter five will examine the notion of reasonableness as it manifests itself in the concept 
ofpoliticalliberalism. Thebeliefthatreasonandnotreligiousdoctrineorsomeothersubjectively 
chosen universal moral code should guide people's decisions is one of the foundational tenets and 
distinguishing characteristics ofliberalism. In tum, the notion of reasonableness-i.e., acting in a 
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manner that would be acceptable to all "reasonable" people-has been an essential component 
of all forms ofliberalism, 15 and is especially important to the idea of a purely political liberalism. 
The concept ofpoliticalliberalism places special demands upon citizens in relation to their capacity 
to act in a reasonable manner. In particular, the obligation that individuals separate the political· 
from the nonpolitical, increases the requirement for reasonability. Citizens must not only be able 
to distinguish the reasonable from the unreasonable, they must also be able to reason correctly as 
to the "proper" demarcation line between the political and the nonpolitical. Given the broad 
definition of''reasonable" that is commonly employed by political hberals, this additional demand 
forces political liberalism to be more reliant upon the presence and appropriate application of 
reasonableness than is the case with other forms of liberalism. 
Chapter six will discuss the significance of the presence and absence of reference to 
political power in the concept of political liberalism, and the importance of this characteristic to 
theviabilityoftheideaofapurelypoliticalconceptionofjustice. Whetherpresentedintheform 
of a concern with limiting government power to prevent the state and its agents from violating 
individuals' rights, or using government power to protect the rights of citizens from the unlawful 
or otherwise unacceptable transgression of these rights by their fellow citizens, the (mis )use of 
political power has traditionally been a central concern ofliberalism. Not surprisingly, this aspect 
ofliberal theory is a fundamental and animating feature of the concept of political liberalism. 
Indeed, it is because the concept of political liberalism is understood to provide a regulatory 
framework that effectively demarcates the acceptable boundaries with respect to the use of 
political power, that it is claimed to be able to resolve the problem of political stability and secure 
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the foundation for a well-ordered pluralistic democracy. By restricting the coercive use of state 
power to the realm of the political, and identifying the purposes for which state power can 
legitimately be employed, the concept ofpoliticalliberalism is said to offer a paradigm that can 
secure the voluntary and reliable support of the adherents of a wide diversity of competing, 
conflicting, and irreconcilable views, and in so doing generate the conditions needed to establish 
and sustain a just and stable society (e.g., Rawls 1993; Larmore 1996). 
Finally, chapter' seven will summarise the principal arguments and conclusions presented 
in the thesis, and offer some general remarks regarding the viability of the concept of political 
liberalism, and the direction in which political theory should proceed if theorists hope to respond 
effectively to the problems identified in this study. 
In its short life, the concept of political liberalism has garnered a substantial amount ofboth 
positive and negative commentary. Indeed, since its emergence, political liberalism has become 
one of the most commented upon developments in modern political theory. The concept of 
political liberalism has been both deified and vilified; presented as a solution to the "modern 
political problematic"-i.e., the problem of developing a conception of justice that will (or even 
can) be freely and willingly endorsed by the adherents of a plurality of conflicting and 
irreconcilable conceptions of the good (Gamwell1996: 7 4)-and an exemplar of all that is wrong 
with contemporary political philosophy. In many ways, the concept ofpoliticalliberalism has 
rearranged the landscape and the vernacular of contemporary political philosophy. Arguably, 
political liberalism now stands as the model against which all new formulations ofliberalism are 
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compared; more importantly, it seems to offer one of the most promising responses to the problem 
of political stability in contemporary ''multicultural, morally pluralist" societies (Moon 1993: ix). 
The idea of a purely political liberalism represents an extremely significant and influential 
contribution to efforts to answer a question that for thousands of years has confronted political 
theorists: namely, how is it possible to secure the conditions needed to establish and sustain a just 
and stable society. As divisive ethnocultural and religious conflict and the violent disintegration of 
nation-states become more commonplace, the resolution of the problem of political stability 
becomes increasingly pressing. Indeed, given the ever-increasing degree of sociopolitical tensions 
and instability that troubles the new world (dis )order, and the potential consequences of this 
instability,itisdi:fficulttoimagineamoreimportantorworthyproject.Itisthisbeliefthatenlivens 
this thesis. 16 
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VI. Addendum-Terminology 
Presented below are a number of terms that appear frequently throughout the thesis. Each term 
is accompanied by a definition and/or an explanation as to how the term is employed in the thesis. 
The purpose of this terminological addendum is to facilitate a clear understanding of the meaning 
of certain terms and the manner in which they are used in the thesis. Given that many of the terms 
listed below are used interchangeably with other terms or in a manner that may differ from their 
common usage, this addendum will help to minimise the likelihood of confusion in relation to the 
precise meaning of said terms and eliminate the need to reiterate such information regularly, 
thereby allowing for fewer interruptions in the text. 
basic liberties: the "institutional rights and duties that entitle citizens to do various things, if they 
wish, and that forbid others to interfere" (Rawls 1993: 325). These liberties include "freedom of 
thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the 
freedoms specified by the liberty and the integrity of the person; and finally, the rights and liberties 
covered by the rule oflaw" (Rawls 1996: 291 ). A political conception of justice is presented as 
the means by which to secure and protect these liberties. 
basic structure: a "society's main political, social, and economic institutions and how they fit 
together into one unified system of social cooperation." F orpoliticalliberals, the basic structure 
is the primary subject of justice (Rawls 1989: 240; 1993: 11, 35). 
civil society: in this thesis the term civil society is used not in the manner in which it is currently 
commonly employed, but rather in its original sense to refer to the notion of an organized 
sociopolitical community with an established system of government. 
conception of justice: a body ofbeliefs/values that guides individuals' understanding of what 
constitutes just treatment. A conception of justice can be either"political" or "comprehensive" in 
character. Whereas a ''political" conception of justice seeks to govern only the character of a 
society's basic structure and the public behaviour ofindividuals-"political" matters-a 
"comprehensive" conception of justice, a conception of justice founded upon a comprehensive 
doctrine, presents a "moral ideal to govern all oflife [i.e., political and nonpolitical matters]" 
(Rawls 1985: 245). The concept of political liberalism represents a political conception of 
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justice. Unless specified otherwise, in this thesis all references to a "conception of justice" should 
be understood as referring to a political conception of justice. 
constitutional essentials: a group of issues with which a political conception of justice is 
properly concerned. Constitutional essentials include matters such as ''who has the right to vote, 
or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls 
1993: 214; see also Larmore 1996: 126; Larmore 1999: 606, n.8). 
fundamental ideas: foundational beliefs that are innate to, and guide the political culture of, a 
society; they comprise a "shared fund" of accepted beliefs and norms. The fundamental ideas 
associated with political liberalism center around the principle of equal respect for all persons 
(MacGilvray 2001: 34), and include ideas such as the notion of persons as free and equal agents. 
liberal democracy: following the lead ofRawls ( 1985: 224-25), the terms liberal democracy, 
democratic regime, and pluralistic society are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. In 
addition, given that liberalism as discussed in the thesis includes constitutionalism as one of its 
fundamental components, references to any of the aforementioned phrases should be understood 
to include this fact. 
man: for the sake of grammatical simplicity, in this thesis thetenn 'man" and its derivatives (e.g., 
his, him, he) are used in the generic sense to refer to both genders. 
neutrality: primarily used to identify the impartiality, and, by extension, fairness, of a conception 
ofjustice. Political liberals commonly distinguish between three different understandings of 
neutrality-namely, procedural neutrality, neutrality of aim, and neutrality of effect or 
influence-and generally argue that a political conception of justice need only secure a certain 
degree of procedural neutrality and neutrality oj aim in order to be considered "neutral" (for 
further elaboration on this point see chapter four [pp.1 02-03]). As Charles Larmore argues, 
though the type of neutrality associated with political liberalism is a "procedural ideal," "it also 
involves a 'neutrality of aim' .... Butitdoesnotimplya 'neutralityofe:ffect"'(Lannore 1996: 126, 
n.6). In essence, a conception of justice is neutral insofar as its adoption is not intended to favor 
any controversial view of the good life. 
nonpolitical: primarily used as an adjective to identify those values that are too controversial to 
secure the free and willing support of all reasonable people-i.e., nonpolitical values. In this 
sense, nonpolitical values are also "politically unreasonable" values because they cannot 
"reasonably" be expected to secure the voluntary support of all reasonable persons, and thus 
cannot successfully serve as the basis for a political conception of justice. Nonpolitical values are 
presented in contradistinction to political values. Whereas nonpolitical values pertain to all aspects 
of one's life, political values are concerned solely with political questions-that is, questions 
concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. 
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political: in the context ofpoliticalliberalism, the political is "a special domain with distinctive 
features" which produce specific values -i.e.,political values (Rawls 1989: 233). "[T]hese 
values govern the basic framework of social life ... and specify the fundamental terms of political 
and social cooperation" (Rawls 1993: 139); they are values "that all citizens can reasonably be 
expected to endorseinlightoftheircommonhumanreason" (Rawls 1993: 140). Examples of 
political values are the values of" equal political and civil liberty; fair equality of opportunity; [and] 
the values of economic reciprocity" (Rawls 1993: 139). 
political conception: presented as an alternative to a comprehensive doctrine. The principal 
difference between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine lies within the scope of 
subjects to which each applies. Whereas a political conception is restricted to "the domain of the 
political" (Rawls 1996: xxxviii, 38), a comprehensive doctrine is one that "applies to all subjects 
and its virtues cover all parts oflife [i.e., political and nonpolitical]" (Rawls 1996: xxxviii, n.4)-it 
is "a moral ideal to govern all oflife" (Rawls 1985: 245). In this thesis, all references to a ''political 
conception" refer to a political conception of justice. According to its proponents, the concept of 
political liberalism represents the idea/political conception of justice. Unless specifically stated 
otherwise, in this thesis the terms political conception and public conception are used 
interchangeably. 
political justice: the idea of political justice addresses the issue of legitimisation-that is, 
justifying the existence and maintenance of a particular set of institutions, relations, and 
arrangements: i.e., a regime. In this thesis, references to ''justice" or "questions of justice" should 
be understood to refer to political justice. Questions of political justice are questions that concern 
constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice. 
primary goods: certain "basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and ... all-pmpose means such 
as income and wealth," that "citizens need as free and equal persons" (Rawls 1993: 180). 
private: in the context of political liberalism, the realm of the private is the realm of the 
nonpolitical and is juxtaposed against the domain of the political. Matters of private concern are 
not considered appropriate matters forregulation by a political conception of justice, as they are 
too numerous and controversial to secure the voluntary support of a majority of the citizenry of 
a contemporary liberal society. 
problem of political stability: unless specifically stated otherwise, all references to ''the 
problem(s) of political stability" should be understood as also referring to the "question of justice'' 
as it is defined in chapter three (pp. 76-79). 
public: in the context ofpoliticalliberalism,public is synonymous with political-both are used 
to denote those things that are of importance to all members of a society. The realm of the public 
is juxtaposed against the realm of the private. Rawls prefers to refer to this dichotomy as one 
between the ''public" and the "nonpublic" (Rawls 1993: 220, n. 7). Unless specifically noted 
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otherwise, in this thesis the terms public conception and political conception are used 
interchangeably. 
public matters: questions of political justice. 
rational: a person is rational insofar as he possesses the capacity to form and pursue a 
conception of the good ( Gamwell1995: 54). A person acts rationally when he uses his "powers 
of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and interests peculiarly ... [his] own" (Rawls 1993: 
50). 
reasonable: in essence, to be reasonable is to have the capacity for a sense of justice (Gam well 
1995: 54). Except where specifically stated otherwise, in this thesis the term "reasonable" is 
employed to encompass both reasonableness and rationality (see above definition). 
regulatory framework: the conception of justice and the basic structure produced by it. 
well-ordered society: the terminology used-originally by Rawls-to refer to a just and stable 
constitutional democracy (Rawls 1996: 35-43). 
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Notes 
1 It remains a source of debate as to whether Hobbes is correctly identified as a liberal. Whereas theorists such 
as Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott, C. B. Macpherson, and Ian Shapiro-to name a few-consider Hobbes 
to be the originator (in one sense or another) of liberalism, Judith Shklar, for one, has argued that it is a gross 
misinterpretation to label Hobbes a liberal (e.g., Shklar 1989; similarly, see Holmes 1995). 
2 This claim is being made in reference to the arguments expounded by Hobbes in his seminal work Leviathan 
(Hobbes 1968). 
3 In order to remain consistent with Hobbes' vocabulary, I have here used only the masculine gender. 
4 The distinction between and corresponding call for the separation of the "public" and the "private" is 
certainly not unique either to "political" or contemporary liberals. As Joseph Raz has noted, "At least since 
Mill propounded the harm principle, liberal political thought has been familiar with arguments that certain true 
beliefs that individuals are justified in relying upon in the conduct of their private affairs may not be relied 
upon by governments" (Raz 1990: 4). Nevertheless, it is in the concept of political liberalism that this argument 
achieves its most powerful and demanding expression and greatest significance (thus far). 
5 The significance of this qualification will become apparent later in this thesis, especially in chapters three 
through six. 
6 A definition for "comprehensive doctrine" is provided in the addendum contained in this chapter (see 
"political conception," p. 20), as well as in chapter four of this thesis. 
7 The timeframe suggested uses the publication of Rawls' "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" 
(1985) as the signal moment for the emergence of the debate. 
8 A good example of this phenomenon is a recently published book entitled The Idea of a Political Liberalism: 
Essays on Rawls (Davion and Wolf 2000). The title and content of this text imply that the concept of political 
liberalism is strictly a Rawlsian invention and project. Of course, given Rawls' personal currency and his 
significant role in introducing, developing and publicising the notion of political liberalism, such a singular 
focus is understandable, if, in certain respects, unfortunate. 
9 Daniel Bell has cautioned: "Those typically put forward as communitarian critics of liberal political 
theory-Alasdair Macintyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer-have yet to identify 
themselves with the 'communitarian movement'" (Bell1993: 4). Indeed, all of the above noted theorists have, 
to varying degrees, expressed discomfort at being labeled a "communitarian" (Etzioni 1998: ix). 
10 It is worth noting that since the publication of Rawls' Political Liberalism, it has increasingly been argued 
that Rawls' later work effectively addresses many (if not all) of the principal complaints put forward by the 
above noted communitarians; however, this is by no means a universally agreed upon fact. Sandel, for one, 
continues to argue that existing conceptions of political liberalism are unacceptably disrespectful or indifferent 
to constitutive attachments such as religion, culture and family, and antithetical to the establishment and 
maintenance of a "true" community (Sandel1996: esp. 3-24). 
11 Admittedly, this criticism has manifested itself in a variety of ways. For a description of some of the different 
types of communitarian criticisms, see Mulhall and Swift ( 1992 ); Bell ( 1993 ); Gutmann (1984 ); Wallach (1987); 
Neal and Paris (1990); and Buchanan (1989). 
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12 I have included the term "satisfactorily" to acknowledge existing studies (few though they may be) that 
have adopted what might be considered a similar approach. A notable candidate in this respect is Michael 
White's Partisan or Neutral? The Futility of Public Political Theory (1997). White's study also engages the 
work of a number of prominent political liberals. However, his approach remains discernibly different from that 
being proposed herein, especially insofar as White's comparative analysis is, I believe, much more particular 
in its scope: that is, it is not equally attentive to each of the paradigmatic conceptions that he discusses. To 
the extent that such is the case, I find White's study "unsatisfactory." 
13 Given the prominence and-some would say unavoidable--influence ofRawls' work, one might be tempted 
to argue that there is no such thing as a "non-Rawlsian" conception of political liberalism; however, such a 
claim is clearly false. Rawls himself concedes as much when he notes that Larmore and Shklar developed their 
conceptions "entirely independently" of his (Rawls 1995: 133, n.l). Thus, though it may be difficult to deny 
completely Rawls' influence, it is, nevertheless, possible to argue credibly that "non-Rawlsian" conceptions 
of political liberalism have been produced. 
14 For example: it has been suggested that the existing moral-political division between the different extremist 
segments of the American population represents "a possible prelude to the outbreak of large-scale political 
conflict" (see Klosko 1996: 26-Klosko is referring to an argument expounded by James Hunter. For a detailed 
explanation of Hunter's argument, see Hunter [1994; 1990]). Admittedly, many dismiss this type of 
doomsaying; however, as the above suggests, there are also those who argue (persuasively?) that such a 
concern is valid. Texts that-to varying degrees-support this line of argument include: Huntington (1996); 
Gurr and Harff(1994); Kaplan (2000); and Kennedy (1993). 
15 This is not to suggest that the notion of reasonableness has possessed either the same meaning or 
importance for all liberal theorists. 
16 Much of the material presented in this chapter has appeared previously in Young (2002). 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE LIBERAL OUTLOOK 
I. Introduction 
The problem of political stability has long been the subject of discourse and debate among political 
theorists; indeed, arguably, it is a topic that is as old as political philosophy itself Nowhere in the 
realm of political philosophy has the problem of political stability achieved greater attention than 
in the field ofhberal political theory. As noted in chapter one, liberalism was originally developed 
and presented as a solution to the problem of political stability in pluralistic societies. In order to 
facilitate a better appreciation of the basis for this claim and its continued assertion, this chapter 
will present a brief review of the central characteristics of the liberal outlook. Such a review will 
help to identify the specific ways in which liberalism is purported to address the problem of 
political stability. Prior to embarking upon the examination ofliberalismthat is the focus of this 
chapter, it will be useful to elaborate briefly on the rationale for engaging in such an exercise. 
Generally speaking, the concept of political liberalism has been received as an idea which 
first emerged as a substantive, cohesive doctrine in the post-A Theory of Justice (Theory) 
writings of John Rawls; insofar as this is true, political liberalism represents a distinctly 
contemporazy development It is also true, however, that at a fundamentalleve~ political liberalism 
is animated by the same beliefs and principles that underlie the many different formulations of 
liberalism that have emerged throughout history; in this respect, political liberalism is merely the 
latest offspring of a philosophical tradition the foundation of which is centuries old Thus, in order 
to gain a proper appreciation of the unique character of political liberalism and the claims being 
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made on its behalf, one must also understand the tradition from which it evolved. The aim of this 
chapter is to facilitate just such an understanding by presenting a brief review of the central 
characteristics of the liberal outlook; in the process of doing so, the general philosophical 
framework and sociopolitical context within which the concept of political liberalism was 
developed will also be revealed. 
Providing such information now will allow the pending examination of the concept of 
political liberalism to proceed without requiring undesirable interruptions or divergences which 
would otherwise be necessary to explain the historical circumstances and philosophical rationale 
underlying the fundamental arguments used to support political liberalism. Moreover, this 
information will later make it easier to recognise and explain the distinctive traits of the concept 
of political liberalism. Enabling such a clarification is necessary if the goal of this study is to be 
realised. Only by providing such information will it be possible to assess effectively the validity of 
political hberals' claims that their approach to the problem ofpolitical stability offers a better hope 
for success than do previously articulated liberal conceptions of justice. 
Differentiating between the notion of a purely political hberalism and liberalism in general 
is necessary in order to understand the motivation behind the development ofpoliticalliberalism, 
and its significance in relation to the liberal project of securing a just and stable society. Though 
political liberalism certainly shares many of the same characteristics that enliven its philosophical 
brethren, its proponents argue that it differs from its predecessors in a very important way: namely, 
it does not seek to offer a moral ideal to govern all aspects of one's life. Rather, it restricts the 
scope of its concern to political matters. In this respect, political liberalism represents an 
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important and distinctive break with all previous formulations ofliberalism. Accordingly, 
understanding only the fundamental arguments associated with liberalism in general would not 
provide the specific information needed to appreciate the uniqueness and importance of the 
concept of political liberalism. Simultaneously, though, only by examining the characteristics of 
''traditional" liberalism can one fully understand the ways in which political liberalism is said to 
differ significantly from its spiritual kin, and the rationale for these differences. 
The following review is not meant to represent an exhaustive or even a detailed 
examination ofliberalism and its numerous formulations; such an exercise exceeds both the scope 
and the requirements of this study. Rather, the purpose of this chapter is only to provide 
background information that will facilitate the examination of the concept of political hberalism that 
will take place later in the thesis. 
II. The Problem of Defming Liberalism 
Defining hbernlism is neither as simple nor as straightforward a task as one might first imagine. This 
is because the fundamental beliefs and values commonly associated with liberalism "are themselves 
complex, open to various interpretations, and people committed to them routinely disagree about 
their interpretations and relative importance" (Kekes 1997: 22). Consequently, in its relatively 
brief existence, liberalism has been presented in a diversity of formulations often conflicting in 
various ways with one another. 
Not surprisingly, then, the term "liberalism" does not lend itself to easy definition. As 
Cindy Holder has remarked," 'Liberalism' is one of those interesting terms which people seem 
to have no problem using yet nothing but problems explaining" (Holder 2000: 64 5); it has been 
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presented and developed as a political tradition, a political philosophy, and a general philosophical 
theory ( Gaus 1996; see also Johnston 1994: 17).1 In each case, liberalism has been characterised 
by an "immense richness and diversity," both in terms of the individuals responsible for its 
development, and the various movements that have emerged within it (Sturgis 19942). Its 
forefathers and champions include some of the most renowned and respected political theorists, 
individuals whose work has in very significant ways shaped the character of modern Western 
political thought. Liberalism has become one of the most celebrated, criticised, influential and 
enduring doctrines to have emerged during the history of political philosophy. 
As Stephen Holmes has noted, "The liberal tradition is difficult to summarize in brief 
compass" (Holmes 1995: 1 ). The character ofliberalism is correspondingly complex. Though all 
"liberal" doctrines can reasonably be said to possess a common heritage, liberalism itself is 
comprised of"separate and often contradictory streams of thought" (Sturgis 1994; see also 
Holmes 1995: 1 ), encompassing argurilents presented over the course of several centuries and 
''reformulated in many different countries in response to dramatically changing problems" (Holmes 
1995: 1 ). The specific focus and goals ofliberal theorists have differed not only across time but 
also across continents and cultures. Consequently, ''The student of ... [political theory] has to deal 
with both liberalism and liberalisms. He must not overlook the mariifold specific features of the 
liberal approach, its variety in different periods and countries" (Bramsted and Melhuish 1978: xviii; 
similarly, see Kekes 1997: 2; Sturgis 1994; and Gaus 1996). The various permutations that have 
emerged arereflected in the numerous adjectives that have been attached to the term ''liberalism," 
including: classical, egalitarian, economic, rights-based, social, welfare-state, ethical, 
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humanist, deontological,perfectionist, democratic, institutional, and so on. The widespread 
and often haphazard use of the tenns "liberal" and ''liberalism" have further increased the difficulty 
associated with articulating a single, coherent and cohesive understanding of the liberal outlook. 
As Judith Shklar has observed: "Overuse and overextension have rendered ... [the term 
liberalism] so amorphous that it can now serve as an all-purpose word, whether of abuse or 
praise" (Shklar 1989:21; similarly, see Johnston 1994: 17; Holmes 1995: xii; Waldron 1993:35-
62; and Kekes 1997). 
Recognising that "liberalism continues to be a field of contest" (Holmes 1995: 2) and any 
attempt to chronicle in detail the numerous qualities that have been attributed to it would require 
far more space than that available within the confines of this study, this chapter will restrict its focus 
to describing briefly those ideas and characteristics typically associated with liberalism and with 
which the concept of political liberalism has been said to have a particular or noteworthy 
relationship. In doing so, the proceeding paragraphs will offer only an interpretation ofliberalism, 
as opposed to providing a definitive definition. However, it is hoped that the interpretation 
provided will sufficiently capture the basic understandings presented by most traditional and 
contemporary visions of liberalism. 
ill. The Roots of Liberalism 
In thepantheonofpolitical philosophy, liberalism is a relative newcomer. Indeed, it has been 
argued thatliberalismisthetheoryofmodernity(e.g., Beiner 1992, 1997; Gray 1995a, 1995b; 
and Larmore 1996V While this is-at least in certain important respects-undeniably true, it is 
also true that "elements of the liberal outlook" have been uncovered in the history of"the ancient 
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world, ... particularly in classical Greece and Rome" (Gray 1995a: xi; see also Sturgis 1994; and 
· Kukathas 1999). A number of ideas familiar to contemporary liberalism were proselytised by 
Sophists, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Democritus. According to John Gray, notions of universal and 
political equality and the idea of a social contract can be found in Sophistic doctrine, while 
Pericles' Funeral Oration contains "a [clear] statement ofliberal egalitarian and individualist 
principles"(Gray 1995a: 4; see also Sturgis 1994), and the"[Roman] LawsoftheTwelveTables 
... embodied important guarantees of individual freedom" (Gray 1995a: 4). Indeed, the seeds of 
liberalism can be traced to "the Hebrew prophets, the teachings of the pre-Socratic philosophers, 
and the Sermon on the Mount" ("Liberalism" 2000). Hence, it is not unreasonable to argue that 
the roots of liberalism run as deep as those ofWestern political thought itself. 
Despite the presence of elements of contemporary liberalism in ancient and pre-modern 
thought, it is generally agreed that it is not until the seventeenth century that liberalism emerges as 
"a political current and an intellectual tradition, an identifiable strand in theory and practice" (Gray 
1995a: xi);4 it is during this period, that one finds, particularly in the works ofThomas Hobbes, 
Benedict de Spinoza, and John Locke, "the first systematic expositions of the modem individualist 
outlook from which the liberal tradition springs" (Gray 1995a: 9). Reacting to the tyranny and 
misery generated by the arbitrary use of state power, and the chaos and grief wrought by years 
of civil wars precipitated and exacerbated by religious and political intolerance and oppression, 
Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke sought to articulate the framework for a society in which all citizens 
could be free from the fear, injustice, suffering and sociopolitical turmoil produced by capricious 
judgments and punishments justified and enforced via the whimsical use of state power-they 
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sought to provide the foundation for a stable and just society. Their efforts would forever change 
the landscape of political philosophy and provide the foundation upon which numerous future 
theorists would construct their own unique visions ofliberalism. 
Though the multitude of doctrines that have been labeled "liberal" are diverse in character, 
there are certain beliefs and values that are, generally speaking, common and central to all such 
doctrines. As John Gray has remarked: ''whereas liberalism has no single, unchanging nature or 
essence, it has a set of distinctive features which exhibits its modernity, and at the same time marks 
it off from other modem intellectual traditions and their associated political movements" (1995a: 
xi; see also Sturgis 1994; and Kukathas 1999). Those beliefs and values most typically associated 
with hberalism include: the beliefinindividualliberty and equality and the importance of individual 
rights; the importance of private property; the idea oflimited constitutional government; and the 
related values of autonomy, consent, pluralism and toleration. It is to a brief elaboration of these 
beliefs and values that I now tum. 
IV. The Primacy of the Individual 
The quintessential feature ofliberalism is the primacy that it assigns to the individual. Protecting 
the individual represents the principal motivation behind the development ofliberalism: ''Basically 
liberalism has been an attitude in defense of the individual man and citizen in defiance of ... 
arbitrary acts" (Bramsted and Melhuish 1978: xvii; see also xviii, 3; similarly, see Kukathas 1999; 
Johnston 1994: 18-21;Raz 1990: 3-46; Gray 1995a;Manent 1995: xvi; andKekes 1997: esp. 
1-22). Unlike its predecessors which had emphasised community and the role of individuals in 
establishing and sustaining an ideal society, liberalism made the needs of the individual the 
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fundamental focus of concern. Not surprisingly, the liberal concern for the individual has been 
expressed in a number of different ways. Hobbes,5 Spinoza, and Locke, for example, argued that 
their respective models ofliberalism were necessary to secure the conditions for self-preservation. 
A man' sability to live life according to Nature's plan, 6 was understood to be dependent upon his 
being provided with certain safeguards that eliminate the need for him to expend all ofhis energy 
trying either to protect or reclaim the resources necessary for his survival. According to theorists 
such as Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke, the most effective way to address this problem is to ensure 
that one's life, liberty and possessions are protected from arbitrary or otherwise unjustified 
violation. 
Such protection is essential because individuals cannot always be trusted to obey the 
"law( s )"of reason. 7 This is a theme that is prominent in the work of many early liberals (and one 
that, explicitly and implicitly, continues to animate the arguments of a number of contemporary 
liberals8). For example, according to Hobbes, man's ''perpetuall and restless desire ofPower after 
power" (Hobbes 1968: 161), coupled with his natural right to use any and all means at his 
disposal to acquire those things that he deems necessary for his preservation-the "Right of 
Nature"-produces a state of"W arre of all against all," in which there can never be any security 
for life, liberty or property, and man's existence can only ever be "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, 
and short" (Hobbes 1968: 186). Spinoza had a similar, if not quite as pessimistic, view of man's 
ability to act according to reason. Spinoza believed that while men could be taught and learn to 
act in a ''reasonable" manner, "All are not naturally conditioned" to do so; ''nay, on the contrary, 
all men are born ignorant, and before they can learn the right way oflife ... , the greater part of 
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their life, even if they have been well brought up, has passed away" (Spinoza 1951 ). 
Consequently, "most human individuals and most societies ... [will] always be ruled by passion 
andillusionratherthanreason"(Gray1995a: 12). ThoughLocke'sviewofhumannaturewasnot 
(at least, not initially) nearly as disturbing or distasteful as either Hobbes' or Spinoza' s, Locke, 
too, believed that man's inclination and willingness to act in an egocentric manner and to ignore 
the "law of Nature" (which is Reason) would eventually make life in the state of nature 
unacceptably uncertain and dangerous.9 
This shared pessimism regarding the likelihood-indeed, inevitability-and severe 
consequences of unreasonable behaviour provided the rationale for early liberals' arguments 
advocating the need to secure a collective protection for one's life, liberty and property. Lacking 
such protection and any surety of reasonable behaviour, men could expect only a war-like 
existence and an untimely (and, in all likelihood, violent) death. 
While the belief that the life, liberty and property of every person deserve and need to be 
protected from arbitrary violation has remained (albeit, not always in the classical liberal 
formulation) a fundamental component ofliberal theorising, beginning most notably with John 
Stuart Mill, and continuing thereafter, liberal theorists have largely abandoned the classical liberal 
emphasis upon the relationship between such protection and self-preservation. Mill and his 
successors have, instead, focused on the fundamental connection between protecting individual 
liberty and property and securing the conditions under which all individuals might be able to realise 
their full potential and pursue a life of their own choosing and design. Generally speaking, from 
Mill onwards, the overwhelming concern ofliberal theory has been that ofidentifying the means 
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by which all individuals can be assured the opportunity to develop their faculties and capabilities 
fully and pursue and (hopefully) realise their own vision of the good life. While it is certainly true 
that such a concern can also be found, to varying degrees, in the theorising of early liberals such 
as Spinoza and Locke, it is also true that it is a concern for these individuals only to the extent that 
its satisfaction is believed to help secure an "acceptable" life and thereby facilitate sociopolitical 
stability, thus ensuring self-preservation. For early liberals, the opportunity for self-development 
is a means to an end (e.g., self-preservation), and not, as it is for modern liberals, 10 an end in itself 
(e.g., self-fulfillment). 
No longer arguing from a hypothetical state of nature in which self-preservation is always 
in doubt, modern liberals shifted their focus away from discussions concerning which natural 
rights must be forsaken or circumscribed in order to ensure man's survival, and instead began to 
concentrate on identifying those hberties that must be secured and protected if all individuals living 
in existing societies were to have the opportunity to achieve their full potential and "make good 
lives for themselves" (Kekes 1997: ix). Contemporary liberals have embraced the approach of 
their modern predecessors and, in many cases, have made it even more of a focal point in their 
theories. 11 Given this new emphasis upon individual rights as the means by which each person 
might realise self-fulfillment, the rights championed by modern and contemporary liberals have 
been those that allow the individual to undertake activities that will facilitate the realisation of a 
freely chosen vision of the good life. This is not to suggest that arguments of this sort are not also 
present in the work of early liberals such as Spinoza and Locke. However, as has already been 
noted, the ability of individual rights to assist individuals in achieving self-fulfillment, at least in its 
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modem understanding, was, to a great extent, a secondary concern for early liberals. The rights 
championed by modern and contemporary liberals include: freedom from the arbitrary violation 
of one's person, liberty and possessions; freedom of conscience; freedom of religion; freedom of 
association; freedom of speech; freedom of movement; and other similar liberties and 
protections.12 The presence of these rights, it is argued, is essential to the realisation of a just and 
stable liberal polity. 
As liberalism has evolved, so too has the liberal understanding of what constitutes 
providing individuals with a real opportunity to realise their visions of the good life. For example, 
while early liberals such as Spinoza and Locke generally believed that securing the means for self-
preservation would, in effect, make possible the realisation of a fulfilling life, a number of modern 
and contemporary liberals have argued that in capitalist, free-market systems, enabling self-
preservation is, by itself, insufficient to ensure a genuine opportunity to pursue and achieve one's 
goals. If one is to offer a truly effective mechanism by which to provide to all individuals the 
opportunity for self-development and the realisation of their aspirations, then it is necessary to 
provide not only the means for self-preservation but also the economic and material resources 
needed to pursue and realise one's conception of the good. "Indeed, one of the demarcation 
criteria for modern as opposed to classical liberalism is the suggestion (made by modern or 
revisionary liberals) that freedom as autonomy presupposes governmental provision of economic 
resources and governmental correction of the market process" (Gray 1995a: 59-60). 
Such differences aside, all liberals agree that ensuring the necessary degree of protection 
for the individual liberties essential for self -development and self-fulfillment, and thereby securing 
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the conditions for a stable and just society, requires establishing certain regulatory and institutional 
arrangements to control undesirable behaviour. 
'V. The Purpose of Government 
For early liberals such as Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, securing adequate protection for life, 
liberty and property requires the establishment of a common and supreme power: a "sovereign" 
authority with jurisdiction over all and the ability to enforce its commands. This conclusion was 
based upon the belief that in the state of nature-the condition in which all men exist prior to or 
in the absence of a commonwealth-all men possess the right to do whatever they deem 
necessary for self-preservation. In effect, this means that all men possess an unrestricted right to 
everything (Hobbes 1968: 190) and ''the libertie to do all they list" in order to ensure their survival 
(Hobbes 1968: 212). Given man's imperfect character and natural inclination toward self-
interested behaviour, it is inevitable that such freedom will be misused. The potential problems and 
subsequent dangers associated with this freedom are exacerbated by the fact that all men are 
equally able to use their power and cunning to acquire those things that they, correctly or 
incorrectly, believe to be necessary for their survival (Hobbes 1968: 183, 190; Locke 1988: 118-
19). Unchecked, such liberty, coupled with man's natural proclivity for egoistic behaviour, cannot 
help but produce an anarchic, chaotic and violent existence in which no man can ever be free from 
threats to his person, liberty or property. 
To escape from this perpetually uncertain and dangerous existence, individuals need to 
establish a common power "able to over-awe them all" (Hobbes 1968: 185). Early liberals argued 
that such a power could be realised only within the framework of a civil society, or 
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commonwealth. Creating a commonwealth is accomplished by voluntarily enacting a social 
contract13 which transfers to a sovereign authority individuals' natural right to undertake those 
activities that threaten another's person, liberty or property. While the precise demands associated 
with this transfer differ according to the particular theorist in question, 14 all early liberals agreed 
that securing the conditions under which a commonwealth can be created requires a certain 
restriction of man's natural right(s). In effecting the necessary restriction, the enactment of the 
social contract brings about not only the establishment of a commonwealth, but also the creation 
of a government (i.e., a sovereign power) whose task it is both to restrict and protect individuals' 
natural rights. In tum, these actions generate the conditions needed to secure and sustain a just and 
stable polity. 
Though early liberals sometimes differed in their understanding of the most desirable or 
appropriate form of government, they all shared one important belief: namely, that any restrictions 
on individuals' natural liberty must be justified. In the case of the establishment of a commonwealth 
and the creation of a government, early liberals argued that the personal security obtained as a 
consequence of these actions justified the associated limitations imposed upon man's natural 
liberty. The requirement that restrictions on individuals' liberty be justified resulted in early liberals 
arguing in favour oflirnited government-an argument that has remained a staple component of 
the liberal outlook. According to theorists such as Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke (among others), 
government's sole purpose was to protect individuals' lives, liberty and property: to extend a 
government's power or duty beyond this function is to restrict man's natural liberty unnecessarily 
and unacceptably. One of the most powerful expressions of the belief in limited government was 
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articulated by Thomas Paine when he argued, "Government even in its best state is a necessary 
evil" (Paine 1776). 
The belief in limited government was accompanied by a support for the rule oflaw. Early 
liberals argued that men's willingness to limit their natural liberty in order to establish and sustain 
a commonwealth and enjoy all the benefits thereof is dependent upon all agreeing to be subjected 
to the same restraints and conditions. Establishing a common law to which all citizens are equally 
subject and a single judge (e.g., a government) to execute said law are the only means by which 
one can satisfy such a caveat. Accordingly, if men's "lives, liberties, and estates" are to be 
effectively secured from unwarranted violation, governmentmust rule by "an established, settled, 
known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and 
the common measure to decide all controversies between [citizens]" (Locke 1988: 180). Only by 
securing such an environment can one be reasonably protected from arbitrary punishment or 
violation. The laws that are to govern the commonwealth are, in effect, all animated by one 
fundamental purpose: namely, ''the preservation of the society and (as far as will consist with the 
public good) of every person in it" (Locke 198 8: 183 ). Only those laws that contribute to the 
realisation of this goal are (or should be considered) justifiable. 
The protection afforded under the rule oflaw was further enhanced by the notion of the 
separation of powers. Passionately, eloquently, and persuasively argued for by theorists such as 
Locke (Two Treatises of Government), Montesquieu (De I 'esprit des loix-The Spirit of the 
Laws), and Madison (The Federalist Papers), the idea of the separation of powers has most 
commonly presented itself in the form of an argument for the distnbution of governmental authority 
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among a legislature, executive, and judiciary. This separation of powers is normally accompanied 
by a system of" checks and balances" to prevent the abuse or usurpation of power by any of the 
aforenoted individual ''branches" of government. Arguably, this approach received its most famous 
expression in the U.S. Constitution. In preventing a concentration of authority, the separation of 
powers helps to ensure individual freedom by precluding the possibility of any individual, group, 
or segment of society controlling the public policy decision-making process. 
Finally, a government's actions will be tempered by the realisation that its failure to 
provide security for its subjects' lives, hberties and property, will result in its removal. Though the 
maintenance of a commonwealth is understood to require that all citizens obey the government, 
citizens always retain the right to depose, by any means necessary-including revolution and, in 
extreme cases, murder15-any government that is unable to fulfill its intended purpose. Any 
attempt by a government to extend its authority or responsibility beyond that accorded to it by the 
founding social contract and articulated in the commonwealth's civil law, represents an 
unacceptable intrusion upon individuals' natural liberty and thereby jeopardises the continuation 
of the commonwealth, thus risking a return to a life of perpetual uncertainty and danger. Should 
such a situation arise, citizens are entitled to remove the offending government; this threat of 
removal, it is argued, helps to protect against the arbitrary violation of individuals' liberty by 
government. 
Modem and contemporary liberals have continued the practice of arguing for limited 
constitutional government.16 However, their justification for this paradigm has often differed from 
that of their predecessors insofar as modem and contemporary liberals have stressed the need for 
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government as a means to ensure that all individuals are provided with the conditions that will 
enable self-fulfillment. To this end, modern and contemporary liberals have emphasised the 
necessity of ensuring the continued presence of and equal access to those rights that will secure 
for all individuals the opportunity to develop fully as persons and to pursue and (hopefully) realise 
their own particular visions of the good life. In doing so, modem and contemporary liberals have 
also argued that the legitimate scope of government's responsibility and authority extends beyond 
the very limited sphere supported by their predecessors. Not surprisingly, then, many modern and 
contemporary liberals' "attitude to the scope of the state, to the responsibility of society for the 
fate of the individual, [has often] differed greatly from that of earlier liberals" (Bramsted and 
Melhuish 1978: 41). 
In response to a rapidly expanding and increasingly complex economy, a number of 
modern and contemporary hberals have argued that the mere formal provision of rights is by itself 
insufficient to afford all individuals an equal opportunity to take full advantage of said rights. 
According to this view, individual rights are, in effect, useless to those lacking the material means 
needed to employ such rights effectively. For example, "a man who possesses nothing but his 
powers oflabour and who has to sell these to a capitalist for a bare daily maintenance, might as 
well, in respect of the ethical purpose which the possession of property should serve, be denied 
rights of property altogether'' (Bramsted and Melhuish 1978: 41 ). The solution to this problem, 
it has been argued, is greater government intervention in the economy to "correct'' some of the ills 
arising from laissezfaire capitalism (Gray 1995a: 59-60). 
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This willingness to argue in favour of an enlargement of the legitimate sphere of 
government concern and authority certainly exceeds the extremely limited notion of government 
expounded by early liberals, and thus represents a noteworthy difference between modern and 
contemporary liberals and their predecessors in regards to how each group approaches the notion 
of individual rights. Whereas early liberals emphasised the "natural" or divine character of 
individual rights, modern and contemporary liberals tend to argue that the rights in question are 
"natural" only to the extent that they represent rights that all free and equal beings deserve and 
require to realise self-fulfillment. By focusing more on the necessary rather than the natural or 
divine character of individual rights, modern and contemporary liberals believe they are justified 
in proposing a greater scope of responsibility and authority for government. Without the argued 
for government intervention, the opportunity for self-realisation will remain beyond the reach of 
certain individuals, and government will thus have failed in its principal task. 
Though early liberals and their successors have differed in their specific understandings 
of the most appropriate or desirable form of government, the particular institutional arrangements 
championed by both groups, and the individual rights protected by these arrangements, are 
manifestations of certain ftm.damental beliefs and values that animate all types ofliberalism. These 
beliefs and values include an affirmation of: the essentiality of individual liberty and equality; the 
importance of private property; and the related notions of consent, pluralism and toleration. 
Though they have been interpreted differently and used to justify a variety of arguments-not 
always complimentary in character-these shared beliefs and values represent a discernible 
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foundation and, indeed, are the wellspring from which all hberal discourse emerges. The remainder 
of this chapter focuses on an elementary examination of these beliefs and values. 
VI. Liberty 
Of those values championed by liberals, none is more prominent than liberty. 17 Like all features 
of the hberal outlook, the notion ofliberty has been presented in numerous fashions. Early liberals 
such as Locke, Adam Smith, and J .S. Mill all championed a liberty understood primarily as 
freedom from the interference of government and one's fellowmen; they argued that all individuals 
should possess the freedom to develop and pursue their own distinctive ends without fear of their 
efforts being stymied unjustifiably by others. This belief was powerfully and eloquently expressed 
in Mill's On Liberty. As Mill argued, ''The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of 
pursuing our own good in our own way" (Mil11993: 81 ). This was not, however, meant to be an 
unrestricted liberty: one's freedom extended only to the point at which it collided with another's. 
That is to say, an individual should be granted only as much personal liberty as is compatible with 
a like liberty for all others. This limitation was famously captured in Mill's ''harm principle," which 
states: "Acts, of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and 
in more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, 
when needful, by the active interference of mankind" (Mill 1962: 184). 
Mill was influenced by, among others, theorists such as William von Humboldt and 
Benjamin Constant. Humboldt had argued that individual freedom and a variety of experiences 
were necessary prerequisites to the fullest realisation of one's self-development (the idea of 
Bildung)-the proper end of all men (Humboldt 1993: 340). According to Humboldt, "The true 
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end ofMan, or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and not 
suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most hannonious development ofhis 
powers to a complete and consistent whole" (Humboldt 1993: 1 0). Constant advocated "liberty 
in everything, in religion, philosophy, literature, industry, politics" (Constant 1829: vi). He 
understood liberty as ''the triumph of individuality-as much over the authority that would govern 
through despotism as over the masses who claim the right to enslave the minority under the 
majority" (Constant 1829: vi). 
Constant is, perhaps, best remembered for his distinction between the "liberties of the 
ancients" and the "liberties of the modems." According to Constant, this distinction is one between 
the Rousseauian understanding ofliberty as "the collective but direct exercise of many of the 
privileges of sovereignty, deliberating upon the public welfare, upon war and peace, voting upon 
laws, pronouncing judgment, examining accounts and so forth'' (the ancient conception ofliberty), 
and the Lockean understanding ofliberty as "everyman's right to be subject to the law alone, the 
right of not being arrested, tried, or put to death or in any way molested, by the caprice of one or 
more individuals" (the modern conception ofliberty) (Gray 1995a: 21 ). The ancients' conception 
ofliberty allowed the subordination of the individual to the authority of the community: an 
individual is sovereign in public affairs, but a subject in private affairs. Conversely, under the 
modern conception ofliberty, a citizen is sovereign in the private realm, but, in many respects, a 
subject in the public realm. Constant argued that the evolution of man involved a progression from 
the ancient to the modern conception ofliberty. More recently, John Rawls has argued that it is 
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the continuing tension between ancient liberties and modem liberties that must be resolved if we 
are ever to achieve a just and stable liberal democracy (e.g., Rawls 1985: 227). 
In the twentieth century, Constant's dichotomy was eloquently repackaged by Isaiah 
Berlin. Berlin suggested that liberty is best understood as either negative or positive. According 
to Berlin, negative liberty is, in essence, the freedom from coercion. For Berlin, "Coercion is not, 
however, a tenn that covers every form of inability. Ifl say that I am unable to jump more than 
ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind ... it would be eccentric to say that I am to 
that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human 
beings within the area in which I could otherwise acf' (Berlin 1969: 122). One can be considered 
"free to the degree to which no man or body of men (is able to] interfere ... with [his] activity .... 
Ifl am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree" 
(Berlin 1969: 122). Positive liberty is freedom as "the rational self-government of the individual 
agent" (Gray 1995a: 57), someone who is ruled according to his own will, not that of others. This 
understanding ofliberty acknowledges that one's freedom can be restricted by means other than 
"external" coercion-an individual can be equally constrained or impeded by "factors internal to 
the agent himself' (Gray 1995a: 58). It is this conceptoflibertythat is inherent in theideaofthe 
autonomous individual, "one of the key notions of the liberal tradition" (Gray 1995a: 58). Indeed, 
it has been argued that liberalism assigns pride of place above all else to individual autonomy: 
liberalism considers autonomy to be the most important prerequisite to creating the "conditions 
in which individuals can make good lives for themselves" (Kekes 1997: ix; see also 15-16).18 
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The idea ofliberty as autonomy was first championed in the work ofSpinoza and is a 
central feature ofKantian hberalism. Spinoza argued that "self-direction is the essence of freedom" 
(Arblaster 1984: 143): ''Thatthingissaidto beFREEwhichexistsbythemerenecessityofits 
own nature and is determined in its actions by itself alone" (quoted in Arb laster 1984: 143). 
Hence, autonomy is a prerequisite to liberty. Similarly, Kant maintained that only by being 
completely free to make one's own decisions can a person have the opportunity to achieve true 
hberty and realise all the benefits thereof Such freedom, Kant argued, demands that all individuals 
accept that, ''man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a 
means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself 
or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end" (Kant 1785, 
emphasis in original). Individual autonomy and liberty thus require that the state guarantee its 
citizens the right to make their own decisions about how to live, that it ensure equal concern and 
respect for their choices, and that it provide the means needed to realise their goals. Only by 
assuring such conditions can individuals experience true autonomy and thereby achieve the 
greatest degree of individual liberty. This notion ofliberty continues to inform the work of 
contemporary liberal theorists such as Gerald Dworkin (1988) and Joseph Raz (1986). 
Liberals' definitions of the requirements of"true" hberty have also been influenced by their 
understanding of the proper relationship between liberty and democracy. Liberals have recognised 
both the connection and the tension between individual liberty and democracy. If an individual is 
excluded from the political decision-making process, he is thereby, in effect, rendered impotent 
in terms ofhis ability to influence governmental policy and practices. In such circumstances, the 
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individual's liberty is violated to the degree that he is precluded from participating in the 
development of those public policies and practices to which he will be subject. 
As liberal theory evolved and liberals began to argue for greater political equality in the 
form of expanded suffrage, they recognised that in societies employing democratic systems of 
government, the political decision-making process was extremely vulnerable to subversion by the 
majority will. Though this fear had emerged in the writings of early liberals such as Locke and 
Constant, and would constitute an important component ofMill' s On Liberty, it received its most 
eloquent presentation in Alexis de Tocqueville's magisterial Democracy in America. In 
Democracy in America, Tocqueville emphasises the potential for democratic equality in practice 
to produce a tyranny of the majority, and the subsequent need to pay particular attention to 
protecting the liberty of minorities from transgression by the majority. He argues that liberty is a 
fundamental component oflife: it is, he declares, "a sacred thing" and the "greatest of all goods" 
(quoted in Lively 1962: 13, 20). Accordingly, all individuals should be guaranteed "an area of 
activity free from the intrusion of others whether these others are private individuals or public 
authorities, an area in which the individual can make decisions, follow wishes, exercise choices 
without being impeded by any alien will" (Lively 1962: 221 ). Without proper safeguards for 
individual choice, the liberty of minorities would be constantly at risk ofbeing circumscribed or 
suppressed by majorities. 
Successive generations ofliberals have expanded upon and modified in important ways 
the notion ofliberty expounded by their predecessors. In particular, many contemporary liberals 
have argued that freedom as autonomy presupposes not only the formal liberty to act, but also the 
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material resources needed to act effectively. An example of this type of argument is as follows: 
In order to ensure that all individuals who wish to pursue a university education have the 
opportunity to do so, it is necessary to ensure that all have access to the financial resources 
needed to support such an endeavour. In essence, then, a liberty is a true liberty only if it is 
accompanied by the means needed to operationalise it. This beliefhas led some theorists to argue 
in favour of"governmental provision of economic resources and governmental correction of the 
market process" (Gray 1995a: 59-60). The idea that there is a fundamental connection between 
resources in the form of personal property and individual liberty is, of course, not unique to the 
theorising of contemporary liberals; indeed, at least since Locke, it has been a prominent feature 
of the liberal outlook. 
VII. Private Property 
One of the most influential and enduring notions associated with liberalism is the belief that private 
property and individual liberty are inseparable. Arguably, it is Locke who first emphasised the 
connection between individual liberty and the right to private property (Gray, 1995a: 14). For 
Locke, individual liberty is dependent upon the existence of private property that is securely 
· protected under the rule oflaw. This conclusion is premised upon the following argument: 
"property" consists of not only one's material possessions, but also one's person-" every man 
has a 'property' in his own 'person' "(Locke 1988: 130). Hence, protecting one's "property" 
includes safeguarding not only one's possessions but also one's life and personal freedom of 
action. By providing for the existence of private property19 that is securely protected under the 
rule of law, one enables individuals to obtain not only the material means which prevent 
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dependence upon others for one's survival, but also the protection from unjustified violation of 
one's personal freedom, a protection that makes possible the full development of one's faculties 
and abilities and the pursuit of one's conception of the good. Without such security for one's 
person and possessions, individual liberty is, in essence, worthless. This argwnentrepresents one 
of the defining characteristics ofliberalism. According to John Gray, "it is this insight which 
embodies Locke's greatest contribution to liberalism" (Gray 1995a: 14). In his On Property, 
James Madison echoed Locke's argmnent and proclaimed that every man ''has an equal property 
in the free use ofhis faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them. In a word, 
man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights" 
(Madison 1953: 267). 
For classical liberals, a commitment to individual liberty (and, by extension, private 
property) logically entails an endorsement of a free market. A free market facilitates man's 
realisation of the greatest degree ofindividualliberty.lndeed, a free market is said to be essential 
to true liberty. The most powerful expression of this belief can be found in Adam Smith's 
monumentallnquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations. In essence, Smith 
argues that the realisation of man's full potential requires that he be allow~ to follow his natural 
self-interest without undue interference in any sphere oflife. Smith advocated a "system of natural 
liberty" in which "[e ]very man, as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly 
free to pursue his own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into 
competitionwiththoseofanyotherman,ororderofmen" (Smith 1993: 391). Suchasystemis 
characterised by a free market and a limited constitutional government. A free market is 
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necessary, Smith claimed, because there is a direct relationship between a society's economic 
system and its political system. According to Smith, personal and political liberty must be 
accompanied by economic liberty if one is to provide the type of freedom of action that will enable 
the realisation of the full potential of not only particular individuals, but also of society and, indeed, 
of mankind. 
Under a system of natural liberty the market would be guided by an ''invisible hand" that 
would ensure that the consequences of the unfettered pursuit of self-interests benefited society in 
generaL Smith maintained that, ''without any intervention oflaw, ... the private interests and 
passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society, among all 
the different employments carried on in it, as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most 
agreeable to the interest of the whole society" (Smith 1776; see also Smith 1993: xxxvii). Thus, 
men's pursuit of their own betterment would, if only incidentally, promote the interests of others: 
''the self-interested individual unintentionally maximizes the wealth of society for all its members" 
(Smith 1993: xxxvii).Indeed, an individual, ''Bypursuinghisowninterest ... frequently promotes 
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it" (Smith 1993: 292; 
similarly, see 289). Conversely, the benefits to be achieved by granting personal and political 
liberty are significantly retarded if a comparable liberty is not extended to the sphere of economic 
activity. 
The connection between property and liberty has also manifested itself in another 
important way in hberal thought: namely, it has been argued that the rightto private property helps 
to protect individual liberty by ensuring the decentralisation of public decision-making power. A 
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universal right to private property is said to offer an effective mechanism against the concentration 
of power via the control of resources. Providing to all individuals the right to acquire private 
property and enjoy all of its associated benefits allows for the extensive distribution of wealth and 
other resources and thereby helps to prevent widespread dependency on and subservience to a 
single individual or group(s) of individuals (including the government). In doing so, one helps to 
safeguard individual hberty by limiting the ability of individuals to make others so reliant upon them 
that they are able to coerce support for specific public policies or initiatives. 
A number of contemporary liberals have criticised the classical liberal understanding of 
private property, arguing that private property can also be an impediment to individual liberty 
(e.g., Freeden 1978; Gaus 1983, 1994). In particular, ithasbeennoted thattheinabilitytoobtain 
private property can prevent individuals from having the means needed to pursue their goals, and 
exclude them from effectively participating in the public policy decision-making process. From this 
perspective, the classical liberal emphasis on private property and the free market system renders 
individual liberty impotent or merely formal for those who are not propertied. The proposed 
solution to this problem is to expand the scope of government concern to include the economy and 
the distribution of resources. According to this line of argument, "Equality, rights and distributive 
justice must ... be extended to protect not just freedom but also the conditions required for its 
exercise" (Kekes 1997: 13); this approach necessitates ''that individuals ... be guaranteed certain 
basic goods that are needed for living according to any conception of a good life" (Kekes 1997: 
13). 
Though classical and contemporary liberals' understanding of the relationship between 
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liberty and property may differ in certain respects, both groups-indeed, all liberals-agree that 
all men possess an equal right to private property understood as one's life, liberty and 
possessions. 
Vlll. Equality 
Like liberty, equality has been a fundamental feature of the liberal outlook. All forms ofliberalism 
assume that, at least in some important respects, all men are equal. For early liberals, it is men's 
natural equality in terms of each individual's ability to injure or otherwise harm another-in 
conjunction with certain environmental circumstances and innate predispositions--that precipitates 
the need for a collective security for one's life, liberty and possessions, and thus necessitates the 
establishment of government. This belief( albeit, often in a slightly modified version) continues to 
be an animating feature ofliberal theorising. Though liberal theorists' understanding of the source 
and character of man's equality has differed with the passage of time, the belief that all men are 
in some significant sense( s) inherently equal has remained a cornerstone of the liberal outlook. In 
arguing that all men are "naturally" equal, it is not meant that all men are equal in every respect or 
in all capacities. Rather, what is being suggested is that all men are equal in the sense of possessing 
an equal right to their "freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man" 
(Locke 1988: 142). Because all men are said to possess the same natural rights, all are considered 
deserving of equal liberty and protection. This fact necessitates that all men be recognised as 
equal under the law and equally subject to the law. 
In essence, hberalism deems equality to be essential for true liberty: only if all individuals 
are considered equal will all be accorded the same respect and afforded the same opportunities. 
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However, as has been the case with respect to other features ofliberalism, liberal theorists' 
understanding of the proper sphere and subsequent requirements of man's equality has changed 
over time. For example, though classical liberals argued for equality before the law, they were, 
generally speaking, certainly not overly concerned with achieving social, economic or political 
equality. It is onlyrelativelyrecently-beginningmost notably with Mill-that liberal theorising has 
been characterised by arguments championing goals such as political equality in the form of 
universal suffrage. As for socioeconomic equality, liberals remain divided as to whether this is an 
area that is properly the concern of government. Whereas contemporary liberal theorists such as 
Robert Nozicl2° continue to argue for a Lockean style equality, others, such as John Rawls, assert 
the need to ensure that all individuals possess not only equality under the law, but also the ''primazy 
goods" that will assure them the resources they require to pursue and (hopefully) realise their 
respective conceptions of the good. 
Whether it is presented as divine in character, the consequence of desert, or necessitated 
by utility, and regardless of the requirements attached to it, equality is an essential component of 
all forms ofliberalism. And together with the notions ofliberty and property, the liberal affirmation 
of equality provides the basis for and justifies the liberal belief in consent. Man's innate equality 
in terms of the value of each individual's life and liberty makes the legitimacy of any action 
dependent upon the consent of those affected. If all men are to be treated equally, then each must 
be given an identical opportunity to comment upon any public proposal, and everyman's opinion 
must be accorded an equal weight in regards to the decision-making process. 
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IX. Consent 
The liberal understanding ofliberty and equality is inextricably intertwined with the notion of 
consent. For liberals, individual liberty and equality requires consent fu particular, this means that 
a man's property-in all senses thus far identified~ot legally be violated without his consent. 
As Locke argued: "For I have truly no property in thatwhich another can by right take from me 
when he pleases against my consent" (Locke 1988: 188). In relation to the legitimacy of 
government, realising the liberal notions ofindividualliberty and equality demands that the 
institutional arrangements that regulate citizens' behaviour are those to which each citizen has 
voluntarily agreed to be subjected; such an agreement can manifest itself in a number of different 
ways. For example, for social contract theorists this agreement is presented in the form of a 
hypothetical: a particular paradigm is justified provided that it can reasonably be assumed that 
individuals confronted with certain circumstances would choose it rather than other possible 
options. Nevertheless, only under such an agreement can the hberty provided be claimed to secure 
the appropriate degree of personal freedom and equality. Furthermore, only a government that 
operates with the free and willing consent of its subjects can be considered legitimate. The 
assumption is that individuals will only voluntarily consent to be governed by an institutional 
framework that recognises the validity of, and accords the proper degree of respect to, their 
particular conception ofthe good and its associated values and beliefs. By requiring that each 
individual consent to the proposed or existing system of government, hberalism protects individual 
liberty and ensures that the views of each individual are accorded an equal respect and value. 
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Recognising the impracticality of making the legitimacy of a given government conditional 
upon all citizens expressly proclaiming their willingness to obey its dictates, liberals generally 
suggest that one's consent may be either explicit or tacit. Typically, one is considered to have 
tacitly consented to be subject to the dictates of a given government so long as one remains a 
resident of the society in question and continues to enjoy the benefits thereof. The architectonic 
statement in this respect is Locke's: "every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part 
of the dominions of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged 
to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it" (Locke 
1988: 177). A number of contemporary liberal theorists, including John Rawls, David Gauthier 
and Jiirgen Habermas (among others), have suggested that a proposed system of government can 
be considered legitimate provided it could reasonably be expected that under specific (e.g., ideal) 
circumstances it would be agreed to by individuals who possess certain qualities. 
Implicitwithinthehberalnotionofconsentistheprincipleofuniversality, which,according 
to Kant, requires that "our social and political relations ... be governed and our public conflicts 
settledinauniversalmanner"(Kant1970:20}-thatis,inamannerthatwouldbeacceptableto 
all free and equal persons. By definition, any system that does not satisfy the criterion of 
universality must exclude from its sphere of consideration certain individuals and their beliefs and 
in so doing neglect to exhibit a uniform concern and respect for all individuals and thus fail to treat 
all individuals equally. Such exclusion and the resulting unequal treatment often manifest itself in 
the form of a diminished individual liberty, and thereby restricts the ability of the affected 
individuals to realise their full potential and live personally satisfying lives. Hence, consent premised 
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upon the principle of universality is an essential component and condition of the liberal notions of 
individual liberty and equality. 
With minor variations, the above understanding of the nature and role of consent has been 
a fundamental feature ofliberalism since its emergence. The importance that liberalism assigns to 
the notion of consent is a direct consequence of the liberal belief in pluralism. 
X. Pluralism 
The notion of pluralism has played a significant role in the development ofliberalism. As already 
noted, liberalism emerged as a response to religious pluralism and the violence and misery that 
accompanied efforts to suppress and eradicate "offensive" or "sacrilegious" beliefs. Generally 
speaking, liberalism defines pluralism as the recognition that there will always be a diversity of 
conflicting, irreconcilable and incommensurable values and conceptions of the good life.21 Such 
diversity and conflict is assumed to be "an intrinsic, irremovable element in human life" (Berlin 
1969: 167). Pluralism is juxtaposed against monism, or the belief"in the discoverability and 
harmony of objectively true ends, true for all men, at all times and places" (Berlin 1990: 211 }-a 
belief that guided political theorising prior to the emergence of liberalism. 
Liberalism has always presumed the presence of a plurality of existing political and 
religious opinions. The liberty and equality championed by liberalism, and the consent considered 
essential to the preservation of this liberty and equality, are necessary, liberals argue, because of 
the equal inherent worth of each individual, and the fact of pluralism. Liberalism is particularly 
concerned with value pluralism, or the belief that "the ends of men are many, and not all of them 
are in principle compatible with each other'' (Berlin 1969: 168-69). Given that individuals will 
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inevitably and perpetually support a diversity of competing and often conflicting and 
incommensurable values and conceptions of the good, individual liberty and equality are necessary 
if all persons are to be given an equal opportunity to pursue a life of their own choosing and design 
and thereby realise self-fulfillment. 
Mill'sOnLibertyremainsoneofthemostpowerfuldefensesofpluralism.Millargues 
forcefully for the existence of a plurality of attitudes and opinions. He concludes that "[i]f all 
mankind minus one were of the opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, 
mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, ifhe had the power, 
would be justified in silencing mankind" (Mill1993: 85). Mill contends that without freedom of 
thought and freedom of expression, individuality and self -development are detrimentally stymied, 
practice becomes based upon "dead" doctrines, and progress ends. Liberals have also argued that 
accepting pluralism helps to protect individual liberty in much the same way as do limited 
government and the right to private property: namely, by impeding the concentration of power. 
This argument is premised upon the belief that "a state marked by homogeneity would also turn 
outto be one whose power was most difficultto limit" (Kukathas 1999). By enabling the presence 
and public affirmation of a plurality of competing values and conceptions of the good, one helps 
to ensure the dispersion of power by requiring that the government of the day respond to a 
diversity of often conflicting interests. In this sense, as Lord Acton noted, " 'Liberty provokes 
diversity, and diversity preserves liberty' "(quoted in Kukathas 1999). 
Rather than trying to identify a way in which the diversity of opinions and beliefs might be 
transformed into a unified whole or a more harmonious amalgam in which the interests of society 
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and those of the individual converge and support one another-as had been the goal of its 
predecessors-liberalism accepts that such a unity is unachievable because of the natural and 
ineliminableplurality ofhuman beliefs. Accordingly, with respect to the difficulties posed by 
pluralism, the goal ofliberalism has not been to secure a homogeneity of cultural, or religious, or 
moral beliefs, but rather to develop a governance framework that can achieve and preserve a 
sociopolitical order within which conflict between competing beliefs is minimised and tempered, 
and the inevitable plurality of views is "allowed to co-exist, if not flourish" (Kukathas 1999). If this 
goal is to be achieved, then individuals must be willing to accept the right of others to affirm beliefs 
and values that conflict with their own, and to pursue conceptions of the good with which they 
disagree. Individuals must, in other words, affirm the value of toleration. 
XI. Toleration 
"[l]n the liberal ethos of the last three centuries, ... [toleration] has been hailed as one of the 
fundamental political and ethical values" (Heyd 1996: 3). The liberal concern with and support for 
toleration is a consequence of the hbernl affirmation of pluralism. Because individuals will inevitably 
affirm different and often conflicting viewpoints, individual liberty and self-fulilllment require that 
all persons exhibit tolerance toward those ideas and pursuits that they find disagreeable. The 
contemporary liberal doctrine of toleration has its roots in early liberals' arguments for religious 
tolerance. Spinoza, for example, proclaimed that "the life of the free and intelligent man, in which 
alone happiness is to be found, must be for ever unattainable, unless men ... [can] be persuaded 
of the stupiditY of religious persecution and ideological wars" (Hampshire 1953: 178). Arguably, 
it is in Locke' sLetters on Toleration that one finds the fust substantive-and, what remains to 
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this day, one of the most vigorous-apologias fortoleration.22 According to Locke, "one man 
does not violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of worship, nor 
is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs, therefore, the care of each man's salvation 
belongs only to himself' (Locke 1689). There is, then, neither a reasonable nor a rational reason 
for intolerance, at least with respect to individual beliefs. 
The principle of toleration is also fundamental to the theories ofKant and Mill. Both 
argued that as society may (and in all likelihood will) contain a number of different conceptions 
of the good, citizens should be allowed to pursue their chosen ends without interference from the 
state or other citizens. Only by providing such freedom can one secure the conditions required for 
self-development and self-realisation and thereby afford each individual the respect that he 
deserves as a free and equal agent. It is worth noting, however, that, relative to the contemporary 
liberal understanding of toleration, early liberal arguments for toleration were often notably limited 
in their scope. Arguably, this is in large part a function of the different character of the societies 
in which early liberals lived. For example, while both Kant and Mill expressed an overwhelming 
theoretical concern for the toleration of diversity, the practical reality of their circumstances 
demanded far less toleration than was advocated by either theorist. The societies in which Kant 
and Mill wrote were largely homogeneous in terms of ethical and religious beliefs and therefore 
could satisfy with relative ease the demands of state neutrality inherent in both theorists' 
conceptions of toleration. 
However, the same cannot be said of contemporary liberal democracies. With the 
progression of time and the evolution ofliberal societies, the number and increasing diversity of 
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competing conceptions of the good that a single conception ofjusticemust try to accommodate 
has multiplied to a degree which Kant and Mill could not have foreseen. Subsequently, liberal 
theorists have modified the doctrines ofKant and Mill in an effort to produce conceptions of 
justice which incorporate the increased degree of toleration required to better accommodate 
present-dayrealities. This has resulted in the original focus on religious toleration being expanded 
to encompass moral and philosophical beliefs as well. The scope of concern has also been 
enlarged to incorporate inter- as well as intra-societal toleration. 23 Though the rationale for 
supportingtolerationhasattimesdiffered-e.g.,itisessentialtorealisetrueindividualliberty;each 
human is deserving of it; it is justified because it is impossible to know the "truth"-generally 
speaking, all forms ofliberalism share the belief that toleration "does not require any weakening 
of certainty, confidence, or commitment to ... one's own beliefs and values" (Heyd 1996: 15). The 
defense of toleration continues to be a primary concern for a number ofliberal theorists, and, in 
various forms, a fundamental component of all liberal conceptions of justice. 
XII. Concluding Remarks 
Admittedly, the above review offers only a cursory foray into the character ofliberal thought; it 
does not do justice to either the individual theorists or the collective history and complexity of 
liberalism. However, for the purposes of this study, the above examination provides a sufficient 
survey of some of the principal ideas that animate and underpin the liberal outlook. 
As the information presented in this chapter suggests, the character ofliberalism is 
multifaceted and impossible to define in a manner that would be acceptable to all those who have 
either been labeled or consider themselves to be a "liberal." Both as a political practice and a 
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philosophical approach, liberalism has been championed by many whose views often conflict 
significantly with one another. Despite these facts, there are certain fundamental beliefs that inform 
the work of all liberal theorists, and together these beliefs can be said to constitute a common, 
substantive liberal framework. In brief, these core elements are a belief in: individual liberty and 
equality; individual rights; the importance of private property; the idea oflimited constitutional 
government; and the related values of autonomy, consent, pluralism and toleration. All of these 
beliefs and values are affirmed-albeit, to differing degrees and in various forms-by all liberals. 
Simultaneously, though, the differences (actual or perceived) between the various formulations of 
liberalism that have emerged are often, correctly or incorrectly, considered important, especially 
in relation to the perceived ability of the liberalism in question to address effectively the 
sociopolitical problems that frequently accompany the practical implementation ofliberal beliefs. 
Such is certainly the case with respect to the differences that are said to distinguish political 
liberalism from other types ofliberalism. While both acknowledging and, in certain respects, 
emphasising their debt to their doctrinal ancestors, political liberals have, nevertheless, argued that 
only political liberalism offers the means by which to secure the conditions that will enable the 
establishment and maintenance of a just and stable liberal democracy. 
In order to understand fully the basis for such a claim and the logic underlying the 
development of a purelypoliticalliberalism, one needs to be cognisant of the relationship between 
political stability,justice, and liberalism. Only by analysing the conclusions ofpoliticalliberals in 
the context ofthe continuing search for a just and politically stable regime can one gain a full 
appreciation of the logic of political liberalism. Though the information provided in this chapter 
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offers glimpses into the relationship between political stability,justice, and liberalism, stating the 
precise nature of the relationship in a more direct manner will help to clarify the rationale behind 
political liberalism. Accordingly, the next chapter will present a brief review of the the relationship 
between political stability, justice, and liberalism, and in so doing help to provide for a clear 
understanding of the motivation behind the development of a purely political liberalism. 24 
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Notes 
1 Of course, different theorists have presented variations of this taxonomy. For example, Ronald Beiner has 
suggested that it is possible to "distinguish three broad senses of the term 'liberalism': (1) liberalism as a 
political doctrine ... ; (2) liberalism as a social order ... ; and (3) liberalism as a philosophical ranking of 
priorities" (Beiner 1997: 5). 
2 Given that HyperText Markup Language (HTML) documents accessed via the internet do not, technically 
speaking, contain page "breaks," it should be noted that for the purposes of this thesis, citations for direct 
quotations extracted from such documents will make reference to only the author and the year, and not to 
specific page numbers. 
3 This is not to suggest that all theorists agree with this characterisation (e.g., Shklar 1989: 21). At the very 
least, however, liberalism as a philosophical approach achieved a hegemonic status in the twentieth century. 
4 According to Friedrich Hayek, the term "liberal" first appeared in the writing of Adam Smith (Hayek 1960: 
408). Of particular note in this respect is Smith's statement regarding the need to allow every man "to pursue 
his own interest his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice" (Smith 1993: 380, emphasis 
added). However, it was not until the nineteenth century that the label "liberal" was used to refer to a political 
movement, "when in 1812 it was adopted by the Spanish party ofLiberales" (Gray 199 Sa: xi; see also Bramsted 
and Melhuish 1978: 3). 
5 As previously noted (p. 22, n.1), it remains a source of debate as to whether Hobbes is correctly identified 
as a liberal. 
6 I am here referring to Hobbes' remark concerning the ability of "any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) 
ofliving out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live" (Hobbes 1968: 190). 
7 By " 'law( s)' of reason" I am referring to what many classical liberals identified as the "law( s) ofNature." To 
use an illustration from Locke: "The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, ... and reason, which is 
that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions" (Locke 1988: 119; see also 120, 131, 143; and Hobbes 
1968: 189-190, 205). 
8 While arguments concerning humans' inability or refusal to obey the "law(s)" of reason have basically 
disappeared from liberal theorising, the underlying sentiment of such arguments-i.e., the belief that 
individuals cannot always be counted on to act in a "reasonable" manner-remains a notable feature of 
contemporary liberal discourse. 
9 I have used the term initially because I believe that while Locke begins by presenting the state of nature as 
one of relative peace and harmony, it becomes clear that by the time men believe it necessary to join together 
to form a commonwealth, the state of nature has degenerated into a Hobbesian-like existence of perpetual 
insecurity and danger. As Locke argues, a peaceful and harmonious state of nature is short-lived (Locke 1988: 
180). The state of nature quickly degenerates into an existence "full of fears and continual dangers." So much 
so, that one's continued enjoyment of his person, liberty and possessions "is very uncertain and constantly 
exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part 
no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very 
insecure" (Locke 1988: 179). 
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1° For the purposes of this study, "modern" liberals are those who wrote between the years of 1851 and 1950 
(Bramsted and Melhuish 1978: 36), while "contemporary" liberals are those who wrote after 1950. Though, 
technically speaking, Mill falls into the former category, it remains a matter of debate as to whether he is more 
correctly identified as a "modern" or a "classical" liberal. As John Gray has argued: "Whereas Mill never 
altogether abandoned the classical liberal commitment [to individualism] best expressed in On Liberty, his 
attitudes to trade unions, to nationalism and to socialist experimentation represent the decisive breach" 
between classical and modern liberalism (Gray 1995a: 30; see also Kukathas 1999). 
11 This is not to suggest that modern and contemporary liberals totally abandoned their use of the state of 
nature. For example, it could reasonably be argued that Rawls' "original position" represents, in effect, a state 
of nature. 
12 There are, of course, other important rights such as the right to equal treatment under the law, the right to 
vote, and the right to hold political office, to name only a few; the particular importance of these and the 
previously noted rights will be discussed later in this chapter. 
13 Given that Hobbes seems to allow for men to be forced-at the point of a sword-to participate in the social 
contract, the ''voluntary" character of his compact could be (and has been) questioned. 
14 For example, whereas Hobbes understood the establishment of a commonwealth to require that men transfer 
in toto their "Right of Nature," Locke argued that the creation of a commonwealth demands that men 
relinquish to the community (not the sovereign, per se), only their right to enforce the "law of Nature": that 
is, "to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others, as ... [they are] persuaded the offence deserves, 
even with death itself' (Locke 1988: 159). 
15 Of course, generally speaking, contemporary liberal theorists no longer argue that such drastic means are 
acceptable methods by which to depose "unsuccessful" governments. 
16 Henceforth, I will use the term "limited constitutional government" to refer to the idea of a government 
characterised by a division of power and operating according to and under the rule of law. In this context the 
term "limited" is not being used to imply the type of minimal, "night watchman" state advocated by earlier 
liberals such as Humboldt; rather, it is used to emphasise that there are certain areas of citizens' lives into 
which government should not be authorised to intrude. 
17 Given the lack of"any accepted distinction in meaning between the words 'freedom' and 'liberty'" (Hayek 
1960: 421, n.l), I will use these terms interchangeably. 
18 Not surprisingly, not all liberals adopt such a position. For example: while not disputing the significance 
of liberty and autonomy, Ronald Dworkin argues that equality is the most important component of a liberal 
regime. 
19 For the remainder of this chapter, unless specifically noted otherwise, all references to "property" are meant 
to reflect Locke's understanding of the term. 
20 While it is true that in the lexicon of contemporary political philosophy Nozick is usually referred to as a 
"libertarian," given the close affmity between libertarianism and classical liberalism, I do not believe that it is 
unreasonable to also identify him as a "liberal." Indeed, Jan Narveson, himself a noted libertarian theorist, has 
stated that "[l]ibertarianism is one kind of liberalism" (Narveson 1988: 8; similarly, see Spragens 1999: 19; 
Klosko 2000: 2-3; and Johnston 1994: 25, 44). 
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21 Charles Larmore takes issue with this defmition of pluralism (e.g., Larmore 1996: 153-57). A discussion of 
Larmore's concerns takes place in chapter four. 
22 Though I (and others) have identified Locke's Letters on Toleration as the first substantive defense of 
toleration, this is not to suggest that it is universally or even commonly considered the most forceful. Indeed, 
arguably, a more vigorous defense is provided by Pierre Bayle in his Philosophical Commentary (1686). 
23 This approach is, perhaps, best exemplified in Michael Walzer's On Toleration (1997) and John Rawls' The 
Law of Peoples (1999). 
24 Much of the material presented in this chapter has appeared previously in Young (2002). 
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CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL STABILITY, JUSTICE, AND 
LmERALISM 
I. Introduction 
As noted in the preceding chapter, liberalism was originally developed as a means by which to 
secure political stability in societies in which the presence of religious pluralism had produced 
years of repression, persecution, and civil war. The violent, deadly, and destabilising conflict that 
arose in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe as a consequence of the public intolerance of 
religious diversity brought with it the realisation that anew approach to responding to doctrinal 
disagreement was necessary if one wished to avoid such conflict in the future and secure the type 
ofharmonic coexistence needed to ensure and sustain political stability in pluralistic societies. It 
is this goal that gave rise to the doctrine of liberalism. 
For early liberal theorists, then, there was a fundamental causal relationship between 
liberalism and the search for political stability: the former represented both a response to and the 
successful completion of the latter. Early liberal theorists also realised that the ability ofliberalism 
to achieve the desired effect was itself dependent upon the success ofliberalism in providing a Just 
regulatory framework. Ifliberalism was to reduce to an unproblematic or manageable level the 
likelihood of divisive, destabilising conflict among the members of a given society, then it would 
need to offer a regulatory framework that was perceived to treat all competing interests fairly. In 
order to satisfy such a caveat, the citizens of said society (or, at least, the majority of them) would 
need to believe that they are being treated justly. In other words, liberalism would need to secure 
justice in order to achieve the desired political stability. 
72 
Liberal theorists' understanding of the correct character ofliberalism has, of course, been 
subject to change with the passage of time and the evolution of civil society. As the sociopolitical 
circumstances confronting liberal societies have changed, so too has theorists' understanding of 
the precise demands that a liberal framework must satisfy if it is to secure and sustain justice and 
political stability. Despite such periodic metamorphoses, liberal theorising has continued to be 
animated by the belief that there is a fundamental relationship between justice, political stability, 
and liberalism. Underlying all alterations to classical liberalism has been the desire to adapt 
liberalism to changing sociopolitical circumstances so that it can continue to provide the means by 
which to secure justice and political stability. It is within the context of efforts to enable liberalism 
to respond effectively to the challenges confronting contemporary pluralistic societies that the 
concept of a purely political liberalism emerged. 
Understanding the motivation behind the development of political liberalism thus requires 
aknowledgeoftherelationship between political stability, justice, and liberalism. The logic of the 
changes effected by political liberalism can be fully appreciated only in light of efforts to resolve 
problems of justice and instability in contemporary pluralistic societies. Accordingly, the remainder 
of this chapter will offer a brief review of the relationship between political stability,justice, and 
liberalism. 
II. The Search for Political Stability 
Contemplating and commenting upon the establishment of a politically stable society is an exercise 
that for centuries has occupied political philosophers. Attempting to identify and clearly articulate 
the means by which such a society might be secured and sustained is a task that has captured and 
73 
taxed the imaginations of some of the greatest philosophical minds known to humanity, and 
generated some of the most engaging and magisterial works within the pantheon of political 
philosophy. Efforts to catalogue and explain the essential elements of a politically stable society 
have been and remain a fundamental component of political philosophy. 
Not surprisingly, these efforts have produced a number of different definitions of political 
stability. Some theorists have proposed that political stability demands nothing more than the 
absence of civil war (Thomas Hobbes) or the perpetuation of a given regime (Edmund Burke ).1 
Prima facie, neither of these perspectives suggests that there is anything inherently unacceptable 
with using force either to establish or maintain political stability; indeed, according to these 
definitions, even the most brutal, oppressive military dictatorship could be considered a politically 
"stable" regime. More recently, it has been argued that true political stability requires a more 
exacting standard: functional civil order and regime durability by themselves do not constitute 
political stability. Elements such as consent, liberty, and equality-individually or in different 
combinations and in varying degrees-are deemed necessary for genuine political stability. 
According to many such interpretations, it is illegitimate (not to mention, ineffective) to 
employ brute force arbitrarily either to secure or sustain political order. Enduring, legitimate 
political stability, it is argued, can be achieved only by developing a regulatory framework that is 
voluntarily supported by a majority of those whose actions it will govern. Generally speaking, this 
understanding of political stability has now become the benchmark against which the success of 
all related claims is measured. In other words, a society is considered to have achieved political 
stability when the regulatory framework employed to maintain "the normal functioning of the 
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political system" (Norman 1999a: 3) is freely, willingly, and reliably supported by the majority of 
the citizens who are subject to it. However, as the sociopolitical diversity of societies has 
increased, so too has the difficulty associated with designing a framework that can accommodate 
and adequately satisfy the ever-expanding demands of the citizenry of these societies, and thereby 
secure the type of public agreement needed to establish and maintain political stability. 
III. The Interdependence between Political Stability and Justice 
Increased diversity poses problems for political stability insofar as achieving the voluntru:y public 
agreement necessary to secure and sustain the sought after political stability requires that the 
majority of citizens believe the regulatory framework to allow for the affirmation and realisation 
of their respective conceptions of the good. In essence, then, securing political stability in 
pluralistic societies is dependent upon the majority of the citizens of said societies believing that 
the regulatory framework under which they live is just. Thus the quest for justice is an essential 
component of the search for political stability. The "quest for justice" refers to the goal of 
establishing a society in which all of its inhabitants are treated fairly. The concept of"fair" 
treatment may, of course, mean very different things to different people. For example, Plato's 
understanding of fair treatment (i.e.,justice) as treating "equals" equally and unequals unequally, 
differsdrasticallyfromJohnRawls' significantlylessqualifiedunderstandingoffairtreatmentas 
the guarantee of equality of basic liberties. 
It has often been argued that, though it is possible to obtain varying degrees of political . 
stability without first securing ''universal" justice (i.e., equal justice-however that may be 
defined-for all members of a given society), the continued absence of such justice will eventually 
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lead to the dissolution of political order. Unless all individuals believe that they are being treated 
fairly, the discontent and anger generated by the resulting sense of injustice produces an ever-
present danger that those who believe that they are being treated unjustly will do whatever they 
deem necessary, including armed revolt, to secure "justice." The perpetual volatility of such a 
situation precludes the achievement of genuine political stability. Hence, true political stability 
requires universal justice. 
However, demanding the satisfaction of such a caveat has (not unexpectedly) served only 
to make the achievement of political stability all the more problematic. For like the problem of 
political stability, the question of what is required by justice has been one of the fundamental 
concerns of political philosophy since the time of Socrates and has spawned a number of different 
interpretations regarding exactly what constitutes justice. "Is it need (as Marxists say, 'to each 
according to needs')? Is it merit (in Aristotle, for example, who one is and what one has done)? 
... Is it equality (and in what sense is it true that 'all are created equal')?" (Solomon and Murphy 
1990: 7) The many definitions of justice that have emerged have, in turn, generated an 
''intimidating range of questions about what justice requires and permits" (Macintyre 1988: 1 ), and 
offered a diversity of answers in terms of how we may best secure the conditions needed to 
achieve a just polity. 
The debate surrounding the definitive character of justice has itself been further 
complicated by the fact that"[ m ]any different kinds of things are said to be just and unjust: not 
only laws, institutions, and social systems, but also particular actions of many kinds, including 
decisions, judgments, and imputations" (Rawls 1971: 7). In the final analysis, 'justice" remains an 
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" 'essentially contested concept' ":that is, "even reasonable and informed persons" are often 
unable "to agree on a theory of justice or on all of their judgments about which policies and 
institutions are just" (Norman 1999b). 
Despite the sometimes notable differences among the various extant definitions of justice, 
a central component of most (if not all) theories of justice has been the concept of political 
justice. Political justice addresses the issue of legitimisation-that is, justifying the existence and 
maintenance of a particular set of institutions, relations, and arrangements: i.e., a regime. The 
establishment and perpetuation of a given regime is justified by reference to the specific norms or 
principles on which the regime is based. Generally speaking, contemporary liberal theory tends 
to characterise a just regime as one whose principles of justice secure a fair distribution of 
primary goods, a distribution that genuinely answers citizens' needs and interests. The fairness of 
a particular distribution is understood to be directly related to the equality of said distribution? 
In essence, then, the relationship between political stability and justice can be summarised 
as follows: If genuine political stability is to be secured and preserved, then the regulatory 
framework governing the polity must be understood to be just and its continuation voluntary 
agreed to by all those who must live within its parameters. A framework will be considered just 
and a voluntary agreement for its continuation secured only insofar as its governing principles are 
perceived to be ''fair'' to all those subject to its demands, which they will be to the degree that they 
are believed to allow for the realisation of each citizen's conception of the good and, by extension, 
his self-fulfilment. 3 Not surprisingly, liberal theorists argue that in contemporary pluralistic polities, 
only a liberal framework can hope to satisfy the necessary conditions. 
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IV. Liberalism: The Final Variable in the Equation 
Having (briefly) explained the relationship between political stability and justice, the next and final 
step in the investigation that is the focus of this chapter is to identify the role liberalism is meantto 
play in the search for political stability. In the sense in which it is here being used, "liberalism" 
refers to a philosophical doctrine that articulates a moral outlook to govern all aspects of one's 
life (Rawls 1985: 245); it represents a conception of the good the realisation of which should 
inform the character both of public and private actions. In essence, proponents ofliberalism argue 
that it offers a regulatory :framework that can secure justice and, subsequently, political stability 
for the inhabitants of pluralistic societies. Indeed, as noted above, liberalism is presented as the 
only paradigm that can achieve such results. The reasons for this conclusion are as follows. 
Prior to the emergence ofliberalism, respect for individual freedom and equality was a 
fundamental consideration only insofar as it contributed to the well-being of the community. 
Political theorists produced conceptions of justice that focussed upon the needs and concerns of 
the community rather than those of the individual. The primary function of the individual was to 
secure the prosperity and preservation of the community. The doctrines upon which polities' 
regulatory frameworks were premised did not even allow for the unsanctioned accommodation, 
let alone the public recognition, of views that conflicted with those animatingtheprevailingpublic 
order. Those who subscribed to beliefs and values that differed from those embodied in the 
existing regulatory framework were oppressed and persecuted. This approach allowed for the 
rationalisation of slavery, serfdom and other conditions that denied to individuals the freedom, 
equality and, by extension, dignity that all persons deserve by virtue of their humanity. For hberals, 
78 
such suffocation ofhuman dignity unacceptably disrespects and denigrates individuals, and, in 
pluralistic societies, inevitably leads to divisive, destabilising sociopolitical conflict. 
Liberalism radically altered the focus of concern from the community to the individual in 
both amoral and a juridical sense. Liberalism demands the establishment of permanent institutional 
protections against the arbitrary use of coercive political power and other sociopolitical practices 
detrimental to individual self-fulfilment, and thereby ensures (or so it is claimed) that the freedom, 
equality and human dignity of all persons is respected. The regulatory framework offered by 
liberalism is understood to provide citizens with the freedom to affirm and pursue their chosen 
conceptions of the good, while simultaneously subjecting all citizens to the same public restrictions 
on this freedom. In so doing, liberalism is believed to treat individuals fairly and thus to offer a 
paradigm that can secure the voluntary support of those subject to its demands. In essence, then, 
by providing a regulatory framework that embodies the equal concern and respect needed to 
allow each citizen to affinn, pursue and (hopefully) realise his preferred conception of the good, 
liberalism offers the means by which to establish and preserve justice and political stability in 
pluralistic societies. 
V. Keeping Liberalism Effective 
Following Hobbes' lead, many liberal theorists have suggested that the best way to secure and 
sustain justice and political stability is to establish a social contract premised upon a widespread, 
dependable agreement on a single conception of justice to govern all citizens. Proponents of this 
approach argue that only a regulatory framework that can obtain the voluntary support of those 
who must live within its parameters is likely to be considered just by said individuals and thus able 
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to secure political stability. Such an approach has been and continues to be a cornerstone of 
liberal theory. Recently, a number ofliberal theorists have expanded upon this ''voluntary support" 
argument and suggested that genuine political stability requires that citizens' support for the public 
conception of justice-the principles that guide and regulate public behaviour-must not only be 
uncoerced, it must also be sincere and reliable. Such support, it is argued, can be secured only 
if the public conception of justice enables all persons to pursue their chosen way oflife "freely" 
(understanding, of course, that there will necessarily be certain restrictions upon individuals' 
behaviour with respect to their pursuit of their conceptions of the good). 
However, even within the limited sphere ofliberal theory, there exists significant 
disagreement as to what values need to be accorded primacy in order to secure the necessary 
liberty; the inevitably heterogeneous character of liberal theory makes such disagreement 
unavoidable. Moreover, given the constantly changing nature of civil society, such difference of 
opinion is to be expected. In an effort to respond effectively to different sociopolitical challenges 
and philosophical criticisms, liberal theory has regularly been subjected to a change in direction 
or focus. Liberal-theorists have often modified existing theories in order to produce "new'' theories 
that might better address the demands of their particular sociohistorical situations. Subsequently, 
though there is certainly a noticeable degree of foundational continuity and kinship among all liberal 
doctrines, there have, nevertheless, been many different variations ofliberalism, often conflicting 
with each other in very significant ways. 
Similarly, as modem societies have evolved, the plurality of competing conceptions of the 
good (i.e., life-plans) has increased to a degree that could not possibly have been foreseen by the 
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forefathers ofliberal theory. Theorists are now confronted with communities that are much more 
diverse in their religious convictions, their cultural heritages, and their sources of identity, than was 
the case during the time of either Kant or John Stuart Mill, for example. The increased doctrinal 
heterogeneity that has accompanied the evolution of modem society has brought with it a greater 
possibility and likelihood of disruptive, divisive, destabilising conflict. Indeed, with each passing 
day, public agreement and political stability seem to be more difficult both to obtain and maintain. 
Hence, the task of developing a viable public conception of justice that can adequately satisfy the 
diverse demands of the citizenry of contemporary societies and in so doing secure political 
stability-in its current liberal incarnation-has never been more challenging (or, arguably, more 
important). 
A number of eminent contemporary theorists, including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald 
Dworkin, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Jiirgen Habermas, Will Kymlicka, Charles Lannore, John Rawls, 
Judith Shklar, and Iris Marion Young, to name only a few, have accepted the challenge posed by 
this situation and have directed their attention toward trying to design a conception of justice that 
can secure the basis for justice and political stability in ethnoculturally, religiously, and morally 
diverse societies. 
In responding to the challenges to liberalism posed by the increasing complexities oflife 
in contemporary polities, liberal theorists such as Rawls, Larmore and Shklar have argued that 
traditional liberal responses to the problem of political stability in pluralistic societies are no longer 
adequate for the task at hand. Contemporary liberal democracies, it is claimed, are confronted 
with difficulties previously unknown, especially with respect to the establishment and preservation 
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of a just and stable liberal democracy-in Rawlsian terms, a ''well-ordered" society (Rawls 1993: 
35-43). In particular, the increasingly complicated and controversial nature of the relationship 
between ''the private" and ''thepublic"has provoked liberals like Rawls, Larmore and Shklarto 
suggest that previous understandings of the proper character ofliberalism need to be modified if 
liberalism is to continue to offer an effective response to the problems of stability posed by 
diversity (e.g., Rawls 1993; Larmore 1996; Shklar 1989). 
More specifically, Rawls, Larmore and Shklar have argued that liberalism must become 
more "practical" in the sense that its goal should be to answer the following question: ''how is a 
just and free society possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of 
resolution?" (Rawls 1993: xxviii) The viability ofliberalism as a mechanism for addressing the 
problem of political stability in contemporary pluralistic societies is said to be dependent upon its 
ability to respond effectively to this question. An effective response requires that liberalism be 
reconfigured in such a manner as to enable it to offer a conception ofjustice that can secure the 
free and willing support of the adherents of a plurality of antagonistic and incompatible beliefs and 
practices. Only by adopting such a character can liberalism hope to serve as the foundation for 
a widespread, public agreement on a single conception of justice to regulate society's basic 
structure and thereby secure the sociopolitical conditions required to establish and sustain a 
genuinely just and stable society. 
Theorists such as Rawls and Larmore have argued that traditional formulations of 
liberalism are unable to provide the basis for the required public agreement because, contrary to 
received wisdom, the fundamental beliefs upon which they are based-e.g., the overriding value 
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of individual liberty and toleration-can no longer be assured of securing widespread, voluntary 
support among the citizens of contemporary liberal democracies. Traditional versions ofliberalism 
are animated by conceptions of justice that promote a comprehensive moral ideal to govern all 
aspects of one's life (Rawls 1985: 245). The "correctness" of the norms and practices 
championed by these conceptions, however, has increasingly been questioned, especially during 
the second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the diversity of opinions and degree of debate 
concerning the appropriate principles to regulate public and private behaviour has convinced 
theorists like Rawls, Larmore and Shklar that no conception of justice based upon the tenets of 
a single "comprehensive" doctrine will ever be able to effectively accommodate the multitude of 
world-views found in existing pluralistic societies. 
According to Rawls, Larmore and Shklar, if liberalism is to provide a regulatory 
framework able to secure a voluntary public consensus among the citizens inhabiting typical 
contemporary liberal democracies and in so doing offer a viable response to the problem of 
stability confronting such polities, then it needs to present a conception of justice that is less 
"comprehensive" in its scope of concern than has traditionally been the case. More specifically, 
the only hope for obtaining the required public consensus lies in developing a conception of justice 
that avoids such comprehensiveness and restricts its scope to only those matters upon which all 
reasonable citizens can agree. Rawls, Larmore and Shklar (among others) contend that a 
conception of justice that confines its concerns to "political" matters-that is, to questions 
concerning constitutional essentials and matters ofbasic justice (Rawls 1993: 227t-is alone in 
its ability to satisfy such a criterion. What is needed, then, is a purely political conception of 
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justice. This school of thought has been aptly labelled political liberalism, and its development 
and promotion has attracted the attention of many capable political theorists. 
VI. Prominent Proponents of Political Liberalism 
A number of prominent figures in the field of political philosophy have embraced the project of 
designing and championing a purely political conception ofliberalism; arguably, the most famous 
of these is John Rawls. With the publication of" Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical" 
(Rawls 1985; henceforth, JAF), Rawls ushered in anew era in political philosophy. InJAFRawls 
provided the first (somewhat) detailed articulation ofhis conception of political liberalism, 5 a 
concept and a term that would soon thereafter become familiar features of contemporary political 
theory. 6 Rawls presented his conception as a solution to the problem of political stability in 
contemporary liberal democracies. According to Rawls, a "political" conception of justice (such 
as his conception of political liberalism) can secure what other conceptions of justice based upon 
comprehensive doctrines cannot: namely, widespread public agreement on a single conception of 
justice that can secure the political stability needed to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal 
democracy. 
Not surprisingly, Rawls' philosophical progeny attracted a significant amount of attention 
and provoked both favourable and critical responses. Numerous theorists analysed Rawls' "new"7 
paradigm, suggesting what was both ''right" and "wrong" with it. Subsequent to the publication of 
JAF, Rawls produced a number of essays (e.g., 1987, 1988, 1989) in which he further developed 
and refined his conception of political liberalism. Rawls' efforts to clarify and perfect his 
conception were eventually synthesised to produce Political Liberalism (P L ). With PL Rawls 
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believed that he had finally presented a (relatively) complete articulation ofhis theory. 8 As had 
been the casewithA Theory of Justice (Theory), theorists-political and otherwise-eagerly 
consumed and responded to PL. And like Theory, PL has proceeded to provide the focus for 
a voluminous catalogue of scholarly investigations and (once again) brought Rawls' work to the 
forefront of political philosophy.9 
Yet, a revitalised interest in Rawls' work, and the subsequent generation of a multitude 
of critical analyses ofhis "new" paradigm, were not the only offspring ofRawls' toils. In the wake 
ofRawls'post-Theorypublications,theoristsdidmorethansimplyrediscoverRawlsandanalyse 
his new, provocative propositions; a few also began to develop and articulate their own 
conceptions of political liberalism. One such individual was Charles Larmore. Arguably, next to 
Rawls, Larmore has been the principal champion of the concept of political liberalism, producing 
a significant quantity of analysis directly devoted to developing a viable conception of political 
liberalism. Larmore's first substantive examination of the concept of political liberalism took the 
form ofhis book Patterns of Moral Complexity (1987; henceforth, PMC), which had as its 
goal the development of a viable conception of political liberalism (Larmore 1996: 132). PMC, 
which first appeared in 1987-well before the publication of PL-detailed Larmore's thoughts 
on what he considered to be the "mistakes" troubling contemporary moral (and, by extension, 
political) theory (Larmore 1987: ix). In particular, Larmore was concerned "to show why moral 
philosophy must outgrow the simplifications that have beset its past" (Larmore 1987: 151). 
According to Larmore, much (indeed, the majority) of contemporary moral theory has 
been based upon critical misunderstandings of the fundamental characteristics ofmorality10 and 
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''the relation between moral philosophy and modernity'' (Larmore 1996: 1 ). Larmore hoped that 
the arguments expounded in PMC would show that once moral theory has been adjusted to 
reflect accurately the realities of morality and modernity-i.e., once moral theory ''recovers" the 
"fundamental and pervasive forms of moral complexity that have too often been neglected by 
moral and political philosophers" (Larmore 1996: foreword)-it will then become clear that the 
concept of political liberalism not only offers the most suitable model for a public conception of 
justice for contemporary pluralistic societies, but it also represents the only viable solution to the 
problem of political stability in ethnoculturally, religiously, and morally diverse societies. 
Like Rawls, Larmore continued to develop and refine his initial arguments and produce 
additional material that further detailed and clarified the propositions put forth inP MC. Perhaps 
most noteworthy in this respect are Larmore's articles "Political Liberalism" (1990), "Pluralism 
andReasonableDisagreement"(1994),and"'TheMoralBasisofPoliticalLiberalism"(1999)and 
his 1996 book The Morals of Modernity (MM). In all of these texts, Larmore revises and 
expands upon the arguments he presented inPMC. However, the primary focus and purpose of 
these texts remained consistent with the goal of PMC (Larmore 1996: 1 ): namely, to show that 
''the dominant forms of modem philosophy have themselves been blind to important dimensions 
of the moral life" (Larmore 1996: 1 ), 11 and once theory has recovered these dimensions the 
appropriateness and indeed the necessity of political liberalism will become evident. 
Judith Shklar is another individual whose work has earned her the label of"political 
liberal." In particular, Shklar' snow famous essay ''The Liberalism ofF ear'' (1989) has, for good 
reason, been cited as a paradigmatic example of political liberalism. Like Rawls and Larmore, 
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Shklar has argued that liberalism should be understood as a political doctrine, ''not a philosophy 
oflife such as has traditionally been provided by various forms of revealed religion and other 
comprehensive Weltanschauungen" (Shklar 1989: 21 ). For Shklar, liberalism "is a political 
notion, because the fear and favor that have always inhibited freedom are overwhelmingly 
generated by governments, both formal and informal" (Shklar 1989: 21 ). According to Shklar, 
a liberal political conception of justice is the best means by which to protect individuals from the 
tyranny of abusive governments and the injustices that are made possible by (the inevitable) 
unequal dis1nbutions of sociopolitical power. As is done by Rawls and Larmore, Shklar contends 
that her conception, the "political liberalism of fear," offers a ''neutral" paradigm 12 in that it is not 
specifically or necessarily "linked to any religious or scientific doctrine" (Shklar 1989: 24). 
Shklar' s model ofpoliticalliberalism, like those ofRawls and Larmore, also demands the 
separation of the "personal and the public" (Shklar 1989: 24). Only by ensuring such a separation, 
Shklar argues, can a conception of justice "remove the fear ofburden and favor from the 
shoulders of adult men and women" and in so doing enable them to "conduct their lives in 
accordance with their own beliefs and preferences" (Shklar 1989: 31 ). By allowing citizens to 
pursue "their own beliefs and preferences" publicly and without qualification or reservation, a 
conception of justice based upon the political liberalism of fear is said to provide a paradigm that 
can secure the conditions needed to establish and maintain a just liberal democracy. 
Vll. Concluding Remarks 
Rawls, Larmore and Shklar all (explicitly or implicitly) contend that their respective conceptions 
of political liberalism can offer a solution to the problem of political stability in contemporary 
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pluralistic societies, and thereby secure the conditions required to establish and sustain a society 
in which all "reasonable" individuals can freely pursue and (hopefully) realise their respective 
conceptions of the good. Indeed, all three argue that only a conception ofjustice that embodies 
the principles of political liberalism can achieve such a goal. From this perspective, the concept 
of political liberalism, of which Rawls', Larmore's, and Shklar' s conceptions can be considered 
exemplars, represents one of the most interesting, provocative and significant innovations to 
modern political theory. 
Furthermore, theideaofapurelypoliticalliberalismhasdirectlyandindirectlyin±l.uenced 
and animated an enormous ammmt of recent theorising, and its validity, viability and value continue 
to be the source of vigorous debate among a number of prominent theorists. Its importance can 
(perhaps) best be demonstrated by recognising that if it can achieve its stated goal( s ), "it will have 
accomplished what no previous theory of justice, liberal or otherwise, has-it will have provided 
a conception of political justice that has overcome the impediments posed by controversial 
philosophical questions (e.g., what constitutes the good life?) and removed the paradoxical 
tension, extant since Plato, between political justice and justice for the individual" (Young 1999: 
174-7 5). In doing so, the concept of political liberalism will have secured the conditions necessary 
to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy. The question that needs to be 
addressed, then, is: How viable is the concept of political liberalism? Or, to be more specific, does 
the concept of political liberalism offer a feasible solution to the problem of political stability in 
contemporary liberal democracies?13 
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In order to answer the preceding question, it is necessary to complete a broad analysis 
of the concept of political liberalism. Satisfying such a caveat requires that one's examination 
extend beyond the Rawlsian focus common to existing analyses and take into consideration the 
argwnents contained in a number of the prominent paradigmatic conceptions ofpoliticalliberalism. 
Providing such scope is necessary if one hopes to assess how the proposals contained in non-
Rawlsian conceptions ofpoliticalliberalism might alleviate or eliminate the problems identified in 
Rawls's conception, and thereby rescue the viability of the concept of political liberalism from 
what might otherwise have been presented and accepted as a fatal flaw. Only by undertaking such 
a comparative analysis can one effectively evaluate the viability of the idea, as opposed to a single 
model, of a purely political liberalism. 
The next chapter will attempt to satisfy the above noted methodological requirements by 
presenting a generic version of political liberalism that represents a synthesis of the arguments 
contained in three of the most prominent and commented upon versions ofpoliticalliberalism: 
namely, those ofRawls, Larmore, and Shklar. Adopting this approach will expand the scope and 
detail of the examination beyond that typically found in existing studies and in so doing provide for 
the necessary broad analysis of the concept of political liberalism. 
As with liberalism in general, all conceptions of political liberalism share certain core 
beliefs and characteristics; the interpretation provided in the proceeding chapter alins to articulate 
these features. Doing so will provide the means by which to discover what frailties, if any, 
undermine the viability of the concept (as opposed to a single formulation) ofpoliticalliberalism, 
and make available the information needed to assess the likelihood of its achieving its stated goal: 
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namely, to secure the conditions required to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal 
democracy. It is to the task of identifying the fundamental features ofpoliticalliberalism that I now 
tum.I4 
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Notes 
1 Admittedly, this is a gross oversimplification of the arguments propounded by Hobbes and Burke. 
2 Liberal-democratic theory presumes that in some important sense all people are equal. However, in exactly 
what sense all people should be considered equal (e.g., is my life as valuable as yours? Is my contribution to 
society as valuable as yours?) and what type(s) of equality (e.g., equality of distribution, equality of 
opportunity, etc ... ) should or must be secured are questions which continue to be debated. For the purposes 
of this study, unless specifically stated otherwise, all references to ''justice" should be understood as referring 
to political justice as it is defined in this chapter. 
3 Of course, liberals do not argue that all visions of the good life and their associated beliefs deserve to be 
afforded the opportunity for realisation; normally, this privilege is (explicitly or implicitly) reserved for 
"reasonable" conceptions of the good life. 
4 For a detailed account of exactly what types of issues represent "constitutional essentials and questions of 
basic justice," see Rawls (1993: 227-30). 
5 This is not to suggest that previous articles by Rawls had not also introduced various aspects of his 
conception of political liberalism; however, I believe that it is with JAF that Rawls first truly emphasises and 
significantly defines the purely "political" character of his conception of justice as fairness. 
6 The term "political liberalism" was actually first introduced by Rawls in his 1987 article "The Idea of an 
Overlapping Consensus." 
7 I have placed the word "new" in quotation marks in order to emphasise that, though Rawls' conception of 
political liberalism certainly appears to differ in important ways from the conception of justice that he proposes 
in Theory, it remains a source of debate as to what extent the former represents a "new" theory or merely a 
modification (however slight or significant) of the latter. Though Rawls acknowledges that "there are important 
differences" between the texts of Theory and Political Liberalism, he believes that the theory expounded in 
the latter is totally consistent with the "spirit and content of A Theory of Justice" (Rawls 1993: xiv). Patrick 
Neal, however, has noted·that, "Many maintain that the later work does mark a significant change in doctrine 
in a number of respects," and "most commentators have understood his [Rawls'] practical turn [as exemplified 
in Political Liberalism] to have resulted in a less ambitious and less provocative theory than had been 
advanced inA Theory of Jilstice" (Neal1994: 77 -79; for a similar interpretation see Davion and Wolf2000: 3-4). 
Fortunately, the resolution of this debate is not essential for the purposes of this study. 
8 I include the term relatively in order to acknowledge that at certain junctures within the text of PL Rawls 
concedes that while further elaboration on specific points would be desirable, he is unable (if only due to 
constraints of space) at that time to provide such elaboration. Furthermore, the publication of PL did not signal 
the end of Rawls' writings on the subject. Rawls continues to produce additional material in an attempt to 
further clarify and strengthen his arguments. For example, see Rawls (1995, 1997). 
9 This is not to suggest that in the period between the publication of Theory and the appearance of PL that 
Rawls' work was no longer the focus of a significant amount of theorising. 
10 It is, perhaps, worth noting that Larmore is quick to state that he is somewhat "reluctant to define ... just 
what ... [he] mean[s] by 'morality,' since such definitions have usually turned out to be nothing less than 
theories that deny ... [the] very forms of [moral] complexity" that he hopes to "recover" (Larmore 1987: ix). 
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11 According to Larmore, "moral theory in general and political theory in particular have been burdened, from 
their Greek beginnings through modem times, with unnecessarily simplistic notions of the overall order that 
they can expect to discover. As a result the genuine problems confronting moral philosophy have too often 
gone not merely unsolved, but also unperceived" (Larmore 1987: ix). In order to rectify this deficiency, Larmore 
contends that theorists must "recover" the following "important dimensions" of moral theory: 1) "the central 
role of moral judgement" when trying to answer moral questions (Larmore 1987: ix); 2) the recognition that 
"what may be a decisive moral consideration in one area of social life ... [need not] carry an equal weight in 
other areas" (Larmore 1987: ix); and 3) the understanding that "morality need not be exclusively deontological 
or consequentialist, or in any way monolithic, and ... the ultimate sources of moral value are diverse" (Larmore 
1987: frontispiece). 
12 Because it "can be defmed in quite different ways" and "some of its connotations are highly misleading," 
Rawls is extremely reluctant to use the term "neutrality" in reference to his political conception of justice as 
fairness, and does so only after taking "due precautions and using it only as a stage piece" (Rawls 1993: 191). 
For an interesting response to Rawls on this point, see Kymlicka (1989: 886, n.6). 
13 This question and the one immediately preceding it should not be interpreted as separate inquiries 
(although, under different circumstances it would be quite reasonable to do so). Given that a viable conception 
of political liberalism is one that can effectively resolve the problem of political stability in contemporary liberal 
democracies, I take the viability of the concept of political liberalism to be dependent upon its ability to resolve 
said problem. Hence, I mean for the last question to represent only a more refmed version of the frrst. 
14 A noteworthy amount of the material presented in this chapter has appeared previously in Young (2002). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
I. Introduction 
The twentieth century was a somewhat paradoxical period for liberalism. As both a philosophical 
approach to life and a practical political project, liberalism achieved a global ascendancy in the 
marketplace of ideas; so much so, that toward the end of the century at least one celebrated 
commentator heralded the "end of history," insofar as liberalism had, it was suggested, 
"conquered" all of its notable ideological rivals and in so doing had achieved an unquestionable 
and irrevocable legitimacy as the appropriate framework for personal and political relations 
(Fukuyama 1992: xi). Liberalism's ascendancy, however, was accompanied by an increasing 
degree of skepticism concerning its continued capacity to respond effectively to the problems of 
tolerance and accommodation confronting increasingly complex and diverse contemporary 
societies. Indeed, perhaps more so than ever before, political theorists began to question the 
ability ofliberalism to offer a viable solution to the dilemmas of justice and stability posed by 
pluralism. 
Among those who engaged in such questioning were liberal theorists such as John Rawls, 
Charles Larmore and Judith Shklar, who argued that traditional liberal responses to problems of 
justice and political stability posed by pluralism had been rendered ineffective by the increasingly 
complicated character of sociopolitical life in contemporary liberal democracies. The liberalisms 
oflmmanuel Kant and J .S. Mill, for example, were not equipped to address the type of conflict 
generated by the extreme and ever-expanding diversity ofbeliefs found in many contemporary 
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liberal democracies. Ifliberalism were to continue to offer a viable and effective means for 
resolving questions of justice and stability in pluralistic societies, it would need to be reconfigured 
to reflect the new challenges confronting it. 
More specifically, according to Rawls, Larmore and Shklar, liberalism needed to abandon 
its traditional "comprehensive" moral character and instead adopt a more limited, ''political" focus. 
What this meant is that the conception of justice promoted by liberalism must refrain from 
privileging any single comprehensive vision of the good life and restrict its concern to matters of 
public import (i.e., questions of political justice). Only by doing so could liberalism hope to offer 
a governance framework that provides the degree of equal respect needed to secure the 
widespread, voluntary, reliable support required to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal 
democracy. A liberalism founded upon a conception of justice that confines its concerns to 
political matters-that is, to questions concerning constitutional essentials and matters ofbasic 
justice (Rawls 1993: 227)-is alone in its ability to satisfy such a criterion. What was needed, 
then, was a purely political conception ofliberalism. This approach has become known as 
political liberalism. 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the fundamental features of, and principal claims 
associated with, the concept of political liberalism, as expounded by some of its leading 
proponents. The conception ofpoliticalliberalism presented will represent a synthesis of a number 
of existing paradigmatic conceptions ofpoliticalliberalism: namely, those ofRawls, Larmore, and 
Shklar. Such an approach better enables one to critique the concept, as opposed to a single 
conception, of political liberalism. In describing the quintessential characteristics of the concept 
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of political liberalism, the chapter will also reveal the ways in which political liberalism is said to 
differ significantly from its spiritual kin, and highlight certain of the proposed distinctions between 
the component conceptions used to develop the synthetic model under examination. 
II. The Character of a Political Conception 
A political conception is presented as an alternative to the idea of a general comprehensive 
doctrine. The principal difference between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine 
lies within the scope of subjects to which each applies. Whereas a political conception is restricted 
to "the domain ofthe political" (Rawls 1996: xxxviii, 3 8), "a special domain with distinctive 
features" that produce specific values (Rawls 1989: 233), a general comprehensive doctrine is one 
that "applies to all subjects and its virtues cover all parts oflife [e.g., political and nonpoliticalj" 
(Rawls 1996: xxxviii, n.4)-it is "a moral ideal to govern all oflife" (Rawls 1985: 245)_1 
Utilitarianism, the theories ofKantandJ.S. Mill, and the belief systems associated with most 
organised religions, are offered as examples of":fully comprehensive" doctrines (Rawls 1988: 252; 
see also Larmore 1996: 13, 127-29, 132; and Larmore 1999: 602-05). Political liberals contend 
that conceptions of justice have usually been founded upon comprehensive doctrines. However, 
because a conception of justice based upon a single comprehensive doctrine presents a vision of 
the good which is to "govern all oflife" and to which all citizens must adhere, any such conception 
is unable to secure the widespread public support required to establish and sustain a well-ordered 
society. As Rawls argues, no single comprehensive doctrine, reasonable or otherwise, ''will ever 
be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens" (Rawls 1996: xviii, 38). Accordingly, if justice and 
political stability are to be realised, the "[governing] tenns of political association must ... be less 
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comprehensive than the views of the good life about which reasonable people disagree" (Lannore 
1996: 123). 
Inotherwords, thepublicconceptionofjusticemustbe"minimal"or''thin"intermsofits 
moral character and demands if it is to be acceptable to all reasonable people. Political liberals 
emphasise that this does not, however, mean that ''those who embrace it will live up to it without 
effort and without exception" (Lannore 1996: 123). Affirming such a conception will entail both 
accepting "whatever burdens of controversy weigh upon the reasons for affirming if' (Lannore 
1996: 131) and willingly adhering to certain "burdens of judgment" (Rawls 1996: 54-58V A 
''minimal" moral conception is merely a framework the demands of which are general enough to 
enable the adherents of a plurality of conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines to 
support it voluntarily (Larmore 1996: 123). 
A political conception of justice refuses to embody or champion a ''thick" conception of 
either the good or the self, such as those offered by communitarian and romantic ideologies. 
Political liberals adopt this approach not because they assume that all such conceptions have 
nothing positive to offer the citizens of liberal societies, but rather because the potential 
consequences of adopting such conceptions are clear: at best, they "distract us from the main task 
ofpolitics when they are presented as political doctrines, and at worst can, under unfortunate 
circumstances, seriously damage liberal practices" (Shklar 1989: 36). Shklar, for example, notes 
that those who have supported "ideologies of solidarity" such as those championed by 
communitarian and romantic critics of liberalism, "have gone on in our century to create 
oppressive and cruel regimes ofunparalleled horror" (Shklar 1989: 36). This conclusion is 
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supported by the work of individuals such as historian Robert Conquest, who has convincingly 
argued that"[ t ]he huge catastrophes of our era have been inflicted by human beings driven by 
certain thoughts" (Conquest 1999: 3): e.g., by the belief' 'that utopia can be constructed on earth" 
(Conquest 1999: 3) merely" 'by altering the shape of society'" (Conquest 1999: 6). 
A political conception of justice represents the realisation of a minimal moral framework, 
being neither a consequence of nor identical to a comprehensive moral doctrine (Rawls 1989: 
233). The content of a political conception "-its principles, standards, and values-is not 
presented as an application of an already elaborated moral doctrine, comprehensive in scope and 
general in range" (Rawls 1989: 242). Rather, a political conception is void of any specifically 
"comprehensive" or ''nonpolitical" concerns and is thus a "freestanding'' view (Rawls 1996: 12-
13 ): its values are arrived at independent of nonpolitical considerations, thereby ensuring that it 
neither demands nor presupposes a ''wider commitment to any other doctrine" (Rawls 1993: 12-
13). By restricting its scope to the domain of the political, a political conception demands only that 
individuals adhere to a certain set of political values: namely, those embodied in the political 
conception. Political values are presented in contradistinction to nonpolitical values. Whereas 
political values are concerned solely with political questions-that is, questions concerning 
constitutional essentials and matters ofbasic justice-nonpolitical values pertain to all aspects of 
one's life. 
The political values associated with political liberalism are represented by the principles 
of justice which regulate the basic structure (Rawls 1993: 11, 3 5), and the idea of free public 
reason. 3 "[T]hese values govern the basic framework of social life ... and specify the fimdamental 
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terms of political and social cooperation" (Rawls 1993: 139); they are values ''that all citizens can 
reasonably be expected to endorse" (Rawls 1993: 140). Examples of the political values 
attributed to political liberalism include the values of" equal political and civil hberty; fair equality 
of opportunity; [and] the values of economic reciprocity" (Rawls 1993: 139). Importantly, these 
values are able to achieve widespread, voluntary support among the citizenry of contemporary 
liberal democracies, because they are the manifestation of certain ideas inherent in democratic 
societies. 
Accordingtopoliticalliberals, there exist within the public cultureofall-or, at least, 
almost all-democratic societies certain .fundamental ideas (Rawls 1993: 14). Fundamental ideas 
are foundational beliefs that are innate to and guide the public culture of a society; they comprise 
a shared fund of accepted beliefs and norms. In the case of political liberalism, these fundamental 
ideas are represented by the notion of society as a "fair system of cooperation" (Rawls 1993: 
15), 4 and the conception of persons as free and equal. Such ideas are "central to the democratic 
ideal" and, therefore, inevitable components of the public culture of democratic societies (Rawls 
1993: 167). Moreover, these ideas are not simply metaphysical or psychological constructs, but 
rather they are "fundamental political ideas" that are empirically based and widely supported 
within the public culture of contemporary liberal democracies (Rawls 1993: 167; see also Rawls 
1989: 240; and Larmore 1996: 134-35, 145-46, 151). Together, thenotionofsocietyasafair 
system of cooperation and the conception of persons as free and equal represent a "core, minimal 
morality" that has been and continues to be present and pervasive in contemporary liberal 
democracies (Lannore 1996: 152). Such being the case, the fundamental ideas animating political 
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liberalism do not constitute particular or contentious religious, philosophical, or moral ideas 
(Rawls 1985: 23 3), at least not for the citizens ofliberal democracies. Hence, the political values 
derived from these ideas and represented by a political conception of justice are values that are 
normally affirmed :voluntarily by all (or, at least, most) citizens of democratic societies. 
By seeking agreement on only those values that are already generally accepted 
components of the public culture and that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse freely 
and willingly, a political conception ofjustice differs in a very significant way from conceptions of 
justice premised upon comprehensive doctrines: specifically, it remains neutral with regard to 
questions of the good. Political liberals commonly identify three different ways in which the 
concept of neutrality may be understood: namely,procedural neutrality, neutrality of aim, and 
neutrality of effect or influence. A doctrine is procedurally neutral if it can be justified by 
"appeal to neutral values, that is, values ... that regulate fair procedures for adjudicating, or 
arbitrating, between parties whose claims are in conflict" (Rawls 1993: 191 ). The concept of 
political liberalism expresses "far more than procedural values," and insofar as it does, it cannot 
be considered procedurally neutral. Neutrality of aim is obtained when society's "[basic] 
institutions and policies are neutral in the sense that they can be endorsed by citizens generally as 
within the scope of a ... political conception" (Rawls 1993: 192). Political liberalism attempts to 
attain a certain degree of neutrality of aim, to the extent that the basic institutions it promotes and 
the public policies produced by them are not arbitrarily biased in favour of any particular 
comprehensive doctrine. 
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Finally, political liberals often differentiate between neutrality of aim and neutrality of 
e.ffoct or influence. The principal difference between the two centres upon the question of intent. 
Whereas neutrality of effect or influence is concerned solely with the consequences of an action 
(e.g., a public policy), neutrality of aim is concerned with the intent of an action and ensuring that 
the state refrains from doing anything which is "intended to favour or promote any particular 
comprehensive doctrine rather than another, or to give greater assistance to those who pursue it" 
(Rawls 1993: 193). Political liberals accept that political liberalism must simply abandon as 
impracticable the idea of neutrality of effect or influence because 
it is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just constitutional regime not to have 
important effects and influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure and gain 
adherents over time; and it is futile to try to counteract these effects and influences, or even 
to ascertain for political purposes how deep and pervasive they are (Rawls 1993: 194; see 
also Larmore 1996: 126, n.6; and Shklar 1989: 33). 
Thus, in the final analysis, political liberals propose that a political conception of justice obtains, 
and need only achieve, a limited degree of procedural neutrality and neutrality of aim. 5 
Therequirementthatthepublicconceptionofjusticeremainneutralinrelationtoquestions 
of the good "is expressed by the priority of right" (Rawls 1996: 17 6). Originally expounded by 
Kant, the notion of the priority of right over the good asserts that ''justice is independent from and 
prior to the concept of goodness in the sense that its principles limit the conceptions of the good 
which are permissible" (Rawls 1985: 249). The practical consequence of this restriction is that 
"comprehensive conceptions of the good are admissible, or can be pursued in society, only if their 
pursuit conforms to the political conception of justice (does not violate its principles of justice)" 
(Rawls 1993: 176,n.2). Thepriorityofrightmeansthatthepoliticalconceptionofjusticemay 
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"impose limits on permissible ways oflife; and hence the claims citizens make to pursue ends that 
transgress those limits have no weight (as judged by that political conception)" (Rawls 1988: 251 ). 
In essence, political liberals justify their use of the priority of right by arguing that: 1) it "is 
characteristic ofliberalism as a political doctrine and ... seems essential to any conception of 
justice reasonable for a democratic state" (Rawls 1985: 250); 2) it ensures that the principles of 
justice adopted are fair to all citizens conceived of as free and equal; and 3) it is necessary if one 
hopes to obtain a public conception of justice that can secure widespread voluntary support. 
Indeed, the idea of the priority of right is an essential element of the concept of political liberalism. 
Political liberals contend that given the increasingly pluralistic character of contemporary 
liberal democracies, any conception ofjustice that hopes to obtain voluntary, widespread public 
support, and thus secure genuine and enduring justice and political stability, must avoid 
proclaiming the intrinsic worth of any particular conception of the good. Only by adopting such 
an approach can one hope to develop a conception ofjustice that contains no presuppositions 
regarding those controversial philosophical issues that have previously frustrated the attainment 
of the type of public agreement needed to establish and maintain a just and stable liberal 
democracy (Rawls 1993: 12, 35-43 ). By embodying a limited procedural neutrality and neutrality 
of aim, the concept ofpoliticalliberalism is said to offer a conception of justice which effectively 
avoids controversial claims concerning the validity or value of any moral, religious, or philosophical 
presuppositions. In doing so, political liberalism presents a neutral framework in the sense that it 
respects ''the reasonable disagreement people have about the nature of the good life" (Lannore 
1996: 124) insofar as it is supported by political principles that express a conception of justice that 
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all reasonable citizens can a~ "despite their inevitable differences about the worth of specific 
ways oflife" (Larmore 1996: 123). 
The neutrality of a political conception of justice allows it to secure what other conceptions 
of justice based upon comprehensive doctrines cannot: namely, an overlapping consensus. 
Simply put, an overlapping consensus is an agreement among the adherents of the various 
competing, conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines that are likely to survive in a 
just contemporary liberal democracy (Rawls 1985: 226). An overlapping consensus on a political 
conception ofjustice means that despite the inevitable presence of a plurality of antagonistic and 
incompatible views, citizens of a well-ordered society are able to agree on a single conception of 
justice to regulate the basic structure (Rawls 1985: 226). By facilitating such an agreement, the 
concept of political liberalism can generate the conditions-which are said to be presently absent 
(Rawls 1993: 4 )-needed to produce a just and stable polity and thereby satisfy the practical 
demands of political philosophy in a democratic society. 
Ill. The Fact of Reasonable Disagreement 
According to political liberals, the need for an overlapping consensus (and, by extension, a 
political conception of justice) is generated by the fact of reasonable disagreement-the 
inevitable and inelim:inable presence of a plurality of reasonable yet conflicting and irreconcilable 
comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1993: 36). Originally manifesting itself in the form of disputes 
over the validity of different religious beliefs, in the course of the last four centuries the 
phenomenon of reasonable disagreement has expanded to become a dispute about the nature of 
the good life in general. 
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As opposed to their ancient and medieval predecessors who tended to believe that 
Reason would naturally lead to consensus about the nature of the good life, political liberals have 
assumed that reasonable disagreement about the nature of the good life is not just a mere 
possibility, but to be expected. Indeed, such disagreement is understood to be unavoidable. 
Hence, unanimity concerning the character of the good life is, in effect, possible only through the 
use of an unacceptable degree of coercion. Consequently, if we are to develop a conception of 
justice that can adequately accommodate the ineradicable conflict of values that characterises 
contemporary liberal societies, we must make the fact of reasonable disagreement the fundamental 
consideration of our deliberations. Only by fully understanding and addressing the fact of 
reasonable disagreement can we hope to design a conception ofjustice that can secure the type 
of widespread, voluntary support needed to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal 
democracy. 
Theideaofreasonabledisagreementisdistinguishedfromthemorefamiliarunderstanding 
of disagreement. The idea of reasonable disagreement refers to the presence of a diversity of 
comprehensive doctrines which, though conflicting and irreconcilable, are all reasonable. That is 
to say, all reasonable comprehensive doctrines allow for the presence and public affirmation of 
a multitude of different and conflicting beliefs and accept that it is unreasonable to use state 
power to enforce the comprehensive views of a single doctrine. 6 The general notion of 
disagreement assumes the existence of a plurality of competing, antagonistic and irreconcilable 
comprehensive doctrines, any number of which may be unreasonable in the sense ofbeing 
incompatiblewithapoliticalconceptionofjustice(Rawls 1993: xxx, 36, 164). The distinction 
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between reasonable disagreement and general disagreement is essential to understanding how the 
citizens of a contemporary liberal democracy might achieve a public agreement on a single 
conception of justice to regulate the basic structure of their society. 
According to political liberals, the presence of a plurality of competing, conflicting and 
irreconcilable reasonable comprehensive doctrines is an innate feature of democratic societies. In 
other words, reasonable disagreement is not "a mere historical condition that may soon pass 
away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture of democracy," and as such, it will develop 
and persist in all democratic societies (Rawls 1993: 36). Given this fact, any conception of justice 
that hopes to secure the overlapping consensus required to establish and sustain a well-ordered 
society must be able to accommodate a diversity of antagonistic and incompatible reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. A conception of justice animated by the notion of reasonable 
disagreement is able to do so by embodying the belief that democratic societies will always contain 
a plurality of conflicting and irreconcilable reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and recognising 
that it is unreasonable either to attempt to prohibit the public affirmation of any reasonable doctrine 
or to try to regulate the basic structure of society according to the dictates of a single 
comprehensive doctrine. As Rawls notes, the force required to achieve such objectives is 
incompatible with the fundamental ideas innate to liberal societies, and therefore unacceptable to 
the citizens of contemporary liberal democracies (Rawls 1989: 242). 
Political liberals do not consider the coercive use of state power in and of itself 
problematic; indeed, they recognise that "the political power exercised within a political 
relationship is always coercive power backed by the state's machinery for enforcing its laws" 
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(Rawls 1989: 242; see also Larmore 1999: 607; and Shklar 1989: 29). For political liberals, the 
coercive use of state power is unacceptable only when it is employed to enforce obedience to a 
particular comprehensive doctrine thereby denying the truth or validity of opposing moral 
judgments. 
Subsequently, political liberals contend that it is acceptable for those participating in the 
overlapping consensus to exercise their political power over those outside of the consensus, 
provided that this power "is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which 
all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable 
to them as reasonable and rational" (Rawls 1993: 217). By recognising and making 
accommodations for the diversity of views likely to exist in contemporary democratic societies, 
a conception of justice based upon the notion of reasonable disagreement can expect to obtain, 
without the widespread and continual or frequent use of unacceptable state coercion, the support 
of a majority of the citizenry and in so doing secure the political stability needed to establish and 
sustain a well-ordered democratic society. 
To summarise: Given the ineliminable pluralistic character of contemporary liberal 
democracies, any conception of justice that hopes to secure the degree of voluntary support 
needed to achieve the sought after political stability, must allow for the public affirmation and 
pursuit of a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In tum, 
only a conception of justice premised upon the notion of reasonable disagreement can satisfy such 
a prerequisite and thereby provide the basis for an overlapping consensus, which is alone in its 
ability to secure the type of political stability necessary to establish and sustain a well-ordered 
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society. Hence, once one recognises that reasonable disagreement is an inherent feature of all 
democratic societies, the need for an overlapping consensus and, by extension, a political 
conception ofjustice, becomes evident Indeed, the fact of reasonable disagreement and the idea 
of an overlapping consensus are inextricably connected. The fact of reasonable disagreement 
necessitates the achievement of an overlapping consensus if political stability is to be secured, and 
the establishment of an overlapping consensus (and, by extension, the viability of the concept of 
political liberalism) is dependent upon the widespread acceptance of the notion of reasonable 
disagreement and adherence to its associated demands. 
It is here worth noting a potential criticism surrounding my use of the term ''reasonable 
disagreement." It might be argued that I have used the term "reasonable disagreement" to 
represent what Rawls refers to as "reasonable pluralism," and in so doing I have belittled an 
important distinction between Larmore's conception of political hberalism and that ofRawls. After 
all, does not Larmore explicitly claim that the concept of reasonable disagreement is significantly 
different from that of pluralism? Indeed, Larmore argues that"[ t ]he expectation of reasonable 
disagreement is, in fact, a more unsettling view than pluralism, one that runs contrary to some of 
the deepest preconceptions in the Western tradition. It is the recognition that, on matters of 
supreme importance, reason is not likely to bring us together, but tends rather to drive us apart" 
(Larmore 1996: 12). The trouble, according to Larmore, is that many (if not most) 
theorists-including Rawls-continue to confuse the fact of reasonable disagreement with the 
notion of pluralism (Larmore 1996: 153-154), and in so doing they incorrectly make the focus 
oftheir analysis the dilemmas associated with pluralism. Larmore defines pluralism as "the 
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conviction that in the end the human good is not one, but many, its different forms irreducible to 
any single basis such as pleasure, freedom, or knowledge" (Larmore 1996: 12). Pluralism differs 
from the fact of reasonable disagreement in that "pluralism has to do not with disagreement about 
ideals, but with agreement about the independent and equal value of different ideals" (Larmore 
1987: xii-xiii). 
A conception of liberalism that takes the notion of pluralism-as understood by 
Lannore-as its fundamental concern is itself"a very controversial doctrine" (Larmore 1996: 154) 
and "one of the things about which reasonable people [will] disagree" (Larmore 1996: 12). 
Consequently, any conception of justice that rests "essentially on the acceptance of pluralism" 
(Lannore 1996: 154) will itselfbecome"justanotherpartoftheproblem" that it is supposed to 
resolve (Lannore 1996: 151 ). Conceptions of justice animated by the notion of pluralism can only 
further compound the problem of reasonable disagreement. By confusing the fact of reasonable 
disagreement with the notion of pluralism, theorists fail to address the reality of contemporary 
moral conflict effectively and in so doing preclude the possibility of developing a conception of 
justice that accords the appropriate and required degree of respect to all individuals. Absent the 
necessary degree of respect, it is impossible to secure the conditions required to establish and 
sustain a just and stable liberal democracy. Hence it is imperative that anyone hoping to develop 
a viable conception of political liberalism clearly understands the difference between the fact of 
reasonable disagreement and the notion of pluralism and ensures that his conception takes as its 
focal point the former and not the latter. Only by doing so can one hope to generate the kind of 
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uncontroversial paradigm needed to achieve the type of public consensus necessary to secure the 
stability required to establish and sustain a well-ordered democratic regime. 
However, having noted this problem, and despite his initial argument (seemingly) to the 
contrary, Larmore concludes that Rawls' characterisation and use of the term reasonable 
pluralism is in fact quite compatible with his (Larmore's) own understanding of reasonable 
disagreement (Larmore 1996: esp. 154, 170; see also Larmore 1999: 602). In the final analysis, 
then, though Larmore employs slightly different terminology than that used by Rawls and initially 
suggests that this difference has important consequences, the effect of their arguments is, 
according to Larmore, identical. Both conclude that resolving the problem of political stability 
requires the development of a conception ofjustice that effectively accommodates the problem 
of doctrinal disagreement among reasonable people. 
IV. Reasonable Citizens 
Political liberals maintain that all reasonable and rational citizens will recognise and accept the fact 
of reasonable disagreement and voluntarily adhere to its dictates. In essence, ''reasonable" citizens 
are those who "seek a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others 
on terms all can accept" (Rawls 1993: 50-51). More specifically, 
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social 
cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms of social 
cooperation ( defmed by principles and ideals) and they agree to act on those terms, even 
at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others also accept 
those terms (Rawls 1996: xliv). 
It might be argued that the above definition of a "reasonable" citizen does not represent a 
universally accepted understanding among political liberals, and to present it as such is not only 
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misleading but also potentially problematic. It is problematic insofar as the notion of'1'easonable" 
is a pivotal component of the concept of political liberalism, and thus the conclusion( s) of any 
assessmentoftheviabilityoftheideaofapurelypoliticalliberalismwillbesignificantlyinfluenced 
by the definition of "reasonable" attributed to it. 
Larmore, for example, seems to reject the above definition in favour of what he labels a 
more "abstract" definition (Larmore 1999: 602). In "The Moral Basis ofPolitical Liberalism," 
Larmore states: "I should point out that in referring to reasonableness, I do not mean quite what 
Rawls himself does. He means by it the moral commitment to seek and to abide by fair principles 
of cooperation, particularly in view of the extent to which people tend to naturally disagree in their 
comprehensive conceptions ofhuman flourishing; thus he [Rawls] distinguishes the reasonable 
from the rationaf' (Larmore 1999: 601 ). Larmore, on the other hand, uses "reasonableness" 
more generally to refer to ''the free and open exercise of the basic capacities of reason'' (Larmore 
1999: 602 ), and in so doing he makes no distinction between reasonableness and rationality. 
"Reasonable people according to ... [Larmore's] usage are therefore rationar' (Larmore 1999: 
602). However, after presenting his distinction, Larmore notes that ''reasonable" people as he 
understands them may also be "reasonable in Rawls' sense ... if they are concerned to reason 
about how best to be fair (though their commitment to fairness will not follow from being 
reasonable alone)" (Larmore 1999: 602). More importantly, Larmore follows this somewhat 
qualified concession with the acknowledgment that, when all is said and done, the difference 
betweenhisandRawls'useofthetermreasonable''isonlyterminological"(Larmore 1999: 602). 
Also worth noting is Shklar' s perspective on this issue. She adopts a somewhat unique 
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approach among political liberals insofar as she remains silent in terms of offering an explicit 
definition of a ''reasonable" citizen. However, though she refrains from providing such a definition, 
it is quite clear that to the degree that some individuals affirm certain beliefs-for example, the 
belief that all people have the right to be free from the fear of fear and cruelty-and others do not, 
one can discern a tangible distinction between ''reasonable" and ''unreasonable" citizens in her 
conception of political liberalism. In tum, her understanding of the characteristics of a reasonable 
citizen is certainly compatible with that ofRawls and Larmore. In the final analysis, then, the 
proposed definition of''reasonable" herein assigned to political liberalism represents, in effect if 
not in presentation, an understanding shared by the prominent paradigmatic conceptions of 
political liberalism. 
Reasonable citizens so understood will recognise that the achievement of the social world 
they seek requires that they treat their fellow citizens in a ''reasonable" manner (i.e., as free and 
equal beings). Reasonable treatment, in tum, necessitates that in the case of a conflict between the 
values of one's comprehensive doctrine and the political values of the public conception of justice, 
primacy be assigned to political values-i.e., to those values that all reasonable people can 
reasonably be expected to endorse voluntarily. According to political liberals, this caveat is 
unproblematic, because the desire to secure a well-ordered society, coupled with the inherent 
compatibility of a political conception of justice and reasonable comprehensive doctrines, 7 
engenders an atmosphere in which political values will normally outweigh, yet not outvalue, 
nonpolitical values. This seemingly paradoxical feat is possible, it is claimed, because each citizen's 
"overall view" consists of two distinct yet related views: "one ... can be seen to be, or to coincide 
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with, thepubliclyrecognized political conception of justice; the other ... is a(fully or partially) 
comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in some manner related" (Rawls 1993: 
38, 140). If political values are to achieve the required status, individuals must forsake the" 'cult 
ofwholeness' "and "embraceacertaindifferentiationbetween ... [their] role as citizens, free of 
status and ascription, and ... [their] other roles where ... [they] may be engaged with others in the 
pursuit of substantial ideals of the good life" (Larmore 1996: 141). 
Political liberals believe that such a differentiation is not only possible but is indeed a 
recognisable part of the public culture of contemporary Western liberal democracies (e.g., Rawls 
1993: 38, 140, 167; Larmore 1996: 135, 145, 151). In tum, the seemingly schizophrenic 
character of one's overall view enables individuals to separate public (i.e., political) from private 
(i.e., nonpolitical) concerns. Given this fact, political liberals argue that political values may 
simultaneously be equal yet pre-eminent because 1) individuals are able to assign primacy to the 
political values of the conception of justice without having to compromise adherence to the 
nonpolitical values of their own comprehensive doctrine and can therefore affirm the conception 
of justice as compatible with their comprehensive views (Rawls 1993: 157); 2) a political 
conception of justice can be affirmed from within the framework of a wide variety of 
comprehensive doctrines and this enables the establishment of an overlapping consensus which 
significantly reduces the likelihood of divisive conflicts between political and nonpolitical values;8 
and 3) because ''the values that conflict with the political conception of justice and its sustaining 
[values] ... conflict with the very conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing 
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of mutual respecf' (Rawls 1993: 157), individuals will naturally be inclined to assign pre-eminence 
to political values.9 
V. The Primacy of Reasonableness 
In assigning primacy to the political values of the conception of justice, citizens are, in effect, 
assigning primacy to reasonableness. Reasonable citizens will recognise that reasonableness must 
be the final court of appeal in relation to decisions concerning conflict( s) between competing 
values: indeed, it must be the standard used to judge the validity of all "public" claims. Only by 
assigning primacy to reasonableness, as opposed to a single understanding of the truth, can one 
exhibit the requisite degree of respect for one's fellow citizens. To employ a different standard 
would be to disrespect and degrade others' beliefs, and thereby effectively preclude the 
achievement of a polity in which all citizens are able to "cooperate with others on terms all can 
accept"-the very foundation of a well-ordered society. In this respect, reasonableness serves 
to guide and temper individuals' behaviour to the extent that makes it possible for the adherents 
of a wide diversity of competing, conflicting, and often irreconcilable and incommensurable 
comprehensive views to all agree on a single conception of justice to regulate society's basic 
structure. 
It might be argued that not all political liberals would agree with the above description of 
the role of reasonableness, especially with respect to its ability to serve as a moderating and 
u:irifying force. For example, whereas Rawls clearly believes that reason( ableness) can and will 
guide and temper individuals' behaviour in the desired manner, Lannore explicitly argues that in 
an atmosphere of doctrinal diversity such as that which is present in many contemporary societies, 
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reason( ableness) alone cannot provide, at least not to the extent that Rawls suggests, the basis for 
the type of overlapping consensus demanded by political liberalism (Larmore 1996: 127). Such 
a difference, if present, would represent an important distinction between two of the principal 
proponents ofpoliticalliberalism and would critically undermine one of the foundational arguments 
of this thesis: namely, that the prominent, paradigmatic conceptions ofpoliticalliberalism are 
sufficiently similar in all important respects to allow their conflation for the purposes of analysis. 
Accordingly, before proceeding any further, it is necessary to determine ifLarmore' s use of 
reason( ableness) differs notably from that ofRawls. A brief review of the relevant arguments of 
Rawls and Larmore will help to answer this question. 
For Rawls, reasonableness is arguably the ''final authority" (e.g., O'Sullivan 1997: 7 41-
7 42; DePau11998; Nielsen 1998; Mandie 1999; andY oung 2001 ): Thatis, the viability ofhis 
conception is inextricably dependent upon the presence and "appropriate" influence of 
reason( ableness ). This is a condition that is directly and indirectly reiterated throughout the entirety 
of Political Liberalism. Larmore, however, appears purposely to assign reasonableness a more 
secondary, subordinate role. Indeed, he seems to make a concerted effort to emphasise that the 
viability ofhis conception is not reliant-or, at least not as reliant as is Rawls'-upon the 
moderating and unifying force of reason( ableness ). Larmore's decision to adopt this approach 
reflects his belief that an appeal to reason(ableness) cannot guarantee consensus. 
Whereas Larmore recommends the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect on the 
basis that they are norms that all reasonable people can reasonably be expected to endorse 
voluntarily, he is quick to add that "[t]his does not mean ... that the norms of rational dialogue and 
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equal respect are implicitly contained in the bare notion of reasonableness" (Lannore 1996: 134). 
''The point is not to show thatreasonablepeople, no matter what else they believe, must affirm 
them" (Lannore 1996: 134). Thus it should not be presumed that the norms of rational dialogue 
and equal respect ''will recommend themselves to all humanity by the idea of reason alone" 
(Lannore 1996: 134). Indeed, "reasonableness alone ... is too thin a basis for choosing between 
rival [norms]" (Lannore 1996: 127). Hence, reasonableness-''that is, thinking and conversing in 
good faith and applying, as best one can, the general capacities of reason that belong to every 
domain ofinquiry"-is no guarantee of consensus (Lannore 1996: 122). This is especially true with 
regards to securing widespread public agreement on a definition of the good life. Indeed, Larmore 
argues that ''the nature of the good life in a great many of its aspects has come to seem a topic on 
which disagreement among reasonable people is not accidental, but to be expected" (Larmore 
1996: 122). Moreover, "On matters of supreme importance, the more we talk with one another, 
the more we disagree" (Lannore 1996: 122). If reason( ableness) cannot ensure consensus, then, 
according to Lannore, it cannot be expected to serve as the final authority for a viable conception 
of political liberalism. Subsequently, Larmore argues that it is impossible to develop a viable 
conception of political liberalism that is dependent upon the moderating and unifYing force of 
reason(ableness)-the inevitability of reasonable disagreement makes it impossible to do so. 
Such a position would seem to differ notably from that ofRawls. Rawls explicitly argues 
and continually emphasises that the political values that comprise his conception ofpolitical 
liberalism are values ''that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse in light of their 
common human reason" (Rawls 1993: 140, emphasis added). He concludes that all reasonable 
116 
people will voluntarily affirm the political values embodied in his conception of justice. Though 
Rawls concedes that even reasonable people will at times disagree with one another over matters 
of the ''first significance" (Rawls 1989: 23 8), he believes that such disagreement will be so 
infrequent that it need not be a significant concern. Recognising that ''the values that conflict with 
the political conception of justice and its sustaining [values] ... conflict with the very conditions that 
make fair social cooperation possible on a footing of mutual respect" (Rawls 1993: 157), it is 
unlikely that reasonable people will affirm any such conflicting values. Moreover, Rawls seems to 
hold out hope that even in those rare instances of conflict over matters of the first significance, 
somehow the power of reason will persuade individuals to act in a reasonable manner. 
Understanding the potentially severe consequences-namely, the destabilisation of society-of 
such conflict, reasonable people will be extremely hesitant to believe that any conflict of values 
"justifies their opposing the political conception as a whole, or on such matters as liberty of 
conscience, or equal political liberties, or basic civil rights" (Rawls 1993: 155). 
But does Lann.ore really disavow the moderating and unifying force of reason( ableness )? 
On the surface, perhaps. However, once one digs deeper and reveals the fundamental 
assumptions that underlie Larmore's arguments, it becomes clear that the viability of his 
conception is equally as reliant as is Rawls' upon the presence and appropriate influence of 
reason( ableness ). For example, Lannore' s focus on ''reasonable" disagreement-the foundation 
ofhis conception-is undeniably crucial to the success ofhis argument. Lannore, knowingly or 
otherwise, uses the notion of reasonable disagreement to moderate the demands that must be 
accommodated if his conception is to secure the desired support. By limiting the locus to 
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"reasonable" disagreement, Lannore restricts the type of conflicts and demands that individuals 
must admit into the public realm, and thereby makes possible a widespread public agreement on 
a single conception of justice. It would, after all, be unrealistic to expect reasonable people 
voluntarily to support a conception ofjustice that requires that they accept unreasonable demands. 
Though Lannore is surprisingly vague in tenns of defining the precise difference between 
"reasonable" and "unreasonable" disagreement, it is clear that only the former must be 
accommodated in order to achieve the necessary consensus on a public conception of justice. In 
turn, only by enabling the achievement of such a consensus can one hope to secure the conditions 
required for the establishment and preservation of a just and stable liberal democracy. In this 
context, the achievement of the sought after consensus is dependent upon individuals needing to 
accommodate only "reasonable" disagreement: to demand something more would be to forsake 
the achievement of the required consensus. In essence, then, using the adjective "reasonable" 
serves to moderate the demands that the public conception of justice must accommodate and that 
individuals must accept, and in so doing makes possible the required consensus and, subsequently, 
the realisation of a just and stable liberal democracy. 
The term "reasonable" plays a similar role with respect to narrowing to a manageable 
degree the audience that must be satisfied with any proposed conception of justice in order for 
it to be correctly considered viable. Lannore emphasises the need for the conception of justice 
to secure the support of "reasonable" people. Though his description of the principal 
characteristics of a reasonable person is painfully general in nature-a reasonable person is 
someone who thinks and converses in good faith and applies, as best he can, "the general 
118 
capacities of reason that belong to every domain of inquiry" (Larmore 1996: 122)-the frequency 
with which Larmore specifically identifies "reasonable" people as the focus of concern rules out 
the possibility that such references are unintentional or inconsequential. Obviously, not all people 
can correctly be considered reasonable, otherwise there would be no need to specify a particular 
type of person. Larmore leaves no doubt that it is the support of reasonable people that must, first 
and foremost, be secured. To this end, developing a conception of justice that can serve as the 
basis for a just and stable liberal democracy requires identifying ''what reasonable people can still 
share, despite their differences about the good life" (Larmore 1999: 602). Once again, then, 
Larmore uses the adjective ''reasonable" both to distinguish and limit the criteria that a conception 
of justice must satisfy in order for it to be considered viable, and to moderate the demands upon 
the conception of justice in a manner that enables it to secure the public support needed to 
establish and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy. 
Larmore argues that while the use of force to secure continued adherence to the 
conception of justice is unavoidable, such force is legitimate only insofar as it is accompanied by 
"reasonable agreement about the rules to be enforced" (Larmore 1999: 607). To try to force 
compliance to principles that are not the subject of such agreement would be to treat individuals 
"merely as means, as objects of coercion, and not also as ends" (Larmore 1999: 607). Larmore 
contends that the only effective way to avoid such a problem is to ensure that the conception of 
justice embodies an equal respect for all persons. According to Larmore, it is our commitment to 
equal respect that drives us to seek reasonable agreement, not vice versa. "In other words, the 
guiding aim ofpoliticalliberalism is not to devise political principles by appeal simply to whatever 
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might tum out to be common ground among divergent views. It is instead to base such principles 
precisely on the moral norms that impel us to seek common ground as far as possible" (Lannore 
1996: 145). 
What is problematic for Lannore' s argument, however, is that enacting Lannoreanrespect 
also requires that individuals freely and willingly affirm the belief that views that may irreconcilably 
conflict with their own, nevertheless deserve to be treated with equal respect. Only by voluntarily 
embracing such a belief do individuals treat others as ''beings capable of thinking and acting on 
the basis of reasons"-as both means and ends-thereby "engaging directly their distinctive 
capacity as persons" (Larmore 1999: 607) and enabling the achievement of the required 
consensus. But why should or would people freely and willingly affirm such a belief? 
Larmore maintains that the citizens of contemporary liberal societies can be expected to 
affirm such a belief not merely because it is a common and generally accepted feature of the 
public culture of such societies or because a shared human reason will direct or convince them 
to do so, as Rawls seems to argue. Rather, said citizens will believe that given the fact o.f 
reasonable disagreement (and all of its accompanying demands) and the widely accepted 
understanding of persons as free and equal agents, a conception of justice based upon the notion 
of equal respect represents a morally legitimate and just paradigm. In essence, such a 
conception is morally legitimate and just, because it treats all individuals as ''beings capable of 
thinking and acting on the basis of reasons," and in so doing, it allows all individuals to affirm and 
publicly pursue their own particular vision of the good life. This fact ensures that a conception of 
justice developed around the notion of equal respect (and complimented by the norm of rational 
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dialogue) can-and will-be voluntarily endorsed by the adherents of a wide diversity of 
competing, conflicting, and irreconcilable views, and thus obtain the support of the majority of 
citizens. By making it possible for a majority ofthecitizemyto endorseasingleconceptionof 
justice freely and willingly, Larmore's paradigm can secure the required political stability. For 
Larmore, then, it is the moral legitimacy and justness and not the reasonableness of his 
conception that enables it to achieve the sought after results. 
However, Lannore is, in effect, merely substituting notions such as mora/legitimacy and 
justness for that of reasonableness. The reason that his conception is morally legitimate and just 
is because given the fact of reasonable disagreement and the generally accepted understanding 
of persons as free and equal agents, his conception offers the most reasonable paradigm. It offers 
the most reasonable paradigm because it allows all reasonable individuals to support it without 
having to compromise, transgress or forsake any of their fundamental values. In doing so, it 
enables all reasonable people to pursue and potentially realise their own particular interests and 
goals, thereby "engaging directly their distinctive capacity as persons." Only a conception that 
holds the promise of fulfilling such a condition can correctly be considered to exhibit the necessary 
respect for individuals; and only by expressing the necessary respect can a conception reasonably 
be expected to obtain the free and willing support of a majority of reasonable people and thereby 
generate the conditions needed to establish and maintain a just and stable liberal democracy. 
In other words, Lannore' s conception is morally legitimate and just only insofar as it treats 
all individuals in an equally respectful manner; it satisfies this prerequisite to the degree that it 
engages persons both as means and ends. Fulfilling such a condition requires that it accommodate 
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the fact of reasonable disagreement, which it does to the extent that it enables all reasonable 
people to affirm the public conception of justice voluntarily; it achieves this goal only insofar as it 
is perceived to allow all reasonable people to affirm and publicly pursue their individual 
conceptions of the good. In order for a person to believe this to be the case, he must first believe 
that all individuals deserve to be treated with equal respect. Though there can be no certainty that 
all reasonable people will voluntarily affirm the norm of equal respect, it is surely true that 
reasonable people are much more likely than others to do so. There is no indication that Larmore 
would disagree with this conclusion. Indeed, knowingly or otherwise, Larmore is arguing that 
reasonable people will share a "commitment to organize political life" around those beliefs and 
values that all reasonable people can reasonably be expected to endorse (Larmore 1999: 602); 
foremost among these is the belief in equal respect. At the very least, it is certain that the type of 
voluntary, sincere, and reliable support required to establish and sustain a well-ordered society 
cannot reasonably be expected from unreasonable people. 
In essence, then, Larmore's conception can achieve its stated aims only if its target 
audience is comprised primarily of reasonable people (as identified by Larmore) who believe that 
his conception adequately responds to the problem of reasonable disagreement. In this respect, 
Lannore' s notion and use of"reasonable(ness )"serves a moderating and unifying function: it 
provides specific parameters which guide one's understanding of the requirements associated with 
an acceptable and viable public conception ofjustice. Though such a conception may need to be 
morally legitimate, just, and common to the public culture, it must, above all else, also be able to 
secure the supportofthemajorityofthe citizenry, and it will be able to do this only if it effectively 
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addressestheproblemofreasonabledisagreement, whichitcandoonlyifittreatspeopleina 
reasonable manner-i.e., with equal respect. Only by satisfying the above criteria can it 
reasonably be hoped that the conception of justice will be considered acceptable to the majority 
of the citizenry. 
The reason that the norms of equal respect and rational dialogue are judged by Larmore 
to be the only viable foundation for anon-coercive public conception of justice for contemporary 
pluralistic societies is because given the fact of reasonable disagreement and the common 
understanding of persons as free and equal, they are norms that all (or, at least, the majority of) 
reasonable people can reasonably be expected to affirm freely and willingly. Only by securing 
such support can one reasonably hope to generate the conditions needed to establish and sustain 
a just and stable liberal democracy. Thus, in the final analysis, the validity and viability of 
Larmore's conception are a product of its reasonableness. 
It might also be suggested that Shklar presents an understanding of the role of 
reason( ableness) that differs radically from that ofRawls and Larmore. Whereas the success of 
bothRawlsian and Larmorean political liberalism is conditional upon the ability of reason( ableness) 
to secure the framework for the estab~ishment and maintenance of an overlapping consensus on 
a single political conception of justice, Shklar argues that such an expectation and goal are 
unrealistic and must be avoided if one hopes to generate the conditions needed to protect 
individual freedom effectively and in so doing offer the basis for a truly just liberal society. Shklar 
explicitly condemns as dangerously utopian the position adopted by Rawls, Larmore, and all 
others who premise the viability of their conceptions upon something as subjective and 
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unpredictableashumanreason(ableness) (e.g., Shklar 1989; see also Shklar 1966: 19). This 
condemnation represents a crucial distinction between Shklar' s understanding of the proper 
character of political liberalism and that ofRawls and Larmore. But does Shklar' s disavowal of 
any dependency upon reason(ableness) translate into a practical avoidance of the same? 
Shklar contends that Rawls and his ilk are too optimistic regarding the possibilities of 
humanity. Despite overwhelming historical evidence suggesting the folly of such optimism, they 
nevertheless remain members of the "party ofhope" (Shklar 1989: 26), 10 and this is a fundamental 
and extremely dangerous flaw that cannot be countenanced. One of the more prominent and 
pervasive manifestations of this flaw is the crucial role that Rawls and Larmore assign to 
reason( ableness ). As previously noted, the viability ofRawlsian and Larmorean political hberalism 
is dependent upon the ability of reason( ableness) to unify and temper individual behaviour in the 
public sphere in such a manner as to secure the conditions required to achieve widespread public 
agreement on a single conception of justice to regulate the basic structure of society. Only if the 
majorityofthecitizemypossessesthesameunderstandingoftherequirementsofreason(ableness) 
and faithfully acts in a reasonable manner is it possible to secure such an agreement and thereby 
obtain the type of political stability required to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal 
democracy. Both Rawls and Larmore believe that not only is it possible to achieve the necessary 
unity of understanding and behaviour, but, indeed, such a unity is a characteristic of existing 
Western liberal democracies. 
Shklar labels such beliefs utopian and dangerous; they embody an obvious disregard for 
the painful lessons ofhistory and the ''undeniable actualities" (Shklar 1989: 27) of contemporary 
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societies, and in so doing not only allow but invite the occurrence of new cruelties and horrors. 
Not surprisingly, then, Shklar refuses to premise the success of her political liberalism on 
something as idiosyncratic and unpredictable as the reasonableness (or, for that matter, any other 
potential capacity) of man. Rather, she develops her conception around the idea of a summum 
malum-the abuse of public power and the resulting cruelty and fear-from which all individuals 
must be effectively protected if they are to realise the personal freedom they require to pursue a 
life of their own choosing and design. By "putting cruelty first" (Shklar 1989: 29, 3 7), Shklar 
believes that her conception of political liberalism generates goals the achievement of which are 
not dependent upon the realisation of a utopian ideal. She maintains that all humans possess a 
natural fear of cruelty (Shklar 1989: 29), and as such it is not, as reasonableness is, an ideal that 
needs to be realised: the universal fear of cruelty will always be a feature ofhuman existence. 
Accordingly, by basing her conception on the innate desire to avoid cruelty, and presenting as its 
goal the prevention and reduction of cruelty, Shklar believes she has established a guiding principle 
that is both realistic and inherently universal in character, and an objective-the reduction and 
prevention of public cruelty-that is realisable. But has Shklar fully explored all of the potential 
problems associated with the operationalisation of her argument? 
Let us assume that Shklar is correct in her assertion that all humans possess a natural fear 
of cruelty and will seek to avoid it whenever possible; this fact alone does not eliminate the need 
for Shklar' s conception to rely on reason( ableness) or to secure an overlapping consensus in 
order to achieve its stated aims. Even if one accepts Shklar' s claim regarding the universal desire 
to avoid fear, the ability of such a claim to serve as the foundation for a political conception of 
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justice which avoids all reliance upon the moderating and unifying role of reason( ableness) is 
dependent upon all individuals possessing the same definition of cruelty. Shklar defines cruelty as 
"the deliberate infliction of physical, and secondarily emotional, pain upon a weaker person or 
group by stronger ones in order to achieve some end, tangible or intangible, of the latter'' (Shklar 
1989: 29). While Shklar's association of cruelty with physical and emotional pain is 
understandable and undoubtedly something with which all individuals could generally agree, there 
seems to be no conclusive evidence or overwhelming reason to believe that all individuals would 
agree that the purposeful infliction of such pain always constitutes an unacceptable cruelty and, 
subsequently, something from which people should be protected. 
Consider the debate surrounding the use of corporal punishment to effect desirable 
behaviour among children. Many parents believe that it is their right as a parent to discipline their 
child(ren) in the manner that they deem most appropriate and effective, within ''reasonable" limits. 
It could be argued that the physical pain caused by the infliction of a reasonable punishment is a 
positive method of modifying a child's behaviour insofar as it helps to teach a child the difference 
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and in so doing helps to protect not only the 
child but other members of society from even greater future pain and cruelty. This argument could 
be extended (albeit, likely with notably less support) to the use of corporal punishment in public 
schools; in this context, it might be claimed that corporal punishment properly dispensed will help 
dissuade children from engaging in behaviour that prevents or jeopardises either the establishment 
or maintenance of a positive learning environment. From the perspective of its proponents, then, 
the use of corporal punishment-and, by extension, the accompanying physical and emotional 
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pain-helps to produce a civil, respectful, and educated citizenry which, in turn, generates 
significant benefits for all members of the society. Such ''public" benefits, however, are possible 
only if the application of corporal punishment is secured by public law-i.e., state-sanctioned. 
Consider also the use of chemical agents to disperse protesters engaged in peaceful but 
disruptive demonstrations. There is no question that individuals exposed to such agents experience 
a notable amount of physical pain and discomfort, and in this respect the use of such agents could 
be labeled "cruel." It is, however, also true that there is debate as to appropriateness and 
acceptability of employing such means for such a purpose. It is commonly argued that peaceful 
demonstration is the "lifeblood" of democracy, and as such it is never appropriate or acceptable 
to use chemical agents to disrupt such activities or to dissuade individuals from participating in 
them. It could, however, also be argued that the pain and fear caused by chemical agents properly 
used is less than might otherwise have to be inflicted to achieve the same results, and therefore the 
use of such agents and the accompanying pain and fear is, at worst, an instance of employing the 
lesser of two evils. In other words, the use of chemical agents for such purposes is akin to inflicting 
a limited degree of pain and fear in order to avoid causing a greater degree of pain and fear-in 
effect, Shklar's "rule of avoidance" (Shklar 1989: 30). 
One might protest that the cruelty from which Shklar seeks to protect us is the fear of the 
"pain inflicted by others to kill and maim us" (Shklar 1989: 29). Subsequently, the use of state-
sanctioned corporal punishment against children, whether by their parents or by administrators in 
public schools, or the use of chemical agents against protesters do not constitute valid examples 
of the type of cruelty with which Shklar is concerned. However, according to Shklar, individuals 
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must be equally protected from both physical and emotional pain if they are to realise the 
personal freedom that respects their dignity as persons (Shklar 1989: 30). Indeed, Shklar states 
thatitis fear, not the concrete act of cruelty or the infliction of physical pain, per se, that "makes 
freedom impossible" (Shklar 1989: 29); if this is true, then the actual physical repercussions of an 
action are ofless importance than the imagined threat. That is to say, it is the individual's 
perception of the potential threat, rather than the likely or predictable consequences of an action, 
that will impede his personal freedom. 
Moreover, the fear ofbeing killed or maimed is not the only fear likely to be considered 
an unacceptable or "cruel" impedimentto one's personal freedom. The threat ofless physically 
disastrous consequences is also able to generate a significant degree of fear among many 
individuals. For example, the threat of incarceration or having one's child(ren) removed to the 
custody of a governmental agency often produces a fear powerful enough to prevent individuals 
from adopting or continuing a particular lifestyle that they would otherwise choose to embrace. 
In such cases, the fear in question certainly inhibits the ability of such individuals to pursue a freely 
chosen conception of the good life. Even the establishment of mandatory seatbelt or motorcycle 
helmet laws could be said to restrict unreasonably the personal freedom of those who are subject 
to these laws. Individuals living in jurisdictions that maintain such laws could argue that they are 
being subjected to an unacceptable level of fear oflegal persecution when they choose to exercise 
their personal freedom by not wearing a seatbelt or not wearing a helmet while operating a 
motorcycle. The point is this: in all of the above noted cases, individuals who disagree with the 
existing laws can reasonably argue that the fear oflegal persecution for disobeying said laws 
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inhibits their personal freedom in an unacceptable manner. In this context, the use of corporal 
punishment or chemical agents could certainly qualify as an unacceptable cruelty. 
Potentially more problematic is the possibility that the fear of merely being denied the right 
to engage in certain activities might provoke some individuals to behave in a manner that will prove 
to be physically and emotionally painful-indeed, potentially fatal-for others. Consider the 
actions of certain religious sects or paramilitary militia groups in the United States. A belief that 
existing governments were failing to secure the proper local or national (or even international) 
environment while simultaneously prohibiting certain behaviours or activities deemed essential to 
the continued functioning and prosperity of these groups has been perceived by their members to 
pose a sufficient threat to their particular way oflife to warrant a significant reaction. The actions 
taken by some of these groups (the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, for example) in response 
to perceived threat( s ), have at times been sufficiently extreme to pose a serious risk to the physical 
safety and emotional well-being of many individuals, and, indeed, have resulted in death, serious 
injury, and substantial emotional trauma for many of those involved. 
Accordingly, it would be a mistake to assume that the fear ofbeing killed or maimed is 
the only fear able or likely to impede one's personal freedom or to elicit fearful reactions, and thus 
the only fear correctly associated with cruelty. Other less physically threatening potentialities are 
also likely to generate fears that significantly inhibit personal freedom and in so doing constitute 
what their victims would likely consider to be unacceptable or cruel impediments to the realisation 
of their respective visions of the good life. However, i±: in tum, cruelty is to be understood as any 
action that purposely or knowingly produces physical or emotional pain or the fear of such pain, 
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then it is unlikely that all individuals would agree that "public" cruelty (Shklar 1989: 29) is 
something that should always be avoided or prevented. More importantly, even if cruelty is 
defined as the purposeful or knowing infliction of unnecessary pain or fear, achieving a universal 
agreement on precisely what constitutes cruelty will still be much more problematic than merely 
agreeing that it is desirable to avoid cruelty. These difficulties are important for the following 
reasons. 
Before one can identify the measures needed to protect all individuals equally from 
cruelty and fear-the type of protection that Shklar is seeking-it is necessary to develop a 
definition of cruelty that all citizens can voluntarily support. Only after having done so can one 
determine "appropriate" and effective means for the prevention and reduction of cruelty and fear. 
Yet, if, as the above discussion suggests, conflicting and irreconcilable understandings of the 
precise character of cruelty are inevitable, then securing the required support will be dependent 
upon all parties respecting the beliefs of others, at least insofar as achieving the desired agreement 
necessitates accepting a definition of cruelty that might not be identical to one's own. 
Of course, it will be neither possible nor desirable to accommodate all beliefs. It is 
inevitable that, for any number of reasons, certain individuals will affirm and promote beliefs the 
public operationalisation of which would violate fundamental principles ofliberal democracy. 
Consequently, certain boundaries demarcating what constitutes an (un)acceptable belief will have 
to be established. In a liberal society guided by a political conception of justice, the logical 
boundary between the publicly acceptable and unacceptable would be that between the 
reasonable and unreasonable. Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend how it could be otherwise: one 
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is unlikely to consider an unreasonable definition to be acceptable, or vice versa. Moreover, in 
contemporary liberal democracies, arguments publicly promoting and defending the legitimacy and 
acceptability of a specific definition of cruelty are likely to be presented in terms of whether it is 
(un)reasonable to expect others to accept voluntarily the demands associated with the definition 
in question. Hence it would seem that the realisation of the type of equal protection that Shklar 
seeks is dependent upon developing a ''reasonable" definition of cruelty. In tum, citizens' 
acceptance of and continued support for such a definition can be assured only if they faithfully act 
in a reasonable manner: i.e., if they accept the need to respect and accommodate beliefs that 
conflict with their own and recognise that it is an insult to their fellow citizens' dignity as persons 
to attempt to impose a particular belief (such as a specific definition of cruelty) upon them. 
Shklarmight have argued that individuals would support her definition for purely pragmatic 
reasons. Yet, if an individual believes that Shklar' s definition of cruelty is, for example, too lenient 
and the practical consequences of its public adoption will inhibit his freedom to raise his children 
in an appropriate manner (e.g., make it illegal for him to use corporal punishmentto teach his 
children the difference between right and wrong), then he is unlikely to consider it "pragmatic" to 
support Shklar' s definition of cruelty. This is to say nothing of the difficulties posed by human 
fickleness in terms of maintaining such pragmatic agreements. Indeed, as many contemporary 
liberals argue, agreements based solely upon pragmatic considerations are inherently unstable. The 
vagaries of circumstance and fortune make it impossible forpurelypragmatic arguments to secure 
the type of enduring support and, subsequently, stability desired and required. 
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But even if one were able to develop a definition of cruelty that all citizens could voluntarily 
support, problems remain. In particular, agreement on a definition of cruelty does not automatically 
or necessarily translate into a similar agreement concerning the appropriate-"proportionate and 
necessary," in Shklar' s terms (Shklar 1989: 31 )-mechanisms for protecting individuals from 
cruelty and fear. For example, whereas some would undoubtedly argue that securing a truly 
protective division of power requires a legally entrenched scheme of redistributive justice, 
including state-protected programs such as affirmative action and hiring quotas, there will 
inevitably be others who believe that such intrusion by government is unacceptable and/or 
unnecessary. A similar problem arises in relation to the use of capital punishment. Public opinion 
polling-e.g., Gallup polls conducted between the years of1991 and2001-suggests that a 
noteworthy majority (65o/o-80%) of the population of the United States considers capital 
punishment a "proportionate and necessary" response to serious, violent crimes. Others, however, 
believe government-sanctioned capital punishment to be an extremely offensive public cruelty and 
an "absolute evil, an offense against God or humanity" (Shklar 1989: 23). Importantly, those who 
believe that capital punishment offers the only effective deterrent to violent crimes are also likely 
to argue that the failure to provide for capital punishment unnecessarily and unacceptably exposes 
citizens to "severe cruelty and fear from private criminals" (Shklar 1989: 31 ). Even some of those 
who agree that capital punishment constitutes a "cruelty" might nevertheless argue that it 
represents an acceptable cruelty inasmuch as it protects citizens from "more severe cruelty and 
fear from private criminals." 
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The use of deadly force by police officers offers another example of a potentially 
problematic issue. Even if all citizens agree that the authority to use deadly force is necessary if 
police are to serve their intended function and protect the personal safety and freedom of all 
citizens, such consensus does not preclude disagreement concerning the specific circumstances 
under which the use of such force is justified. Indeed, opinions regarding the character of 
"acceptable" guidelines to regulate the use of such force, and judgments regarding its justifiable 
application, are likely to diverge for different segments of society. The reality is that members of 
visibleminoritygroupswholiveinjurisdictionsthathaveexperiencedverifiedincidencesofpolice 
harassment and brutality against visible minorities will likely be much more demanding and precise 
in their definition of what constitutes a justifiable use of deadly force than, say, Caucasians who 
have never experienced or witnessed such harassment and brutality and are inclined to disbelieve 
reports of such behaviour. 
Shklar suggests that decisions regarding what constitutes a "proportionate and necessary" 
response to public cruelty should reflect the concerns of the victims of such cruelty or those most 
likely to beitsvictims(Shk:lar 1989: 35). Yet, insofarasaccommodatingtheconcernsofvictims 
entails constraints that leave others fearful that the resulting system will be unable to accomplish 
its intended task, adopting such an approach will not be understood to provide the sought after 
equal protection for all. 
The above noted problems further underscore the need to establish an agreed upon 
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable expectations and demands. Traditionally in a 
liberal democracy the boundary between the reasonable and the unreasonable serves this function, 
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and there is no reason to believe that it should or would be otherwise for Shklar' s conception. In 
the final analysis, then, it would seem that Shklar has no choice other than to rely upon 
reasonableness to secure the conditions that will enable her conception to achieve its stated goal. 
Only if the individuals involved and the definition of cruelty are and remain "reasonable" can one 
realistically hope to secure the conditions that will make it possible to protect all citizens equally 
from cruelty and fear. In this very important sense, Shklar' s conception is as reliant upon the 
presence and appropriate influence of reason( ableness) as are those ofRawls and Larmore. It 
thus seems fair to propose that reason( ableness) occupies a similar role and is assigned a like 
primacy in the conceptions of Rawls, Larmore and Shklar. 
It is important to note, however, that in assigning primacy to reasonableness political 
liberalism is not espousing an indifference or skepticism toward the truth of moral judgements. 
Rather, political liberalism acknowledges the importance of such questions but realises that 1) 
''while people can recognize everyone else's comprehensive views as reasonable, they cannot 
recognize them all as true" (Rawls 1993: 128); 2) ''there is no shared public basis to distinguish 
the true beliefs from the false" (Rawls 1993: 128); and 3) it is impossible to obtain a purely 
''political" answer for such questions (Rawls 1993: 151-52).11 A conception ofjusticepremised 
upon skepticism would necessitate that we abandon our commitment to the truth of our beliefs 
when they are confronted with reasonable disagreement. This is not to suggest that there is no 
connection between skepticism and political liberalism. Indeed, Shklar, for example, states that 
while skepticism is not a necessary feature ofher conception of political liberalism, "there is ... 
areal psychological connection between them" (Shklar 1989: 25). This conclusion is premised 
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upon a particular understanding of the character of skeptics: namely, that skeptics "must prefer 
a government that does nothing to increase the prevailing levels of fanaticism and dogmatism" 
(Shklar 1989: 25). Yet, Shklar also notes that such an attitude could also prevail among a "society 
ofbelievers,"howeverunusual such an occurrence might be (Shklar 1989: 25). Simultaneously, 
it is possible for skeptics to be "extremely oppressive" (Shklar 1989: 25). 
In the final analysis, the uncertainty regarding the character of a regulatory regime founded 
upon skepticism makes it impossible for skepticism to serve as the basis for an effective 
conception ofliberalism (political or otherwise). However, the reason that it is necessary to assign 
primacy to reasonableness is not because "we cannot rightfully believe that our own views are 
better supported by experience and reflection than those of other people" (Larmore 1996: 126; 
see also 171-72). Rather, we must adopt such an approach because regardless of the apparent 
soundness and reasonableness of our beliefs and supporting arguments, it would be foolish not to 
expect them to encounter reasonable disagreement. Such disagreement is inevitable ''because 
different conceptions of the good life usually involve (to an extent we may not realize at first) rather 
articulate but different structures of purposes, significances, and activities" (Larmore 1996: 127); 
and this diversity of"structures of purposes, significances, and activities" makes it impossible to 
develop a universally acceptable method for determining the correctness or primacy of a given 
belie£ In other words, such diversity ensures reasonable disagreement about the nature of the 
good life. Using skepticism as a justification for the type ofhberal neutrality promoted by political 
liberalism would doom any associated conception of justice to failure, for skepticism "about our 
ability to know the nature of the human good" is itself an item of reasonable disagreement 
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(Larmore 1996: 126). Recognising these facts, apolitical conceptionofjusticerestrictsitsconcem 
to the reasonable in order to avoid such conflict and provide the foundation for an overlapping 
consensus: this is not, political liberals argue, akin to showing indifference or skepticism toward 
thetruthofmoraljudgements(Rawls 1996:62-63, 150; Larmore 1996: 126-27, 171-72; and 
Shklar 1989: 25). 
Concomitantly, the differentiation between troe and reasonable is, for political liberals, 
more than a matter of semantics. According to political liberals, whereas requiring that a 
conception of justice be affirmed as ''true" significantly limits its scope of acceptability and thereby 
substantially decreases the possibility of obtaining an overlapping consensus. On the other hand, 
insisting that a conception of justice need only be endorsed as ''reasonable" enables all those who 
hold reasonable doctrines to affirm the conception of justice from within the framework of their 
own comprehensive doctrine voluntarily, and this flexibility greatly facilitates the achievement of 
an overlapping consensus. The ability of a political conception to accommodate all reasonable 
doctrines in this manner is said to ensure that it is not merely an "account ofhow those who hold 
political power can satisfy themselves, in light of their own convictions, ... that they are acting 
properly" (Rawls 1989: 24 7). Rather, because it allows each reasonable citizen to affirm the 
conception of justice as morally compatible with his own reason, a political conception of justice 
obtains political legitimacy (Rawls 1989: 24 7) and in so doing helps to nurture, secure and sustain 
political stability. 
Reasonable individuals will accept the above explanations and caveats and recognise that 
only a conception of justice that embodies the concept of reasonable disagreement can assure the 
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proper and necessary degree of respect and accommodation and thereby secure the basis for a 
public agreement that can serve as the framework for a well-ordered society. Reasonable citizens, 
then, can reasonably be expected to affirm as reasonable (i.e., morally acceptable) the 
fundamental ideas and the political values associated with political liberalism, and the directives 
that derive from these ideas. As a result, not only are reasonable citizens voluntarily able to 
support the notion of reasonable disagreement without having to compromise, transgress or 
forsake any of their fundamental moral beliefs, but their beliefs direct them to be responsive to its 
demands. 
VI. The Role of Rationality 
Reasonable citizens' inclination and willingness to accept the notion and demands of reasonable 
disagreement is further stimulated when their reasonability is supplemented by rationality. In 
essence, citizens are "rational" when they use their "powers of judgment and deliberation in 
seeking ends and interests peculiarly ... [their] own" (Rawls 1993: 50)12 -e.g., when they develop 
and pursue a particular conception of the good. In turn, rational citizens will understand that given 
the diversity of competing, antagonistic and often irreconcilable views that exist, ensuring and 
sustaining the conditions that will enable one to pursue and (hopefully) realise his particular ends 
and interests is dependent upon securing certain safeguards. Specifically, citizens must be assured 
the freedom to affirm and publicly pursue a life-plan of their own choosing (and, should it be the 
case, of their own design). This caveat necessitates that the public sphere allow for the existence 
and pursuit of a variety of conflicting and irreconcilable conceptions of the good. If such a 
condition is to be fulfilled, citizens must willingly accept the public presence and validity of views 
137 
that conflict with their own, and faithfully adhere to the dictates of what Rawls has referred to as 
the precept of avoidance. 
In agreeing to adhere to the dictates of the precept of avoidance, citizens are agreeing to 
refrain from publicly asserting or denying the validity of"anypart:icular comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral view, or its associated theory of truth and the status of values" (Rawls 
1993: 150); they are agreeing to apply ''the principle of toleration to philosophy itself' (Rawls 
1993: 1 0). By doing so, citizens reduce the likelihood of conflict between competing views, and 
thus help to secure a politically stable environment-something that is critical to the achievement 
of one's goals. Without political stability, one can never be sure that existing circumstances which 
allow the pursuit and realisation of particular ends and interests will not suddenly and unexpectedly 
change leaving one in a drastically different situation that is much less hospitable or even 
antagonistic to his pursuits. Recognising this fact, rational citizens will understand the need to 
develop and support a conception of justice that eliminates, to the extent possible, the likelihood 
of divisive, irreconcilable conflict between the adherents of competing and conflicting 
comprehensive doctrines. A conception of justice that embodies both the notion of reasonable 
disagreement and the precept of avoidance is best suited to achieve such an objective. 
Politicalliberalsarguethataconceptionofjusticepremiseduponthenotionofreasonable 
disagreement, and embodying the precept of avoidance, is able to reduce divisive conflict 
significantly because it removes from the political agenda the most troublesome questions: namely, 
those that deal with the truth of religious, philosophical, and moral views. By incorporating the 
precept of avoidance into its framework, a political conception of justice refrains from passing 
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judgment on such matters. In tum, by avoiding decisions regarding the truth of religious, 
philosophical, and moral judgments, and "securing the basic rights and hberties, and assigning them 
a due priority" (Rawls 1989: 253), a political conception of justice "removes from the political 
agenda the most divisive issues, serious contention about which must undermine the bases of social 
cooperation" (Rawls 1993: 157). When issues aretakenoffthepolitical agenda, they cease to 
be "appropriate subjects for political decision by majority or other plurality voting .... [These 
matters are to be considered] as correctly settled once and for all" (Rawls 1993: 151, n.16). 
In removing controversial issues from the political agenda, then, a political conception of 
justice helps to eliminate the principal source of sociopolitical division and in so doing makes an 
overlapping consensus possible and thus secures the conditions needed to establish and maintain 
a well-ordered society. While political liberals do not propose that all potentially controversial or 
divisive issues will or even can be resolved in such a manner, they do suggest that those that 
remain will, for the most part, be related to less controversial matters, and therefore pose much 
less of a threat to efforts to obtain and sustain an overlapping consensus on the conception of 
justice (Rawls 1993: 151-52). 
Furthermore, the public reason innate to democratic societies will help to resolve any 
contentious issues that may remain. Public reason is generally defined as citizens' reasoning 
regarding "the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires of society's 
basic structure'' (Rawls 1996: 213 ). More specifically, public reason identifies the "guidelines of 
inquiry that specify ways of reasoning and criteria for the kinds of information relevant for political 
questions" (Rawls 1996: 223 ). By doing so, public reason helps to define the proper parameters 
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of public debate and thereby significantly reduces the likelihood of divisive conflict. It is not 
necessary for public reason to regulate all debate and decisions. In order to establish an 
overlapping consensus, the guidelines of public reason need only apply to discussions related to 
"fundamental matters" (Rawls 1996: 214) such as ''who has the right to vote, or what religions are 
to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property" (Rawls 
1993: 214), and not to "our personal deliberations and reflections about political questions" 
(Rawls 1993: 215). 
For political liberals, the public reason common to contemporary liberal democracies 
manifests itself in the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect. The norm of rational 
dialogue requires that citizens be willing to 
respond to points of disagreement by retreating to neutral ground, to the beliefs they still 
share, in order to either (a) resolve the disagreement and vindicate one of the disputed 
positions by means of arguments that proceed from this common ground, or (b) bypass the 
disagreementandseekasolutionoftheproblemonthebasissimplyofthiscommonground 
(Larmore 1996: 135; see also Rawls 1993: 43-46). 
However, on its own, the norm of rational dialogue offers only procedural guidelines: it does not 
explain why individuals who disagree with one another would or should continue to dialogue. 
Subsequently, adherence to the norm of rational dialogue alone "does not rule out resorting to 
force, instead of discussion, to achieve a political settlement. What demands that we go on talking, 
whatinotherwords requires political principles to be the object of reasonable agreement, is the 
additional norm of equal respect for persons" (Larmore 1996: 136, emphasis in original). The 
norm of equal respect insists that all individuals be treated as "beings capable of thinking and 
acting on the basis of reasons" (Larmore 1996: 137)13-that is, "as beings capable of affirming 
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a vision of the good life" (Lannore 1996: 136). Exercising the norm of equal respect requires that 
we recognise and accept the fact of reasonable disagreement, and in so doing refrain from ''resting 
compliance only on force" (Lannore 1996: 13 7). Combined, the norms of rational dialogue and 
equal respect ''work together to yield the liberal ideal of political neutrality" (Lannore 1996: 141 ), 
the very foundation of the type of uncontroversial framework required to secure an overlapping 
consensus. 
"[T]he important point" is that the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect "are views 
at which reasonable people can arrive" (Larmore 1996: 131 ). Political liberals contend that 
reasonable people will voluntarily support a conception of justice based upon the norms of rational 
dialogue and equal respect because these norms treat all individuals as ''beings capable of thinking 
and acting on the basis of reasons," and thereby afford equal respect to all views. By offering a 
framework that remains neutral in relation to questions of the good, a conception of justice based 
upon these norms can be endorsed by all (reasonable) people without anyone having to 
compromise, transgress or forsake his particular fundamental beliefs-i.e., moral convictions that 
are not open to compromise. Furthermore, because the norms of rational dialogue and equal 
respect are familiar to the public cultures of contemporary liberal societies (e.g., Lannore 1996: 
134-35, 145-46, 151) and generally accepted by the citizens of these societies, their use will not 
necessitate a radical violation or transformation of the existing public culture. A conception of 
political liberalism based upon the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect can therefore 
effectively accommodate the fact of reasonable disagreement and thus obtain the free and willing 
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support of a majority of citizens, thereby securing the conditions needed to establish and sustain 
a just and stable liberal democracy.14 
Rational citizens will recognise that if they hope to secure an environment of 
accommodation and reciprocal respect for one another's particular ends and interests, then they 
must support a conception of justice that embodies both the notion of reasonable disagreement 
and the precept of avoidance-i.e., a conception of justice that assigns primacy to reasonableness 
as defined by public reason. And only by securing such an environment can one effectively reduce 
the likelihood of divisive, irreconcilable conflict and generate the conditions that will freely allow 
all reasonable citizens to pursue and (hopefully) achieve their respective goals. 
For all of the above noted reasons, political liberals believe that no conflict of values is 
likely to arise that would precipitate reasonable and rational citizens withdrawing their support for 
the political conception of justice. That is to say, in those situations in which the resolution to a 
specific conflict does not satisfy all of the competing reasonable demands and is thus to that extent 
unsatisfactory, those whose demands were not accommodated will still maintain the same level 
of support for the political conception of justice (Rawls 1993: 155). 
In essence, then, the notion and requirements of reasonable disagreement (including 
adherence to the precept of avoidance) can and will be willingly accepted and supported by all 
reasonable and rational persons, because 1) the idea and demands of reasonable disagreement 
are morally compatible with the fundamental beliefs affirmed by such persons; 2) they recognise 
that establishing and sustaining an overlapping consensus will secure the greatest opportunity for 
them to pursue and live the life that they choose; and 3) they realise that the establishment and 
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perpetuation of an overlapping consensus on a public conception of justice is impossible if citizens 
refuse to act in a manner that is compatible with the idea and demands of reasonable 
disagreement. 
hnportantly, the conclusion that all reasonable and mtional citizens will be willing to accept 
the notion and demands of reasonable disagreement is further premised upon the belief that, 
generally speaking, such an acceptance is already exhibited by the citizens of existing 
contemporary liberal democracies. Political liberals maintain that this beliefis not merely hopeful 
conjecture on their part: it is, rather, an empirical fact (Rawls 1993: 13, 15, 167; see also Lannore 
1996: 134-35, 145-46, 151; andK.losko 1993,2000).1tis suggested that given this "fact," it can 
reasonably be assumed that the citizens of a well-ordered society will also affirm the fact of 
reasonable disagreement and voluntarily adhere to the dictates of the precept of avoidance. If this 
is true, then there is also good reason to believe that these citizens, like those of contemporary 
liberal democracies, will accept reasonableness as the supreme standard of judgement for public 
matters and be willing to adjust or revise their comprehensive doctrines when circumstances so 
demand. 
VII. The Right Kind of Stability 
As previously noted, by accepting the notion and demands of reasonable disagreement, citizens 
enable the achievement of an overlapping consensus. This fact is important, political hberals argue, 
because only by securing an overlapping consensus can one hope to obtain the type of political 
stability required to establish and sustain a well-ordered society. If we are to achieve the 
conditions needed to obtain and preserve a just and stable liberal democracy, then the public 
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conception of justice must secure the "right" kind of stability: that is, it must promote" 'stability 
for the right reasons' "(Rawls 1996: xxxix, n.5). "[T]he problem of stability is not that ofbringing 
others who reject a conception to share it, or to act in accordance with it, by workable sanctions, 
if necessary, as if the task were to find ways to impose that conception once we are convinced 
it is sound" (Rawls 1993: 143). Rather, "Stability is secured by sufficient motivation of the 
appropriate kind" (Rawls 1993: 142-43). This means that citizens' support for the conception of 
justice must be motivated by the desire to act justly. In contemporary pluralistic societies, acting 
justly requires that citizens accept and be willing to act in accordance with the demands of 
reasonable disagreement. 
According to political liberals, the type of stability needed to establish and maintain a well-
ordered society can be obtained only by ensuring that the public conception of justice satisfies two 
criteria: 1) "it must be willingly and freely supported by at least a substantial majority [of the 
citizenry]" (Rawls 1993: 38, emphasis added); 15 and 2) citizens' support for it cannot waiver, 
regardless of changes in their personal circumstances or in the distribution of political power. This 
final caveat necessitates that the public agreement on the political conception of justice be more 
than a mere modus vivendi. 
A modus vivendi is a purely instrumental agreement founded upon compromise and 
exhaustion (Rawls 1996: xli). 16 
A typical use of the phrase "modus vivendi" is to characterize a treaty between two states 
whose national aims and interests put them at odds .... The treaty will ... be adhered to 
because doing so is regarded by each [state] as in its national interests .... But in general 
both states are ready to pursue their goals at the expense of the other, and should conditions 
change they may do so (Rawls 1993: 147). 
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The parties to a modus vivendi support its establishment and continuation not because they believe 
it to be the ideal agreement for all concerned or even the most desirable agreement from a partisan 
perspective, but rather because they have exhausted all efforts to secure a voluntary or coerced 
obedience to their respective comprehensive views and, subsequently, have concluded that a 
modus vivendi offers the best possible optionfor the time being. 
Thus, under a modus vivendi, toleration of conflicting religious, moral, and philosophical 
views is simply the result of an inconclusive distribution of power-no single party commands 
sufficient power to suppress opposing and competing views (Baier 1989: 77 4 ). Moreover, as the 
parties involved believe that the agreement holds no particular intrinsic value forth em, they will, 
when they believe they are in a position to do so, abandon it and use their power to try to force 
others to obey the canon of their particular comprehensive doctrine. Hence, the stability of a 
modus vivendi is dependent upon "circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate 
convergence of interests" (Rawls 1993: 14 7). By being subject to the vagaries of circumstance 
and fortune, a modus vivendi can offer nothing more than a temporary solution to the problem of 
political stability, and therefore it is unable to secure the kind of conditions needed to establish and 
sustain a well-ordered society. 
An overlapping consensus is presented as something "quite different" from and superior 
to a modus vivendi (Rawls 1993: 14 7). The principal and crucial difference between the two is 
the ''moral object and moral grounds" that characterise the overlapping consensus but are absent 
from a modus vivendi: "the object ofthe [overlapping] consensus, the political conception of 
justice, is itself a moral conception ... [that] is affirmed on moral grounds" (Rawls 1993: 14 7). For 
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political liberals," 'political' is not defined in opposition to 'moral,' but at the same time ... 
[political liberalism] is to be understood as something other than a conception of justice founded 
on a comprehensive moral ideal" (N eal1990: 3 3 ). "A political conception of justice is a moral 
conception worked out for a specific subject, namely, the basic structure of a constitutional 
regime" (Rawls 1988: 252). Thus, contrary to what some of its critics have argued, the concept 
of political liberalism is not premised upon an amoral conception of justice (Larmore 1996: 145). 
Indeed, Lannore, for example, argues that only in virtue of an overriding commitment to 
"certain moral principles" can the adoption of a purely political conception ofliberalism be fully 
explained and justified (Larmore 1999: 602). For reasons that will be made evident in the 
following paragraphs, this assertion bears further investigation. 
Larmore contends that, in arguing that a political conception of liberalism is the 
appropriate response to the problem of reasonable disagreement, political hberals are doing more 
than merely suggesting that such an approach is necessary to accommodate the value conflict that 
is an ineliminable feature of contemporary liberal democracies; they are also affirming-explicitly 
or otherwise-the correctness of" certain moral convictions, which imply that this is the proper 
route to take" (Lannore 1999: 605; see also Larmore 1996: 13 5, 145, 151 ). This understanding 
is based upon the recognition that the search for a "freestanding" political conception is not the 
only possible response to the problem of reasonable disagreement. There is nothing that requires 
that liberalism become "political" in the sense advocated by Rawls, Lannore or Shklar, for 
example. As Lannore notes, "liberal thinkers ... [could] instead dig in their heels and, observing 
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correctly that no political conception can accommodate every point of view, maintain that 
liberalism stands or falls with a general commitment to individualism" (Larmore 1999: 605). 
The reason that liberals refrain from adopting such a stance is because the "abiding moral 
heart ofliberal thought" is the belief that the basic principles of political association "should be 
acceptable to those whom they are to bind" (Larmore 1999: 605). Importantly, this conviction 
is not simply the result of a belief that people should be bound only by moral rules that they cannot 
reasonably reject. Rather, it is a consequence ofliberals' belief that the coercive use of state 
power to enforce obedience to ''the fundamental terms of political life" is legitimate only insofar 
as the principles in question are able to secure the free and willing support of those they are to 
govern (Larmore 1999: 606-07). Larmore correctly notes that this belief animates Rawls' liberal 
principle oflegitimacy, which states: "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when 
it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals common to their human 
reason" (Rawls 1993: 137). 
According to Larmore, however, such an explanation is incomplete because it does not 
fully explain why liberals assign "political authority'' (Larmore 1999: 609) to the notion that the 
basic principles ofpoliticallife should be acceptable to those they are to bind. Larmore maintains 
that the elementary basis for this belieflies at an even "deeper" moral level (Larmore 1999: 607). 
Specifically, liberals' conviction thatthe''fundamental terms of political life should be the object 
of reasonable agreement" (Larmore 1999: 606) is the product of their commitment to the principle 
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of equal respect. A brief review of the legitimate use of coercive state power reveals why this is 
so. 
As does Rawls, Lannore observes that "the use or threat of force cannot be deemed 
wrong in itself, for then political association would be impossible" (Lannore 1999: 607). 
However, attempting to use force alone to secure obedience to political principles is morally 
unacceptable to liberals because to do so is to treat individuals "merely as means, as the objects 
of coercion, and not also as ends" (Lannore 1999: 607). By demanding that the principles of 
political association be the object of reasonable agreement among those they are to govern, 
Rawls'liberalprincipleoflegitimacyrequiresthatpeoplebetreatedas''beingscapableofthinking 
and acting on the basis of reasons"-in other words, both as means and ends-and in so doing 
necessitates that individuals' "distinctive capacity as persons"be respected. It is, Larmore argues, 
because liberals believe people to be deserving of equal respect that they think it necessary to 
require that the terms of political life be the object of reasonable agreement. 
Lannore contends that a belief in equal respect does in fact animate Rawls' liberal 
principle oflegitimacy (Lannore 1996: 146); however, Rawls fails to state clearly ''the nature of 
this moral foundation and the precise position it occupies in political liberalism" (Larmore 1999: 
605). This failure is said to be problematic inasmuch as it prevents Rawls from fully explaining why 
political liberalism is the most appropriate and appealing response to the problem of reasonable 
disagreement. According to Larmore, only by openly acknowledging and making clear the moral 
basis of political liberalism is it possible to explain satisfactorily how the concept of political 
liberalism can effectively justify the principle of state neutrality ''without having to take sides in the 
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dispute about individualism and tradition"-the fundamental problem confronting liberal theory 
(Larmore 1996: 132). 
Such a position would seem to differ irreconcilably from that ofRawls. To explain: Rawls 
insists that a political conception of justice must be "freestanding," which requires that it neither 
depend upon nor be the product of''moral requirements externally imposed" (Rawls 1993: 98). 
If, when all is said and done, a "political" conception is, as Larmore argues, premised upon "a 
moral authority higher than the political principles that we give ourselves" (Larmore 1999: 609), 
then surely it violates the aforenoted requirement and, by extension, negates the purely political 
character of the concept of political liberalism. In this context, it would not seem unreasonable to 
argue that Larmore's acknowledgment of the moral foundation ofhis conception represents a 
significant ~istinction between his conception and that of Rawls. 
However, having noted this deficiency, Larmore proceeds to argue that Rawls' failure to 
acknowledge fully, or state clearly, the ''underlying moral foundations" (Larmore 1999: 599) of 
the conceptofpoliticalliberalism, is more cosmetic than substantive. The fact that Rawls does not 
explicitly articulate the moral foundation ofhis liberal principle oflegitimacy does not mean that 
no such foundation exists. Indeed, according to Larmore, an examination ofRawls' notion of 
"reasonableness" reveals that it embodies precisely this understanding of the moral basis of 
political liberalism (Larmore 1999: 611). Larmore observes that, forRawls,peoplearereasonable 
insofar as they voluntarily maintain a "moral commitment to seek and to abide by fair principles 
of cooperation" (Larmore 1999: 601 ). Fair principles of cooperation are those ''which all citizens 
as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
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common to their human reason" (Rawls 1993: 140). Hence, Rawlsian ''reasonableness" requires 
compliance with the liberal principle oflegitimacy which, as already noted, demands that 
individuals be respected as persons. In essence, then, Rawls' commitment to the liberal principle 
oflegitimacy is premised upon its reasonableness, and its reasonableness is a measure of its 
respect for persons. In this sense, Rawls' liberal principle oflegitimacy "expresses in effect the 
idea of respect for persons" (Larmore 1999: 61 0) and in so doing constitutes a "moral response" 
to the problem of reasonable disagreement (Larmore 1999: 602). 
· Thus, in the final analysis, Rawls' liberal principle oflegitimacy commands the political 
authoritythatitdoes,notbecauseitisaprinciplethatallreasonablepeoplewillnecessarilyaffirm, 
but rather because it compels us to respect others as free and equal and, subsequently, to seek 
political principles that can be the object of reasonable agreement (Larmore 1999: 608). Given 
this fact, Larmore argues that the norm of equal respect cannot correctly be considered legitimate 
in the same sense as the political principles that individuals share as members of a political 
community. Rather, the norm of equal respect must be understood to possess a legitimacy that 
supercedes mere political authority. What this means, according to Larmore, is that Rawls' hberal 
principle oflegitimacy, in virtue of its embodying the norm of equal respect, should be understood 
as possessing amoral authority independent of its ability to secure reasonable agreement. In other 
words, we should consider it to be a principle ''binding on us independent of our will as citizens, 
enjoying a moral authority that we have not fashioned ourselves. For only so can we make sense 
of why we are moved to give ourpoliticallife the consensual shape it has" (Larmore 1999: 609). 
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Subsequently, political liberalism cannot "coherently claim to be freestanding with respect to 
morality altogether" (Larmore 1999: 608). 
Larmore questions whether Rawls would be willing to accept such a conclusion, ''to admit 
that, as citizens reasoning from the standpoint of ... [Rawlsian political liberalism], we must 
acknowledge a moral authority higher than the political principles that we give ourselves" 
(Larmore 1999: 609). Rawls seems to regard the liberal principle oflegitimacy "as one whose 
validity, at least from the political point of view, depends on our collective will as citizens" 
(Larmore 1999: 609). However, Larmore also convincingly argues that the constraints that Rawls 
imposes upon the parties tasked with choosing the political principles to regulate the basic 
structure reflect an underlying moral commitment to reasonableness. Because the aforementioned 
constraints are imposed and not the subject of an a priori agreement, neither they nor our 
commitment to reasonableness can correctly be imagined to be the "object of choice" (Larmore 
1999: 609). This fact, Larmore claims, would suggest that the political principles associated with 
Rawls' conception possess "a moral basis that we cannot conceive as rooted like them in our 
political will" (Larmore 1999: 61 0). Moreover, because our commitment to the liberal principle 
oflegitimacy is a consequence of our moral commitment to reasonableness, which is itself 
independent of our will as citizens, the liberal principle oflegitimacy cannot correctly be 
considered to have the same status as the political principles that comprise the public conception 
of justice. Under such circumstances, the liberal principle oflegitimacy must ''have a moral 
authority for citizens that is independent of[ and supercedes] their political will" (Larmore 1999: 
610). 
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But if it is the case that both Larmorean and Rawlsian political liberalism are premised 
upon a conception of justice that requires the acknowledgement of amoral authority higher than 
the political principles that citizens give themselves, what are the consequences of this fact? How 
does the presence of such a moral basis impact upon efforts to secure and sustain an overlapping 
consensus? Though one might initially be inclined to suggest that both Lannore and Rawls, among 
others, have argued persuasively that any conception of justice that possesses such a moral 
character cannot possibly serve as the basis for the sought after overlapping consensus, Larmore 
· presents a convincing case that the presence of the type of moral foundation that he believes 
animates both his and Rawls' conceptions need not negate their ''political" character or undermine 
the plausibility of a tangible distinction between a political conception and a comprehensive 
doctrine. 
Larmore maintains that ''the principle of respect ... [need] not express or entail a 
comprehensive moral philosophy" (Lannore 1999: 623), and, such being the case, admitting that 
it serves as an "independent" moral basis for a conception of justice does not eliminate the 
possibility of categorising that conception as ''politically freestanding'' (see Lannore 1999: 608-11, 
623-25). In turn, insofar as Larmore effectively defends this claim, he also reveals how it is 
possible forpoliticalliberalism to embrace the presence of the proposed "independent" moral 
foundation openly without either abandoning its purely political character or,requiring that it be 
notably modified. IfLannore is correct about the moral foundation ofRawls' liberal principle of 
legitimacy, its similarity to the norm of equal respect (both in terms of its character and the role 
it plays), and the ability of a political conception to possess such a foundation without negating its 
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political character, then Larmorehimselfhas shown the practical insignificance ofRawls refusal 
to more fully acknowledge or state clearly the ''moral foundation" ofhis own conception. In effect, 
then, this debate further demonstrates the similarity between Rawlsian and Lamorean political 
liberalism with respect to this matter. 
Importantly, in explaining how political liberalism can possess an independent moral 
foundation without undermining its freestanding character, Larmore not only effectively rebuts 
criticisms proclaiming the amoral character ofpoliticalliberalism, he also reveals how it is possible 
to embrace amoral foundation without precluding the achievement of the sought after overlapping 
consensus. Indeed, it is because individuals voluntarily affirm the moral foundation identified by 
Larmore that they are able to accept the demands of the overlapping consensus as being in some 
manner morally compatible with their respective doctrines. Political liberals maintain that the 
presence of this shared moral affirmation ensures-to the extent that it is humanly possible to do 
so-that support for the overlapping consensus will remain stable regardless of changes to 
individuals' personal circumstances or "shifts in the distribution of political power" that result in 
the relative strength of one's view in society increasing to the point of dominance (Rawls 1993: 
148). For this reason, an overlapping consensus is claimed to be "far more stable than ... [a 
consensus] founded on views ... that regard the acceptance of the principles of justice simply as 
a prudent modus vivendi given the existing balance of social forces" (Rawls 1985: 250). It is the 
increased degree of stability secured by an overlapping consensus that makes it superior to a 
modus vivendi. 
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The ability of the overlapping consensus to be more than a modus vivendi is an essential 
component of the political liberal argument for the value, superiority and necessity of not only an 
overlapping consensus, but also of a political conception ofjustice. It is not that an overlapping 
consensus cannot serve as a modus vivendi; rather, it is that an overlapping consensus is not and 
cannot be merely a modus vivendi (Rawls 1993: 14 7). Only if it is able to achieve a greater 
degree of political stability than can be obtained by a modus vivendi can the proposed overlapping 
consensus justifiably be claimed to be superior to a modus vivendi. In tum, the value of a political 
conception of justice lies in its ability to provide the basis for an overlapping consensus that can 
secure the (greater) degree of stability needed to establish and maintain a well-ordered society. 
Indeed, the development of a political conception of justice is presented as a prerequisite for the 
establishment of an overlapping consensus, which is alone in its ability to accommodate the fact 
of reasonable disagreement in a manner that can secure the basis for a well-ordered society. 
As with other features of the preceding portrayal of the concept ofpoliticalliberalism, it 
might be objected that the above understanding of the importance of an overlapping consensus 
is not universally shared by all political liberals. Of particular note in this respect would be Judith 
Shklar. Shklar explicitly rejects the search for or possibility of an overlapping consensus on a 
single conception ofjustice to regulate the basic structure of a contemporary liberal democracy. 
She suggests that any conception of justice that seeks to realise such a consensus is, like any 
conception that relies upon human reason( ableness) to achieve a specific goal, dangerously 
utopian in its character and expectations and doomed to failure (e.g., Shklar 1989). 
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However, the earlier discussion surrounding Shklar' s condemnation of Rawls' and 
Lannore' s reliance upon reason( ableness) also speaks directly to the need for an overlapping 
consensus among the adherents of a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive 
doctrines. Though Shklar explicitly and emphatically disavows the search for an overlapping 
consensus, the potential problems confronting the operationalisation ofher conception absent such 
a consensus both on what reasonably constitutes "cruelty" or an unacceptable degree of fear and 
on the specific character of the mechanisms to be employed to protect individuals, suggest that 
the viability ofShklar'.s conception is indeed dependent upon the achievement of an overlapping 
consensus on these matters. Hence, despite Shklar' s claims to the contrary, her focus on cruelty 
and fear does not eliminate the need for her conception to rely upon the achievement of an 
overlapping consensus in order to realise its stated aim. This is not to suggest that Shklar actively 
or purposely engages in or promotes either the search for or achievement of an overlapping 
consensus: indeed, as noted, the opposite is true. Nevertheless, the success of Shklar's 
conception, its ability to secure the universal and equal protection and freedom to which it aspires, 
is unavoidably dependent upon the ability of reason( ableness) to temper individual behaviour in 
the public realm and secure the conditions that enable the realisation of an overlapping consensus 
on both a single public definition of cruelty and the appropriate means for the prevention and 
reduction of cruelty. 
Though Shklar' s conception may arguably seem notably less utopian than those of either 
Rawls or Lannore, by itself this character trait does not and cannot completely free Shklar' s 
conception from its dependency on reason( ableness) and the achievement of an overlapping 
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consensus. Thus, Shklar' s rejection of the search for or possibility of an overlapping consensus 
is rendered insignificant insofar as it fails to produce the practical consequences demanded by her. 
It might be protested that my analysis of Shklar' s arguments is premised upon a 
misinterpretation or misrepresentation of the principal project animating her conception. 17 
Whereas I portray Shklar as seeking to develop a conception of political liberalism similar in 
character and motivation to those of Rawls and Larmore, it might be argued that Shklar's 
conception has no such objective. Rather, she wishes only to make clear the flaws and dangers 
associated with the type of utopian approach to theorising that she believes characterises the 
conceptions of Rawls and Larmore, and in so doing convince theorists to abandon such an 
approach. In other words, Shklar is interested in stimulating a change in the character of political 
theorising, not in developing an operable paradigm of justice for contemporary liberal 
democracies. However, surely the ultimate goal ofShklar' s conception is to effect positive, 
concrete change, at least insofar as she seeks to identify the means by which to secure political 
conditions that will better protect individuals from the abuse of political power. If generating such 
change was not the purpose ofShklar' s conception, then there would be no need for her to be 
concerned with practical matters such as public cruelty and the abuse of political power, and no 
need for her to suggest that theorists abandon utopian theorising, as is clearly her wish. Hence, 
inasmuch as Shklar' s conception, purposely or otherwise, seeks to secure concrete change, my 
interpretation remains valid. 
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Vlll. Concluding Remarks 
The concept of political liberalism is an attempt to explain "how a reasonably just and well-
ordered democratic society might be possible" (Rawls 1996: lx). In their efforts to develop a 
plausible and viable explanation, political liberals have engaged "the basic problems that have 
motivated liberal thought," and sought to design a conception of justice that responds effectively 
to these problems (Larmore 1990: 339). Political liberals argue that the demands generated by 
the fact of reasonable disagreement-an inevitable and ineliminable feature of modernity-require 
that pluralistic polities adopt a conception of justice which "supposes that there are many 
conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good, each compatible with the full rationality 
ofhuman persons" (Rawls 1985: 248). Only by doing so is it possible to achieve the type of 
public agreement needed to resolve the problems of justice and political stability in contemponuy 
pluralistic societies and thus establish and maintain "a reasonably just and well-ordered democratic 
society." Political liberals believe that their model ofliberalism offers a conception of justice that 
is able to secure and sustain the required public consensus and thereby generate the conditions 
needed to achieve and preserve a just and stable liberal democracy. The soundness of this belief 
will be explored in chapters five and six.18 
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Notes 
1 Rawls further differentiates between folly and partially comprehensive doctrines. A fully comprehensive 
doctrine encompasses "all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated scheme of 
thought ... whereas a doctrine is only partially comprehensive when it comprises certain (but not all) 
nonpolitical values and virtues and is rather loosely articulated" (Rawls 1988: 253). 
2 For a complete description of what constitutes a "burden of judgment" see Rawls (1996: 54-58). 
3 Rawls defines free public reason as free and equal citizens' "reasoning in the public forum about 
constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice" (Rawls 1993: 10). For further elaboration on Rawls' 
understanding of public reason see (Rawls 1993: 212-54). 
4 A society obtains a "fair system of cooperation" when: 1) its "citizens do not view the social order as a fixed 
natural order, or as an institutional hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic values"; and 2) it allows the 
pursuit and realisation of conflicting conceptions of the good (Rawls 1993: 15). For further elaboration 
concerning what is entailed by the idea of society as "a fair system of cooperation," see Rawls (1993: 16). 
5 Despite Rawls' argument that political liberalism expresses "far more than procedural values," I believe it 
correct to claim, as does Larmore, that the neutrality embraced by political liberalism is a "procedural ideal" 
that "also involves a 'neutrality of aim' .... But it does not imply a 'neutrality of effect'" (Larmore 1996: 126, 
n.6). Insofar as this claim is valid, I think it fair to say that the concept of political liberalism embraces both a 
certain degree of procedural neutrality and neutrality of aim. 
6 Reasonable comprehensive doctrines "are doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that political 
liberalism must address" (Rawls 1993: 36). More specifically, reasonable comprehensive doctrines support "a 
constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea oflegitimate law" (Rawls 1999a: 132). 
7 A political conception of justice is inherently compatible with reasonable comprehensive doctrines because 
both accept and allow for the presence of a diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines 
and both recognise that it is unreasonable to want to use public power to enforce the views of a single 
comprehensive doctrine. 
8 Moreover, by seeking an overlapping consensus on only the political conception of justice, political liberals 
believe that political liberalism has restricted its scope to the extent that it can avoid having to mediate 
between the most controversial religious, moral, and philosophical issues. 
9 Although theorists such as Larmore and Shklar rarely use the term nonpolitical values, it is evident, I 
believe, that they too are, in effect, arguing for a Rawlsian-style distinction between those values that can (i.e., 
political values) and those values that cannot (i.e., nonpolitical values) reasonably be expected to serve as the 
basis for a public conception of justice that can secure the voluntary support of the adherents of a plurality 
of conflicting and often irreconcilable views (see Larmore 1999: 606-07; Larmore 1996: 126, 136; and Shklar 
1989). 
10 Shklar uses the phrase "party of hope" to refer to theorists who focus on the future and the possible 
achievements of humanity and fail to respect the past and the lessons that it has to teach us. In doing so, said 
158 
theorists engage in utopian theorising. Theorists guilty of this crime are, according to Shklar, members of the 
"party of hope," rather than the "party of memory" (Shklar 1989: 26). 
11 As Rawls notes, "Certain truths, it may be said, concern things so important that differences about them 
have to be fought out, even should this mean civil war" (Rawls 1993: 151-52). 
12 Larmore's understanding of "reasonableness" encompasses rationality in this sense (e.g., Larmore 1999: 
601-02; see also Larmore 1996: 136). 
13 This means that "we should never treat other persons solely as means, as mere instruments of our will; on 
the contrary, people should always be treated also as ends, as persons in their own right" (Larmore 1996: 13 6). 
14 This is not to suggest that the reasons identified represent an exhaustive list. It is quite possible, of course, 
that one could identify other reasons for supporting this claim. 
15 Though Rawls does, in places, add the qualification "politically active citizens" (Rawls 1993: 38), he fails 
to elaborate as to exactly what constitutes a "politically active" citizen. Furthermore, I believe that my omission 
of this qualification is justified by Rawls' use of other less specific statements (e.g., Rawls 1993: xvi). For an 
interpretation that supports this argument, see K.losko (1993: 349, 350). 
16 Larmore notes (1996:133, n.16) that"whatRawls calls a 'modus vivendi' ... is not what I [Larmore] called a 
modus vivendi in Patterns of Moral Complexity, which instead resembles the position Rawls himself favors; 
this is a merely terminological difference." 
17 I thank Pat Neal for engaging my interest in this point. 
18 Much of the material presented in this chapter has appeared previously in Young (2002). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROBLEM OF REASONABLENESS 
I. Introduction 
The concept of''reasonableness" has played a significant role in the history ofliberal political 
theory. Indeed, it has been argued that "public reasonableness is at the centre ofliberalism" 
(Moore 1996: 167; see also Macedo 2000); this claim is especially true with respect to the idea 
of a purely political liberalism. Conceptions ofpoliticalliberalism are rife with references to 
"reasonable people," "reasonable doctrines," "reasonable disagreement," and a host of other 
terms that use "reasonable" as an adjective. More importantly, the tangible significance of 
reasonableness is evident even when such terms are absent. Though political liberals do not 
complete! y ignore the presence or potential effect of unreasonable people, it is the beliefs and 
expectations of reasonable people that take precedence and occupy centre stage. The importance 
of reasonableness for political liberalism is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that 
reasonableness serves as the supreme standard against which citizens are expected to judge the 
acceptability and legitimacy of the public conception of justice and all associated political claims 
and decisions. Not surprisingly, this fact has an inescapable and fundamental influence on the 
character ofpoliticalliberalism, and its consequences are significant and manifest themselves in 
a number of ways. Most noteworthy and problematic in this respect is the argumentative 
importance that political liberalism assigns to being able to distinguish between reasonable and 
unreasonable demands. 
Inherentinthenotionofapurelypoliticalliberalismistheexpectationthatthemajorityof 
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citizens will faithfully act in a reasonable manner (whatever that may entail). It is suggested that 
only by doing so is it possible to secure the conditions that will enable the establishment and 
preservationofajustandstableliberaldemocracy(e.g., Rawls 1993; Larmore 1996). Satisfying 
this caveat necessarily requires that individuals be able to differentiate between reasonable and 
unreasonable demands and somehow guarantee that decisions related to questions of political 
justice--questions concerning constitutional essentials and matters ofbasic justice-are justified 
by reference to only those demands which all reasonable individuals can reasonably be expected 
to support. Failure to secure such a differentiation or surety will effectively preclude the possibility 
of adequately insulating the political from the nonpolitical and thereby prevent the development 
of a conception of justice which can offer the basis for a public agreement that can secure the 
degree of stability required to establish and sustain a well-ordered society. Hence, the viability of 
the concept of political liberalism is dependent upon its providing an unmistakably clear distinction 
between the reasonable and the unreasonable and somehow ensuring that responses to questions 
of political justice are not contaminated by unreasonable views. This chapter will explore the role 
ofreasonablenessinpoliticalliberalismandarguethatnotonlydoexistingconceptionsofpolitical 
hberalism fail to provide the aforementioned distinction and surety, but, indeed, such objectives 
are, practically speaking, impossible to secure and this fact critically undermines the viability of the 
concept of political liberalism. 
II. Reasonable People and the Absence of Conflict 
In essence, political liberals define reasonable people as those who not only exercise the basic 
capacities of reason and converse with others in good faith, but also embrace an overarching 
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moral commitment to the principle of equal respect. Such individuals will voluntarily accept the 
public presence and accompanying demands of a plurality of conflicting and often irreconcilable 
reasonable beliefs and agree to "seek a social world in which they ... can cooperate with others 
on terms all can accept" (Rawls 1993: 50-51 ). 1 Reasonable persons so understood, recognise 
that in contemporary liberal societies a diversity of competing, conflicting and irreconcilable views 
is an ineliminable inevitability, and such being the case, respecting the human dignity of one's 
fellow citizens will necessitate accepting the continued existence and public accommodation of 
views with which one disagrees. In other words, reasonable people freely and willingly accept the 
notion of reasonable disagreement and its associated demands. Reasonable people also 
understand that if they are to satisfy the demands of reasonable disagreement, they must accept 
that it is unreasonable to use state power to enforce adherence to the dictates of a single 
comprehensive doctrine. Any attempt to do so necessarily requires the excessive use of state 
coercion to secure obedience, and the use of such force is both an unacceptable insult to the 
human dignity of reasonable persons and incompatible with liberal ideals. 2 
What all this means, according to political liberals, is that reasonable people can be 
expected to affirm comprehensive doctrines which recognise that respecting the human dignity of 
one's fellow citizens requires endorsing a conception of political justice that supports the notion 
of reasonable disagreement and effectively responds to its demands. For only by doing so can one 
hope to produce an environment in which all reasonable individuals will be able to realise the 
personal freedom necessary to pursue a conception of the good of their own choosing and 
design-the only type of freedom that adequately respects one's dignity as a person (Shklar 1989: 
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30; similarly, s~eLarmore 1996: 123-24;Larmore 1999: 607-08; and Rawls 1996:48-50,53-
54). Such accommodation and freedom can be achieved only if the public conception of justice 
restricts its concerns to matters ofpolitical justice and is comprised of only those values that all 
reasonable people can reasonably be expected to endorse voluntarily and faithfully-i.e., political 
values. Moreover, maintaining a "respectful" degree of accommodation and freedom also 
requires that in the case of a conflict between the political values of the conception ofjustice and 
the values embodied in citizens' comprehensive doctrines, the former always be assigned primacy. 
Political liberals contend that, provided the public conception of justice guarantees certain 
basic liberties which enable all reasonable individuals to pursue their chosen way oflife without 
undue interference from either the state or their fellow citizens, it can be assumed that in those 
instances when it is necessary to do so, such individuals will voluntarily assign primacy to the 
political values that comprise the conception of justice. This conclusion is based upon the following 
assumptions: 1) all reasonable people will want to secure a just and stable society; 2) all 
reasonable people affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines; 3) all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines are compatible with a political conception of justice; 4) each person's "overall view" 
consists of two distinct yet related views-a ''public" view and a ''nonpublic" view-and this 
enables all individuals tO assign primacy to the political values of the conception of justice without 
having to compromise adherence to the nonpolitical values of their own comprehensive doctrine 
(Rawls 1993: 38, 140; Larmore 1987:71,74, 76; Shklar 1989:24-25, 31); and 5) only those 
values that conflict with ''the vezy conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing 
of mutual respect" will conflict with the political values of the conception of justice (Rawls 1993: 
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157). Combined, the above "facts" are said to make it possible for all reasonable citizens to defer 
to the political values of the conception of justice willingly when such deference is necessary. 
Moreover, the conditions secured by the presence of these facts are sufficiently beneficial and fair 
to convince all reasonable people that "no conflict of values is likely to arise that justifies their 
opposing the political conception as a whole, or on such matters as liberty of conscience, or equal 
political liberties, or basic civil rights" (Rawls 1993: 155). 
Underlying the assumption that in the case of potentially divisive conflict individuals will 
be willing to assign primacy to political values is the belief that, generally speaking, the citizens of 
contemporary liberal democracies either knowingly or unknowingly, explicitly or implicitly, accept 
the fact of reasonable disagreement and willingly and faithfully adhere to what Rawls has labeled 
the precept of avoidance. Political liberals argue that citizens who accept the fact of reasonable 
disagreement and recognise the need to always adhere to the precept of avoidance will realise that 
the development of a political conception of justice is necessary to achieve an overlapping 
consensus, 3 which, in turn, is required to secure a well-ordered democratic society. Such being 
the case, political liberals contend that such citizens will also accept that in the case of divisive 
conflict between political values and nonpolitical values, the former must always be assigned 
primacy. 
However, empirical evidence concerning the attitudes of the citizens of a number of 
contemporary liberal democracies would seem to suggest that the validity of the above noted 
beliefs is, at best, (increasingly) debatable. In particular, citizens' willingness to adhere voluntarily 
to the precept of avoidance seems to be much less assured than political liberals suggest. Various 
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studies conducted over the past fifty years reveal that when push comes to shove, many individuals 
are publicly willing to declare certain views to be unacceptable and demand actions which abridge 
many of the ''basic liberties" promoted by political liberalism (K.losko 1993: 352; see also Klosko 
2000: 42-115). Such transgressions areparticularlyevidentwhenoneexaminesattitudes and 
judicial decisions concerning the issue of censorship.4 Evidence suggests that while citizens 
generally seem willing to accept, in principle, the fact of reasonable disagreement and the need 
to remain faithful to the precept of avoidance, when faced with a situation in which the practical 
demands accompanying such actions conflict with firmly held personal beliefs, a significant 
percentage of these same citizens often fails to act in a manner that reflects the fundamental 
principles and practical obligations associated with either the fact of reasonable disagreement or 
the precept of avoidance. 5 Moreover, a recent study reveals that contrary to popular belief,6 this 
willingness to violate the precept of avoidance and abridge basic liberties is a characteristic 
common to all segments of society. 
In The Clash of Rights: Liberty, Equality, and Legitimacy in Pluralist Democracy 
(1996), Paul Sniderman, Joseph Fletcher, Peter Russell, and Philip Tetlock document the 
willingness of"elites"-informed and influential citizens, particularly those who influence or are 
responsible for the development, implementation, and administration of public policies and 
programs7 -to abandon their support for democratic principles and practices. Sniderman and his 
colleagues provide data which suggest that in the case of a conflict of values, elites are equally as 
or more likely to agree to the transgression or suspension ofbasic liberties than are "ordinary" 
citizens. Thus it would seem that regardless of which segment of the citizenry one refers to, the 
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''unavoidable conclusion of decades of empirical studies is ... that significant majorities of ... 
citizens of ... liberal societies, do not uphold basic liberties in the strong sense" demanded by 
political liberalism (Klosko 1993: 353; see also Klosko 2000: 42-115). This willingness to 
abridge basic liberties reflects the qualified acceptance of the notion of reasonable disagreement, 
and the willingness to disregard the precept of avoidance. The violation ofbasic liberties is a 
practical manifestation and consequence ofboth the periodic rejection of the notion of reasonable 
disagreement and the lack of a stable, unqualified commitment to the precept of avoidance-in 
the esperanto of political liberalism, the willingness of citizens to act ''unreasonably." 
ill. Reasonableness and the Scope of Political Values 
Contrary to what political liberals seem to be suggesting, the willingness of citizens to violate the 
precept of avoidance is not simply or primarily a measure of their ''unreasonableness," per se. 
Rather, citizens' inability or unwillingness to remain faithful to the precept of avoidance is often a 
consequenceofalackofagreementonthepropermeaningandscopeofpolitical values.8Though 
citizens may be able to reach a consensus regarding the general principles which they believe 
should guide individual behaviour in the public realm, they nevertheless may continue to disagree 
over the specific interpretation and application of these principles. To illustrate: Both my neighbor 
and I may agree that the rightto freedom of expression is an essential component of a reasonable 
political conception of justice. However, while I may believe that the right to freedom of 
expression does not include the right to publish pornography or racist literature, my neighbor may 
deem any censorship an unreasonable restriction upon his right to freedom of expression. Hence, 
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though both my neighbor and I endorse the concept of freedom of expression, we nevertheless 
disagree about its proper scope. 
Disputes concerning the proper meaning and scope of political values are the consequence 
of disagreements over precisely what constitutes a "reasonable" demand. If political values are 
those values which all reasonable individuals can reasonably be expected to endorse voluntarily, 
then the parameters of the political realm will be determined according to one's definition of 
"reasonable." In the case of political liberalism, this fact might be of relatively little concern if it 
could be guaranteed that all reasonable individuals will possess and maintain an identical 
understanding of what constitutes a ''reasonable" demand. However, surely even political liberals 
would agree that reasonable people will differ in their interpretations of what constitutes a 
reasonable demand. As Patrick Neal has noted, ''there are, have been, and will be many people 
(millions and millions!) who are at least as reasonable as John Rawls and ... who do not believe 
in the values of political liberalism or the liberal version of tolerance" (Neal1995: 25). 
Yet, widespread agreement on a "thick" definition of what constitutes a reasonable 
demand is necessary for the establishment and preservation of a reliable overlapping consensus. 
Without such an agreement, it is impossible to define the meaning and scope ofpolitical values in 
a manner that will adequately prevent divisive, destabilising conflict among adherents of competing 
and conflicting views. This fact is important because only by securing the conditions needed to 
achieve and sustain an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice can one hope 
to obtain the type of political stability required to establish and maintain a well-ordered society. 
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As previously noted, an overlapping consensus is said to be alone in its ability to 
accommodate the fact of reasonable disagreement in amannerthat can secure the kind of stability 
essentialtoawell-orderedsociety-namely,astabilitythatwillnotfluctuatewithchangesin 
citizens' personal circumstances or in the distribution of political power. In contemporary 
pluralistic societies, achieving such stability requires that the conception of justice be morally 
compatible with a wide diversity of conflicting and often irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. 
Only by adopting such a character can the conception of justice hope to obtain the kind of 
widespread, unwavering support essential to the achievement and maintenance of a well-ordered 
society. 
Political liberals argue that the unique character of the overlapping consensus enables it 
to secure the type of moral support needed to achieve the kind of stability required to establish 
and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy. Unlike previously proposed public agreements 
the stability of which has been predicated upon their success in securing widespread support for 
a conception of justice based upon the dictates of a single comprehensive doctrine, achieving a 
stable overlapping consensus requires agreement on only a political conception of justice. By 
restricting its scope to the political conception of justice, the overlapping consensus allows the 
adherents of a wide diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines to embrace 
it voluntarily without having to compromise, transgress or forsake any of their personal values or 
beliefs, and thus to support its establishment and continuation as morally compatible with their 
respective doctrines, thereby ensuring the largest possible base of support. Moreover, the 
presence of this shared moral affirmation ensures that support for the overlapping consensus will 
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remain stable regardless of changes to individuals' personal circumstances or "shifts in the 
distribution of political power" (Rawls 1993: 148; see also Larmore 1996: 133). 
Importantly, the purely political character of the conception of justice also allows 
participants in the overlapping consensus to disagree over controversial religious, moral, and 
philosophical issues and yet still maintain a constant level of moral support for the conception of 
justice and, by extension, the overlapping consensus. Political liberals argue that this type of 
tlextbility, combined with the limited scope of the conception ofjustice, significantly eliminates the 
possibility of divisive conflict between members ofthe overlapping consensus, and thereby 
generates a degree of stability not previously possible. All of the aforementioned features combine 
to engender and secure the type of moral support for the conception of justice that is necessary 
to obtain the stability required to establish and maintain a well-ordered society. 
The above noted achievements are made possible by the use of reasonableness as the 
supreme standard of judgement in public matters (i.e., questions concerning political justice). 
Political liberalism suggests that political stability does not require that citizens affirm as ''true" the 
public conception of justice; an overlapping consensus can be secured and sustained as long as 
citizens affirm the conception of justice as ''reasonable." Indeed, political liberals contend that it 
is necessary to refrain from publicly asserting that the conception of justice upon which the 
overlapping consensus is based is true, because to do so would make it impossible to obtain the 
type of overlapping consensus being sought (e.g., Rawls 1996 128-29, 153; and Larmore 1996: 
173). 
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However, a problem emerges with respect to the assertion that the conception of justice 
need only be affirmed as reasonable. If the degree of political stability provided by the overlapping 
consensus directly corresponds to the depth ofits members' moral affirmation of the conception 
ofjustice, and if we are to believe that the strength of this affirmation will not diminish following 
a change in members' personal circumstances or shifts in the distribution of political power, then 
it would seem that in order to ensure that the overlapping consensus always provides the 
necessary stability, its members must unfailingly support the conception of justice with an equal 
or greater conviction than that which they maintain for the most valued aspects of their respective 
comprehensive doctrines. If certain components of one's comprehensive doctrine are affirmed 
with a greater strength than the political conception of justice (or any of its constituent values), then 
it is quite possible that a change in personal circumstances or a shift in the distribution of political 
power will produce a situation in which the adherents of reasonable doctrines may come to believe 
that it is morally right or necessary to withdraw their support for the existing conception of justice 
and try to enforce society-wide adherence to their own comprehensive views. 
The obvious danger with such a development-aside from the potential conflict and 
turmoil associated with trying to force all citizens to adhere to specific views-is that, should 
support for the overlapping consensus begin to erode, its continued existence and, subsequently, 
the political stability of the society in question, is jeopardised. This threat could be easily overcome 
if it could be guaranteed that, should citizens decide to abandon the overlapping consensus, there 
will be an equal number who will voluntarily and simultaneously chose to become members. Yet 
it is obviously impossible to provide such a surety. 
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One might argue (as do Rawls and Larmore, for example) that the design of the 
overlapping consensus helps to ensure that those whose comprehensive doctrines allowed them 
to become members will likely never be confronted with a situation that forces them to abandon 
their membership. Political liberals contend that should a conflict of values arise, provided that 
certain circumstances obtain-e.g., citizens continue to affirm the notion of reasonable 
disagreement and abide by the dictates of the precept of avoidance-it is unlikely that the 
"unsatisfactory'' resolution of said conflict will precipitate the withdrawal of members' support for 
the political conception of justic~. However, it is also generally acknowledged that such a 
possibility cannot be eliminated (e.g., Rawls 1993: 240-46; Larmore 1996: 142). Hence the level 
of support for the conception ofjustice could conceivably decrease to the point that the scope of 
the public agreement no longer satisfies the demands associated with the type of overlapping 
consensus required by political liberalism. At the very least, it would seem that the possibility of 
such a development is equal to the likelihood that voluntary support for the overlapping consensus 
will increase-something that Rawls, for example, believes will happen with the passage of time 
(Rawls 1993: 142; see also Larmore 1987: 58, 86; and Larmore 1996: 142). 
One thing is certain: once the overlapping consensus no longer includes them~ority of the 
citizenry, the political stability of the society is unacceptably threatened. If the overlapping 
consensus represents an amalgam of those citizens who freely, willingly and sincerely support the 
public conception of justice, then once the majority of the citizenry exists "outside" of the 
overlapping consensus, the situation becomes one in which the minority of the population is forcing 
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themajorityto adhere to its views. Forpoliticalliberals, such a situation is both unacceptably 
illiberal and unstable. 
Does this mean that the continued existence of the overlapping consensus is dependent 
upon its founding and future members maintaining one set ofbeliefs for the entirety of their lives? 
The answer is both "NO" and "YES." Because the overlapping consensus represents an 
agreement on only the conception of justice, and given that the conception of justice is concerned 
solely with the domain of the political, the perpetuation of the overlapping consensus does not 
require that its members maintain the same set of political and nonpolitical beliefs for the 
duration of their lives. However, the continued existence of a viable overlapping consensus-that 
is, a consensus that can secure the stability required to establish and maintain a well-ordered 
society-is conditional upon a certain number of its members (e.g., however many are needed 
to constitute a [large?] majority of the entire population) remaining sincerely and fundamentally 
committed to the political values that comprise the public conception of justice. Hence it is not 
that members of the overlapping consensus need be prohibited from changing their views, per se. 
Rather, the maintenance of a viable overlapping consensus demands that it sustain the voluntary 
support of a majority of its members, and the satisfaction of this caveat necessitates that the 
preponderance of members continue to endorse the political values associated with the prevailing 
public conception of justice. 
Political liberals do not perceive such a requirementto be a threatto the stability of the 
overlapping consensus, because: 1) the political values that constitute the conception of justice are 
values that all reasonable citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse; 2) the majority of the 
176 
citizenry of contemporary liberal democracies is reasonable;9 and 3) all reasonable citizens will 
voluntarily maintain their support for the aforenoted political values because these values are 
understood to provide the best foundation for a public agreement that can secure the conditions 
that will freely enable all reasonable people to pursue and (hopefully) realise their visions of the 
good life. Hence, in effect, the necessary support for the values in question already exists and can 
be expected to continue to do so. 
However, the argwnents ofpoliticalliberals also suggest that onlyreasonablepeople can 
be counted on to maintain their commitment to the political values comprising the conception of 
justice. Yet, if the establishment and preservation of a viable overlapping consensus is dependent 
upon its acquiring and sustaining the voluntary support of a majority ofthecitizemy-as surely it 
must be-and if only ''reasonable" individuals can be relied upon to maintain their support for the 
conception of justice and, by extension, the overlapping consensus, then the preservation of a 
viable overlapping consensus would seem to require that the majority of the population be 
reasonable. As already noted, political liberals believe that such a condition already exists, and 
thus this caveat does not represent an obstacle to the achievement of an enduring overlapping 
consensus. 
The principal problem with such a prerequisite, however, is that it makes the establishment 
and stability of the overlapping consensus dependent upon the "reasonableness" of citizens. As 
a number of theorists have noted, reasonability, especially in contemporary liberal societies, is, 
more often than not, heterogeneous in character (e.g., Neal 1995; and Bohman 1995). 
Subsequently, depending upon the definition of''reasonable" that is employed, the cohort of 
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reasonable citizens may or may not represent the majority of the population. However, the 
overlapping consensus must contain a majority of the population if it is to provide the stability 
required to sustain a well-ordered society. Furthennore, even if the requisite number of citizens 
already were or became reasonable, there could be no guarantee that they would always remain 
so. Reasonability is too fluid, too unpredictable a basis upon which to premise a person's 
continued support for the prevailing definition of''reasonable." If reasonability is to provide the 
basis for a stable overlapping consensus, then all reasonable citizens will have to affirm and 
maintain the same definition of''reasonable"-speci:fically, that propounded by political liberalism. 
Only by ensuring such a homogeneity can one be assured of securing the type of unwavering 
moral support required to guarantee the continuation of the overlapping consensus. Yet, if 
reasonability is heterogeneous and fluid, then surely it is not unreasonable to suggest that not all 
reasonable people will voluntarily endorse or remain faithful to any single definition of''reasonable" 
and its associated demands. 
Moreover, even if we restrict our focus to "reasonable" citizens as defined by political 
liberals, what is affirmed as reasonable by some may (and likely will) nevertheless be considered 
unreasonable or otherwise unacceptable by others. Political liberals readily concede that there will 
be ''reasonable'' disagreement among reasonable people on "matters of the first significance" (e.g., 
Rawls 1989: 238; Larmore 1987: 52; Larmore 1996: 158, 169; Shklar 1984: 8,227;andShklar 
1989: 35). Issues will arise which involve questions that generate such emotion and 
controversy-e.g., governmental policies on abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, capital punishment, 
the use of nuclear weapons, etc-that an appeal to public reason( ableness) is by itself insufficient 
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to resolve any disputes which emerge. If this is true, then there is no effective way to prevent 
divisive conflict between reasonable individuals' fundamental values and the political conception 
ofjustice. However, if such conflict occurs, as it inevitably will, then it is likely that support for the 
political conception ofjustice will fluctuate, and when it does, the overlapping consensus will be 
unacceptably undermined. 
And finally, if, as would seem logical to assume, citizens' initial and continued affirmation 
of the political conception of justice is predicated upon their belief that it condones only reasonable 
behaviour, then it would seem that in order to maintain a constant level of moral support for the 
political conception of justice (and, by extension, the overlapping consensus), all decisions 
justified by reference to it would have to be considered "reasonable" by all participants in the 
overlapping consensus. Yet, even if we assume that all citizens define "reasonableness" as the 
willingness to adhere to the demands of public reason as defined by the conception of justice, 
there can be no guarantee that every decision produced by the political conception of justice will 
be reasonable in the required sense (Rawls 1993: 240). Subsequently, by itself, citizens' 
willingness to assign primacy to reasonableness when confronted with a conflict between the 
''truth" of their fundamental values and the demands of the political conception of justice does not 
resolve all significant problems. If political liberalism is to provide the basis for a reliable 
overlapping consensus, then not only does one need to ensure that all participants in the 
overlapping consensus possess and maintain an identical understanding of what constitutes a 
reasonable demand, but it is also necessary to preclude the possibility of the political conception 
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of justice producing unreasonable decisions. Political liberals, however, have thus far been unable 
to satisfy either of these two criteria adequately. 
For all of the above noted reasons, it is insufficient to suggest or hope, as political liberals 
seem to, that citizens' reasonability (in conjunction with the reasonableness of the conception of 
justice) can or will ensure their continued support for the conception of justice and thereby provide 
a secure basis for a viable overlapping consensus. If it is to establish the foundation for an 
enduring overlapping consensus, political liberalism must somehow guarantee that the strength of 
each member's moral affirmation of the public conception of justice is at least equal to that which 
he has for his most firmly held convictions. If such a guarantee cannot be provided, then there is 
an ever-present danger that a change in individuals' personal circumstances or a shift in the 
distribution of political power will also result in a diminislnnent or substantial erosion of their moral 
support for the conception ofjustice, and, by extension, unacceptably threaten the very existence 
of the overlapping consensus and the well-ordered society founded upon it. 
Yet, if membership in the overlapping consensus requires only that one affirm the 
conception of justice as "reasonable," then there is no way to ensure that the strength of members' 
moral affirmation of the conception of justice ever is, or will always remain, equal to or greater 
than their support for their fundamental values-i.e., those moral truths that are most sacred to an 
individual. Political liberals seem to acknowledge that it is unlikely that those who affirm the 
conception of justice only as reasonable will ever support it with the same conviction with which 
they support their most firmly held convictions. Rawls, for example, concedes as much when he 
acknowledges that, "F ormanythe true, or the religiously and the metaphysically well-grounded, 
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goes beyond the reasonable" (Rawls 1993: 153). If we accept this claim and also (logically and 
reasonably) asstime that most individuals believe their fundamental values to represent the truth, 
then surely those who affirm the conception of justice only as reasonable cannot possibly be 
endorsing it with the same degree of moral conviction that they maintain for their fundamental 
values. This means that should the conception of justice support a decision that conflicts with one's 
fundamental values-a situation that would seem inevitable-assuming that individuals will 
normally strive to act in accordance with the dictates of their fundamental values, it is the 
conception of justice (and, by extension, the overlapping consensus) that will be abandoned, not 
one's fundamental values. If this is true, then the consensus achieved bypoliticalliberalism is not 
the type of overlapping consensus that political liberals seek; it is, rather, more akin to what Rawls 
has labeled a modus vivendi. 
Thus it would seem that if political liberals hope to guarantee that changes in personal 
circumstances or shifts in the distribution of political power will not precipitate a decrease in 
support for the political conception of justice and thereby destabilise the overlapping consensus, 
then they must somehow ensure that individuals affirm the conception of justice as not just 
''reasonable" but also ''true." However, if individuals must affirm the conception of justice as true, 
then not only would the number of citizens who could voluntarily support it be drastically reduced, 
but by making such a demand, political liberalism would be unequivocally abandoning its quest 
for metaphysicalinnocence (N eal1990: 42) and in so doing negating its ability to serve as the 
basis for an overlapping consensus. In turn, such a negation eliminates the possibility of political 
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hberalism securing the degree of stability to which it aspires: namely, that required to establish and 
sustain a well-ordered society. 
This dilenuna brings to mind the paradox of democracy-the possibility "that the principle 
ofmajority-rule may lead to self-contradictions"; more specifically, "that the majority may decide 
that a tyrant should rule" (Popper 1962: 265, n.4), thereby allowing for the destruction of 
democracy. According to political liberals, ifpoliticalliberalism is to secure the conditions needed 
to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy, then it must demand only that citizens 
affirm the conception of justice as reasonable. To demand that the conception of justice be 
affirmed as true would be to, in effect, depoliticise political liberalism and in so doing prevent it 
from providing the foundation for a well-ordered society. However, insofar as political liberalism 
only requires that the conception of justice be affirmed as "reasonable," it risks political instability 
and effectively undermines its ability to serve as the framework for a well-ordered society. 
IV. A Convincing Alternative Scenario? 
Political liberals suggest that there is an alternative to the above scenario. Rather than believe that 
the emergence of a conflict between one's fundamental values and the political conception of 
justice necessitates that one either support said values and reject the political conception of justice, 
or maintain his support for the political conception of justice and forsake said values, political 
liberals contend that citizens confronted by such a conflict ''might" simply choose to "adjust or 
revise"theirdoctrinesratherthanrejectthepoliticalconceptionofjustice(Rawls 1993: 160; see 
also Larmore 1996: 142). But if the concern for political stability is a practical concern, then surely 
it is insufficient merely to suggest that citizens might choose to modify their comprehensive 
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doctrines rather than reject the political conception of justice. As Thomas Hill has noted, "If the 
point oflooking for arguments for stability is to see, before we attempt reforms, whether the 
reforms would be lasting enough to be worth the effort, then a bare possibility is a small comfort" 
(1994: 341 ). Moreover, as Michael Huemer (among others) has suggested, when faced with such 
a conflict, individuals are just as likely to qualify or withdraw, even if only temporarily, their 
support for the political conception of justice as they are to attempt to accommodate it by 
modifying their comprehensive doctrines (Huemer 1996; see also Klosko 1993: 352-53). Indeed, 
it is difficult to fathom why anyone who believes that his comprehensive doctrine represents the 
truth-as most, if not all, individuals do-would even consider adjusting or revising it simply so 
that it can become or remain morally compatible with the public conception of justice. Even if we 
restrict our focus to the domain of the political, it remains unclear why any person would or should 
willingly subordinate what he perceives to be the ''whole" truth, in favour of something less 
"complete." 
Political liberals seem to believe that in the case of a conflict between one's fundamental 
values and the political conception of justice, all reasonable persons will be willing to adjust or 
revise their comprehensive doctrines because 1) they recognise that establishing a well-ordered 
society will secure the greatest opportunity for all to pursue and (hopefully) live the life that they 
choose; and 2) they realise that the establishment and preservation of a well-ordered society 
requires the achievement of an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice, and this 
is impossible if one makes truth the supreme standard of judgment for public matters (Rawls 1999: 
132-3 3, 13 8). Hence, desiring a well-ordered society or the benefits thereof, reasonable citizens 
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will accept reasonableness as the supreme standard of judgment for public matters because they 
understand that only by doing so is it possible to achieve the required public agreement and 
corresponding political stability. This acceptance of reasonableness as the "final court of appeal" 
for public matters ensures that should a conflict arise between one's fundamental values and the 
political conception of justice, citizens will readily consider adjusting or revising their 
comprehensive doctrines rather than simply withdrawing their support for the political conception 
of justice. 
This assumption is grounded in the belief that, generally speaking, the citizens of 
contemporary liberal democracies realise that such polities will always contain a plurality of 
conflicting and irreconcilable reasonable comprehensive doctrines (i.e., they affirm the fact of 
reasonable disagreement). This realisation is accompanied by a belief that it is unreasonable and 
detrimental-to the extent that it is divisive and destabilising and thus an impediment to the 
achievement of one's goals-to demand that all citizens abide by a single understanding of the 
truth. In other words, among the citizenry of contemporary liberal democracies, there already 
exists an adequate, stable consensus on what constitutes a reasonable demand. This consensus 
is present in the form of a pervasive, conscious and subconscious, explicit and implicit, support 
for what Rawls has termed fundamental ideas. 10 However, as has already been noted, empirical 
data suggest that support for the fundamental ideas animating the concept of political 
liberalism-and, thus, for the proposed agreement on what constitutes a reasonable demand-is 
often superficial and fragile and tends to fluctuate with circumstance, and therefore it cannot be 
considered to represent or provide the basis for a stable overlapping consensus. 
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One might challenge the validity of using past examples of unreasonable behaviour to 
question the existing degree of reasonableness or to argue against the likelihood of obtaining 
reasonable behaviour in the future; but what are the alternatives upon which to base such 
predictions? History, at least, provides concrete examples that, when sufficientinnumber and 
similarity, offer a reasonable and justifiable basis for suggesting the probability of certain actions 
or outcomes. If particular circumstances or stimuli have been observed to generate the same 
response (namely, unreasonable behaviour), time and time again, then surely it is not unreasonable 
to argue that, barring some significant and unpredictable change in citizens' behaviour, it is likely 
that this pattern will, with few exceptions, continue. Conversely, in the absence of such a 
suggestive, discernible pattern, one can only guess as to the probable response to a given situation. 
Hence, although it may not offer a guarantee, historical precedent is surely as solid a basis for 
prediction as is available. From this perspective, evidence of past (and present) unreasonable 
behaviour would seem to provide adequate justification for the belief that certain circumstances 
are likely to elicit the same type of behaviour. 
Regrettably, contemporary examples of unreasonable behaviour seem discouragingly easy 
to find; indeed, much of recent history would seem to suggest that rather than humanity becoming 
more reasonable with the passage of time, the opposite is true. With alarming regularity the daily 
news is filled with accounts of unreasonable behaviour: racist, homophobic and other hate-
motivated crimes and killings; military coups; the brutal oppression of secessionist movements; the 
violent and bloody disintegration of multi-ethnic states; and, perhaps most fiightening, instances 
of genocidal behaviour. 
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It might be argued that political liberals have anticipated this evidential problem (i.e., the 
existence of numerous concrete examples of individuals' willingness to act unreasonably) and 
effectively confront it via their use of, and emphasis upon, the notion of fundamental ideas. 
According to political liberals, it is the presence of, and existing support for, these fundamental 
ideas that justify the claim that, in general, citizens of a well-ordered society will voluntarily accept 
the notion of reasonable disagreement and adhere to the demands of the precept of avoidance. 
hnportantly, political liberals believe that individuals' affirmation of the noted fundamental 
ideas, and, by extension, their free and willing acceptance of the concept of reasonable 
disagreement and the demands of the precept of avoidance, can and often will be implicit or 
unrecognised. Such being the case, political liberals argue that it is possible for an individual to 
support publicly a claim that conflicts with both the notion of reasonable disagreement and the 
dictates of the precept of avoidance and yet still remain committed to the tenets of these concepts. 
Hence, an overt display of"unreasonable" behaviour does not necessarily represent a fundamental 
rejection of, or even a withdrawal of support for, either the concept of reasonable disagreement 
or the precept of avoidance. Moreover, the lack of a guaranteed, predictable correlation between 
one's behaviour and one's level of commitment also means that the maintenance of a stable 
overlapping consensus does not require that individuals explicitly or even knowingly support either 
the concept of reasonable disagreement or the precept of avoidance. Thus, according to political 
liberalism, citizens can publicly pursue claims that conflict with the notion of reasonable 
disagreement and/or violate the precept of avoidance-they can act "unreasonably"-without 
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having to withdraw their support for either, and without seriously undermining the stability of the 
overlapping consensus. 
However, whether it is possible, either in theory or in practice, to accomplish such 
apparent contradictions is irrelevant: what matters is how people act. If a judge rules that the 
suppression of communist propaganda or the rejection of the practice oflegislated affirmative 
action is justifiable and legal, then it hardly matters whether he unknowingly or otherwise supports 
principles that conflict with these decisions. Indeed, a penetrating self-analysis or Socratic 
interrogation may reveal that the judge's decision does not coincide with his fundamental beliefs; 
but this revelation changes nothing. The presence of an underlying yet dormant support for certain 
principles does nothing to alter the consequences of the judge's decision. lfthe judge's ruling 
incites a riot, a post facto recognition of the ''unreasonableness" ofhis decision will not undo the 
damage resulting from theriot. The point is this: the stability of the overlapping consensus cannot 
be adequately safeguarded by the implicit or unrecognised affirmation of guiding principles and 
concepts such as certain fundamental ideas, and, by extension, the notion of reasonable 
disagreement and the precept of avoidance. If citizens are publicly allowed to reject the concept 
of reasonable disagreement and violate the dictates of the precept of avoidance, then surely the 
likelihood of unreasonable behaviour dramatically increases and with it so does the fragility of the 
overlapping consensus. 
It might be objected that very few, if any, political liberals are primarily or even 
significantly concerned with the ability of their theories to provide a viable solution to the problems 
currently troubling existing liberal democracies, and such being the case, the value of criticising 
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the inability of political liberalism toresolvetheseproblems is suspect. Ifpoliticalliberals have (at 
least to some extent) accepted that the viability of their theories is dependent upon the presence 
of circumstances that may not currently exist-either in character or in degree-in any actual 
society, then is it still useful to suggest that political liberalism fails because empirical evidence 
suggests that certain of its claims are, or, at least appear, invalid? Surely empirical studies are 
damaging to the viability of a theory only if one assumes that the theory in question was meant 
(and, perhaps more importantly, still seeks) to address the problems currently distressing 
contemporary liberal democracies? 
While it may be true that many political liberals no longer seem notably concerned with 
orprotectiveoftheabilityofpoliticalliberalismtoresolvetheproblemsofstabilitythatcurrently 
trouble existing liberal democracies, there nevertheless remains an inextricable and crucial link 
between the sociopolitical realities of these societies and the theoretical viability of political 
liberalism. Given that political liberals have premised the credibility of a number of their central 
claims-e.g., that certain fundamental ideas are inherent in the political culture of nearly all 
democratic societies and widely supported by the citizens of such societies-upon the empirical 
verifiability ofthese claims, any retreat from emphasising the correspondence between the 
circumstances confronting the theoretical society presented by political liberals and the reality of 
existing contemporary liberal democracies makes little difference in terms of the significance of the 
inability of political liberalism to address adequately the problems posed by empirical evidence 
that contradicts said claims. That is to say, if the viability ofpoliticalliberalism is dependent upon 
the validity of: for example, certain claims about the citizenry of existing societies, claims that, on 
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investigation, prove questionable, then merely disavowing any desire to resolve the actual 
problems confronting existing societies does not eliminate the difficulties that related contradictory 
empirical evidence poses for the concept ofpoliticallibemlism. In order to maintain its theoretical 
viability, political liberalism must abandon its claim to an empirical basis, at least in regards to 
certain of its fundamental ideas, and present an alternate justification for its use of such ideas and 
the precise character or status that it attributes to them. 
Yet, even if one accepts political liberals' arguments concerning the existing level of 
support for certain fundamental ideas and understands the deterministic relationship between these 
ideas and the boundaries of the reasonable, the resulting definition of the reasonable is still too 
vague to identify the proper meaning and scope of political values in a manner that is likely to 
prevent the emergence of divisive, destabilising conflict. Unfortunately, efforts to define the 
parameters of the reasonable in a meaningful way are further complicated by the fact that although 
all political values are by definition ''reasonable," ''not any balance of political values is reasonable" 
(Rawls 1996: xliv). Thus one not only needs to be able to differentiate between political and 
nonpolitical values, one must also be able to distinguish between a reasonable and an unreasonable 
balance of political values. 
Given that there can and likely will be a number of different reasonable balances (Rawls 
1993: 227; Larmore 1987: 41 ), the task of distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable 
balances could very easily become quite difficult. Despite this fact, political liberals fail to provide 
any specific, concrete examples of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable balance. Though 
the political conception of justice proposed bypoliticalliberals is meant to exemplify a reasonable 
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balance of political values, political liberals acknowledge that within the proposed overlapping 
consensus, there will be several competing political conceptions of justice (Rawls 1993: 24 3; see 
also 164, 167), each ''no doubt favored by different interests and political strata" (Rawls 1993: 
36-3 8). Thus, one is still left trying to identify which political conception is the most appropriate. 
Subsequently, the most that can be determined is that something is "reasonable" if it can 
''reasonably'' be expected that it will be endorsed by a majority of the citizenry. Unfortunately, this 
definition is both empirically debatable and far too vague to provide ah effective or viable standard 
of judgment. 
Moreover, even if, for the sake of argument, we accept such a definition as an adequate 
basis for distinguishing the reasonable from the unreasonable, problems still exist. In particular, 
how do we resolve conflicts between competing reasonable demands? The potential plurality of 
reasonable doctrines, and the possibility that there may be a number of reasonable answers to any 
particular question, would seem to guarantee that there will be conflicts between different 
reasonable demands. Political liberals acknowledge the potential for such conflicts, conceding that 
"[i]t is unreasonable ... not to recognize the likelihood-indeed the practical certainty-of 
irreconcilable reasonable disagreements on matters of the first significance" (Rawls 1993: 240; 
see also Larmore 1987: 52; Lannore 1996: 169; Shklar 1984: 8,227; Shklar 1989: 35).Hence, 
it is not enough merely to explain how to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
demands and suggest how we might resolve conflicts between the two; it is also necessary to 
explain how we are to resolve conflicts between different reasonable demands. 
Political liberals suggest that when we are confronted with a number of competing 
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reasonable demands, we should endorse the demand which best reflects the ''most reasonable 
understanding of the public conception and its political values of justice and public reason" (Rawls 
1989: 238; see also Larmore 1996: 139, 158-63). However, without a clear, "thick" definition 
of"reasonable," how are we to determine which demand represents the "most reasonable 
understanding'' of the political conception? Political liberals fail to provide an effective elaboration 
as to exactly how such a decision will be reached or who will decide such matters.11 Furthennore, 
if individuals are told or led to believe that the comprehensive doctrine which they affirm is 
"reasonable," then they will likely also believe that all demands arising from adherence to their 
particular doctrine are reasonable and therefore deserving of public accommodation. Thus it could 
be argued that conflicts between competing reasonable demands would be as or more difficult to 
resolve than conflicts between reasonable and unreasonable demands. If this is true, it would seem 
that it is imperative that political liberals provide a definition of the reasonable that effectively 
distinguishes between different degrees of reasonableness. However, no such definition has yet 
been produced. 
Hence, though political liberals present a number of statements which provide a general 
description of the realm ofthe reasonable, little in the way of any detailed explanation ofthe 
specific parameters of the reasonable is offered. Before one can assume that a political 
conception of justice will be able to secure and sustain a stable overlapping consensus, it is 
necessary to obtain a public agreement on the appropriate composition of the political conception 
and the proper meaning and scope ofits constituent values. Yet, before it is possible to secure 
such anagreement, it is necessary to provide a clear and detailed definition of the reasonable. As 
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James Bohman has noted, "Without a clear way to distinguish the reasonable and the 
unreasonable such that all would agree, a public basis for justification [i.e., astable overlapping 
consensus] cannot be expected to follow from wide agreement about facts and the possession of 
common reasoning capacities" (Bohman 1995: 265). Though currently available definitions of 
"reasonable" offer certain broad guidelines, they lack the depth and clarity needed to provide the 
standard of judgment required to adequately prevent divisive conflict and thereby secure a stable 
overlapping consensus. 
V. The Reasonableness of Public Reason 
Political liberals maintain that public reason will help provide the means by which we can define 
the proper content and boundaries of the reasonable in a manner that will effectively control the 
emergence of potentially divisive conflicts and allow for the peaceful resolution of any 
disagreements that may arise. In essence, public reason identifies the "guidelines of inquiry that 
specify ways of reasoning and criteria for the kinds of information relevant for political questions" 
(Rawls 1993: 223; see also Rawls 1999: 132-38).Bydoingso,publicreasonhelpstodefinethe 
proper parameters of the reasonable and thereby reduces the likelihood of divisive conflict. 
Political liberals do not propose that all debate and decisions be regulated by public reason. In 
order to establish the desired overlapping consensus, the guidelines of public reason need only 
apply to "fundamental matters"-i.e., constitutional essentials and questions ofbasic justice, stich 
as "who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair 
equality of opportunity" (Rawls 1993: 214; see also Larmore 1996: 126; Larmore 1999: 606, 
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n.8)-and not to "our personal deliberations and reflections about political questions" (Rawls 
1993: 215; Lannore 1987: 69, 151). 
However, once again the vagueness of existing definitions of''reasonable" jeopardises the 
viability of such arguments. The ability of public reason to help isolate the specific parameters of 
the reasonable is based upon the assumption that the given distinction between essential and non-
essential political matters will be acceptable to all reasonable individuals and therefore 
uncontroversial. Yet, reasonable people ''with different values will identify ... [the political 
culture's] most salient elements differently according to their values and beliefs" (Klosko 1993: 
352; see also Bohman 1995: 268). Subsequently, the definition of what constitutes a ''fimdamental 
matter" will itselfbe a source of controversy and conflict. In turn, ''when adherents of different 
world-views attempt to realize their values in thepublicrealm" (Klosko 1996: 258)theresulting 
conflict over matters of supreme importance "makes public reason itself essentially contestable" 
(Bohman 1995: 255). Hence one could accept, for example, Rawls' definition of what constitutes 
a fundamental matter as an adequate explanation of the distinction between essential and non-
essential matters, and still be effectively unable to preclude divisive conflict over the appropriate 
"standards of public reason and hence its limits in deliberation" (Bohman 1995: 264). 
Political liberals concede that, even given a consensus on a conception of public reason, 
there will still be instances when an appeal to public reason is, by itself, insufficient to resolve 
conflict. Though it is commonly argued that claims concerning constitutional essentials and 
questions ofbasic justice can usually be settled by an appeal to public reason alone, political 
liberals acknowledge that this is not always possible (e.g., Rawls 1993: 244-46; Larmore 1987: 
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52; and Larmore 1996: 157-58). Politicalquestionswillarisethatinvolveissues-e.g., public 
policies on abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, capital punishment, and the use of nuclear weapons, 
to name a few-that generate such emotion and controversy that an appeal to public reason is by 
itself insufficient to resolve any disputes which emerge. Hence, even in a well-ordered society 
founded upon political liberalism, there will be instances when"[ e ]veryone appeals to political 
values but agreement is lacking and more than marginal differences persist" (Rawls 1993: 240-
41 ). Political liberals recognise that in such circumstances, citizens may often believe it appropriate 
and acceptable to ''invoke principles appealing to nonpolitical values to resolve ... [the conflict] 
in a way they find satisfactory" (Rawls 1993: 244).12 
Of course, to allow individuals to appeal unqualifiedly to nonpolitical values would be to 
undermine public reason and, by extension, the overlapping consensus. Political liberals attempt 
to resolve this seemingly irreconcilable conflict by including the caveat that citizens may appeal to 
nonpolitical values, ''provided they do [so] ... in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason 
itself' (Rawls 1993: 247; see also Larmore 1996: 135-36; and Shklar 1989: 26). Yet, such a 
proposal is problematic for two reasons. First, the reasonableness of such appeals can be 
determined only via due reflection-that is, one must first speculate as to the reasonableness or 
unreasonableness of an appeal and then wait to have his conclusion vindicated. However, if an 
appeal had initially been accepted as reasonable, but upon due reflection proved to be 
unreasonable, then this would suggest that the prevailing understanding of reasonableness could 
be unreasonable. Second, it remains unclear as to who is to decide when it is reasonable to invoke 
nonpolitical values and exactly which nonpolitical values it is reasonable to invoke. Surely the 
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question of who detennines such matters will itselfbe a source of debate and conflict. By failing 
to provide a more concrete definition of reasonable, political liberals allow for such uncertainties 
and in so doing further impede efforts to identify the proper content and boundaries of the 
reasonable. Subsequently, even if one accepts the claims of political liberals concerning the 
appropriate content and application of public reason, such an understanding cannot by itself ensure 
to the degree required by political liberalism the absence of irreconcilable, divisive conflict. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The ability to separate the reasonable from the unreasonable is crucial to the viability of political 
liberalism. If such a separation cannot be achieved, then it is impossible to provide either an 
effective distinction between political and nonpolitical values or the guarantee that nonpolitical 
values will not unacceptably influence citizens' judgments concerning questions of political justice. 
Lacking such a distinction or guarantee, a purely political conception of justice and, subsequently, 
a stable overlapping consensus and well-ordered society are impossible. By failing to define the 
parameters of the reasonable adequately, political liberals are unable to provide the necessary 
distinction or guarantee. 
Yet, even if one were to assume that the definition of''reasonable" presented by political 
liberalism is effectively able to separate political from nonpolitical values and thereby somehow 
ensure that decisions regarding questions of political justice are justified by reference to only those 
values that all reasonable citizens could reasonably be expected to endorse, significant problems 
remain. Simply separating political values from nonpolitical values does not guarantee that 
individuals will be able to secure a stable agreement on eitherthepropermeaning and scope of 
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political values or the primacy or privilege to be assigned to particular political values when they 
conflict with each other. In order to reach a truly meaningful consensus on these matters, one 
needs to first achieve widespread, substantive agreement on a ''thick" definition of the reasonable. 
However, the distinction between "reasonable" and ''unreasonable" offered by political liberals 
is too vague to define the meaning and scope of political values in amannerth.at would adequately 
preclude the emergence of irreconcilable, divisive conflict, even within the confines of an 
established overlapping consensus. This problem remains even if one disregards the extremely 
questionable validity of the empirical claims of political liberals concerning both the presumed 
willingness of individuals to accept the fact of reasonable disagreement and remain faithful to the 
precept of avoidance, and the existing support for the fundamental ideas that animate political 
liberalism. 
Moreover, in order to avoid conflict over the type of issues that would be most 
detrimental to social unity and political stability, political liberals need to guaranteethatthepolitical 
values comprising the conception of justice will always naturally outweigh (i.e., voluntarily be 
given precedence over) whatever values conflict with them. Yet, political liberals acknowledge 
that such a surety is impossible to provide. As Rawls concedes, "Political good, no matter how 
important, can never in general outweigh the transcendent values-certain religious, philosophical, 
andmoralvaluesthatmaypossiblycomeintoconflictwithit"(Rawls1988:275).Consequently, 
conflicts between political and nonpolitical values will inevitably arise. However, the emergence 
of such conflicts presents political liberalism with an intractable dilemma: namely, in order to 
maintain the necessary overlapping consensus, political liberalism would have to assign a greater 
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"weight" to political values. Yet, if at any time political hberalism assigns a general and overriding 
primacy to political values, then it has negated its supposed purely political character and in so 
doing has precluded the possibility of securing either the sought after overlapping consensus or 
a well-ordered society. This is one of the paradoxes inherent in political liberalism. 
Given the diversity of comprehensive doctrines which are likely to exist in contemporary 
liberal democracies, disagreement over what constitutes a reasonable demand is inevitable. 
Indeed, as James Bohman has argued, 
If anything, newer forms of cultural diversity have now produced conflicts and 
disagreements so deep and troubling that even our standard liberal solutions, modeled on 
religious liberty and tolerance, no longer seem adequate or stable .... [M]any current 
disagreements are not merely conflicts of interest, but conflicts of principle. If conflicts of 
interest require adjudication, conflicts of principle, if deep enough, preclude this solution: 
what higher order principles such as fairness consist of may be precisely what is at stake 
(Bohman 1995: 253). 
Thus, "Even if there is an overlapping consensus about certain moral values, conflicts of 
principle about disputed issues are still possible" (Bohman 1995: 254). Unfortunately for political 
liberals, far from supporting or even desiring the separation of political from nonpolitical values, 
public reason from nonpublic reason, individuals seem increasingly willing to demand that 
nonpolitical values-values that are unable to be the object of a free and willing consensus among 
the adherents of a diversity of competing irreconcilable doctrines-be publicly accommodated 
and reflected in governmental policies and practices. With greater frequency, individuals are 
demanding that governments take a ''moral" stand on the (un)acceptability of certain activities and 
practices (e.g., abortion, euthanasia, etc.), even if the legal requirements of such a stand violate 
existingjudicial interpretations of certain constitutional principles. Movements such as the Moral 
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Majority, the Christian Coalition, and the "family values" platform recently promoted by the 
Republican Party in the United States bear witness to this phenomenon. The emergence and 
acceptance of the "politics of difference," the "politics of identity," and other similar phenomena 
have further blurred the distinction between the political and the nonpolitical. For many, now more 
so than ever before, "the personal is the political." 
With disconcerting regularity it seems that people are willing to abide by the "accepted" 
rules for public behaviour only so long as these rules do not conflict with those values which they 
consider inviolable. Once one's non-negotiable moral truths and the existing standards of justice 
diverge and the government refuses to alter policy or law to accommodate the conflicting 
viewpoint(s ), the likelihood of unreasonable behaviour dramatically increases. Regrettably, such 
unreasonable behaviour is arguably becoming more commonplace, as evidenced by phenomena 
such as the militia movements in the United States, the resurgence of neo-Nazi and other racist 
groups, and anti-abortion killings. While one may argue that the percentage of the population that 
supports or participates in such activities is relatively small, the potential impact of this cohort is 
still significant enough to jeopardise sociopolitical unity ~d stability. James Hunter, for one, has 
suggested that the existing moral-political division between the different extremist segments of the 
U.S. population represents "a possible prelude to the outbreak oflarge-scale political conflict" 
(Klosko 1996: 261; see also Hunter 1994, 1990). 
Furthermore, the actual percentage of the U.S. population that affirms doctrines that 
would be incompatible with the demands ofRawlsian political liberalism, for example, has been 
calculated to be somewhere between 20 percent and 40 percent (Klosko 1996: 258-59). It is 
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worth noting that 20 percent of the population of the United States translates into approximately 
50 million people. In addition, it has been argued that while anywhere from 60 percent to 80 
percent of the U.S. population affirms what could be labeled "moderate" doctrines-that is, 
doctrines which do not generate ''unbridgeable gaps" among the citizenry (Klosko 1996: 258-
59)-when trying to resolve contentious political questions, the general ignorance of this cohort 
"allows extremists and special interest groups to play on ... [its members'] emotions and so to 
manipulate them, [thereby further] contributing to the polarization [of society]" (K.losko 1996: 
259). Moreover, as Rawls acknowledges, the threat "oflarge-scale political conflict" need not be 
present before the stability of a society is unacceptably threatened: "That subversive advocacy is 
widespread enough to pose aJive political question is a sign of impending crisis rooted in the 
perception of significant groups that the basic structure is unjust and oppressive. It is a warning 
that they are ready to entertain drastic steps because other ways of redressing their grievances 
have failed" (Rawls 1993: 346). 
Unfortunately, in the final analysis, the problems posed by political liberalism's reliance 
on the appropriate presence and influence of reasonableness, and the accompanying requirement 
that one be able to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable demands and effectively separate 
the two, preclude the possibility of political liberalism securing the foundation for the type of 
overlapping consensus that it requires. Even if one were to accept the (questionable) claim that 
such a consensus is possible, politicalliberalismremainstroubled by a number of unresolved 
difficulties which suggest that in the unlikely event that the sought after overlapping consensus is 
secured, it is improbable that it could perpetually maintain the kind of support necessary to sustain 
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a well-ordered society, at least as such is understood by political liberals. In this regard, perhaps 
the most problematic and implausible feature of political liberalism is its requirement that 
individuals, when confronted with a conflict between their fundamental values and the demands 
of the political conception ofjustice, temporarily subordinate the ''truth" of their comprehensive 
doctrines and assign primacy to reasonableness as defined by the political conception of justice: 
Surely an individual ''will be moved by the appeal to reasonableness ... only to the extent 
that he values reasonableness [more than he values the truth]" (Huemer 1996: 3 82), and there 
seems to be little reason to believe that many will do so. Certainly there exists no persuasive 
evidence to suggest that individuals will voluntarily and faithfully subordinate their fundamental 
''truths" in favour of"reasonable" propositions, even if requests to do so are restricted to issues 
within the domain of the political. If anything, empirical data would seem to suggest that it is at 
least equally as (if not more) likely that in instances of value conflict, individuals will opt to act in 
accordance with their understanding of the truth as defined by their respective comprehensive 
doctrines. If this conclusion is correct, then unless the majority of citizens unfailingly support the 
public conception of justice with a conviction equal to or greater than that which they maintain for 
the most valued aspects of their respective comprehensive doctrines, the type of overlapping 
consensus being sought by political liberalism is impossible to achieve. 
If, when presented with a choice, there is at least an equal possibility that individuals will 
choose to act unreasonably-i.e., to obey the "truth" of their comprehensive doctrines rather than 
assigning primacy to "reasonable" propositions-then there is no way ever to secure the kind of 
reliable support needed to sustain the sought after overlapping consensus. Moreover, the ever-
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increasing doctrinal heterogeneity and corresponding plurality of public reasons that characterise 
contemporary liberal societies, and the subsequent increase in the possibility and likelihood of 
divisive conflict and sociopolitical fragmentation, further compound the significant difficulties 
associated with securing the conditions needed to achieve the sought after overlapping consensus. 
There is no compelling reason to believe that this fragmentation and polarisation of society will 
soon arrest or decline. 
In essence, then, political liberalism embodies a paradox with respect to reasonableness. 
Thesuccessofpoliticalliberalismisdependentuponitsrespectingthereasonablenessofcitizens. 
However, in providing such respect, political liberalism allows for the emergence of 
unreasonableness to a degree that critically undermines its ability to sustain the political stability 
required to establish and preserve a well-ordered society. 
The inability of political liberalism to avoid relying overwhelmingly upon reasonableness 
to help secure the conditions needed to realise the type of overlapping consensus claimed to be 
necessary to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy is not the only difficulty 
confronting political liberals. Political hberalismhas also exhibited a problematic naivete concerning 
the likely abuse of political power and the potential difficulties arising from such abuse. It is the 
task of the next chapter to explore this weakness, identify the difficulties generated by it and the 
consequences that they pose for the idea of a purely politicalliberalism.13 
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Notes 
1 It should be noted that for the purposes of this chapter the term "reasonable" will be employed to 
encompass both reasonableness and rationality as these terms are defmed in chapter four. Though Rawls, 
for example, explicitly argues that "the reasonable" and "the rational" are two distinct entities (Rawls 1993: 51), 
separate yet complimentary and interdependent, there have been a number of theorists who have persuasively 
argued that this distinction is more chimerical than real. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are the 
arguments of Peter Steinberger. In brief, Steinberger contends that Rawlsian "reasonableness is bound up with 
a way of thinking that involves analysis, argument, justification, and, ultimately, rationality" (Steinberger 2000: 
158). The understanding of reasonableness employed in this thesis embodies Steinberger's conclusion. 
Accordingly, whereas Rawls often refers to the actions of "reasonable and rational" persons, for such 
purposes I make reference to only "reasonable" persons. 
2 As previously noted, the problem is not that political power is used to coerce obedience. Political liberals 
accept that all political power "exercised within a political relationship" cannot help but be coercive in 
character(Rawls 1989: 242; Rawls 1996: 136-3 7; Larmore 1999: 600; Shklar 1989: 29). The coercive use of state 
power is unacceptable only when it is used to enforce adherence to the dictates of a particular comprehensive 
doctrine, thereby publicly denying the validity of opposing doctrines. 
3 It is worth reiterating that in associating the establishment of an overlapping consensus with the concept 
of political liberalism, I am not arguing that all political liberals purposely seek the achievement of such a 
consensus. Rather, I am merely asserting that the achievement of an overlapping consensus, whether or not 
one is actively sought, is essential to the success of political liberalism. 
4 For example, in regards to Rawls' analysis of the empirical data surrounding the issue of censorship, George 
K.losko has suggested that Rawls has "overlook[ ed] an enormous body of evidence against the anticensorship 
consensus he believes to exist in American culture" (K.losko 1993: 352). 
5 The "evidence" to which I am referring is the data contained in a number of studies that examine the topics 
of consensus and tolerance among citizens of liberal democracies. For example, see Stouffer (1955); Prothro 
and Grigg (1960); McClosky and Brill (1983); McClosky and Zaller (1984); Gibson (1986; 1989); Sniderman, 
Fletcher, Russell, and Tetlock (1989; 1996); and Abu-Laban and Stasiulis (1992). The findings of these and 
other similar studies have led George Klosko to argue that "the pervasive intolerance ofliberal citizens is one 
of the best attested facts of modem social science" (K.losko 1993: 352; see also Klosko 2000: esp. 42-115). 
6 The "popular belief' in question is the prevailing belief in the thesis of democratic elitism-the notion that 
while ordinary citizens and elites alike tend to unanimously "endorse democratic principles stated in the 
abstract," when confronted with a conflict or controversy, elites are far more likely to maintain their 
commitment to and support for democratic principles and practices. See Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell, and 
Tetlock (1996, esp. 26-51). 
7 Sniderman and his colleagues make reference to a number of different types of elites, including political, 
legal, legislative, administrative, governmental, and partisan elites. My remarks should be interpreted as 
referring to all of the above mentioned categories. 
8 This is not to suggest that such infidelity is never attributable to the unreasonableness of individuals. 
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9 Though Shklar does not explicitly make such a claim, her belief in the possibility of actualising her 
conception of political liberalism suggests that she also believes that the majority of the citizens of 
contemporary liberal democracies is reasonable, at least insofar as they need to be to accept the demands of 
political liberalism. 
10 Recall, fundamental ideas are foundational beliefs that are innate to and guide the political culture of a 
society; they comprise a "shared fund" of accepted beliefs and norms. The fundamental ideas associated with 
political liberalism center around the principle of equal respect for all persons (MacGilvray 2001: 34), and 
include ideas such as the notion of persons as free and equal agents. 
11 Though Larmore discusses the issue of how we might "reasonably rank what ... one value-commitment 
directs us to do, in ... [a] given set of circumstances, above what ... others enjoin us to do there" (Larmore 
1996: 158), not only does he effectively fail to answer the questions here under examination, but he also 
acknowledges "that many will regard ... [his] remarks ... as just so much assertion," and, push come to shove, 
he has "no fully satisfactory answer'' to the question of how incommensurable values might be accurately 
"weighed against one another'' (Larmore 1996: 162). 
12 According to Rawls, for. example, under such circumstances citizens may believe that "it is often more 
reasonable to go beyond the political conception and the values its principles express, and to invoke 
nonpolitical values that such a view does not include" (Rawls 1993: 230, emphasis added). 
13 Much of the material presented in this chapter has appeared previously in Young (2002). 
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CHAPTER SIX: POLITICAL POWER IN POLITICAL LmERALISM 
I. Introduction 
For a concept that has emphasised the need to be ''practical" (e.g., Rawls 1985: 226), political 
hberalism exlnbits a surprising impracticality with regard to how it addresses a very real problem: 
namely, the potential abuse ofpolitical power. Political liberals have generally failed to either 
seriously consider or adequately respond to the possibility that those controlling political power 
will, when the opportunity presents itself: use the mechanisms of state coercion to promote their 
own particular conception of the· good, with little concern for how their actions might affect those 
who affirm different or conflicting beliefs and values. Even in those instances when the problem 
of the potential abuse of political power secures a commanding presence-such as in Shklarian 
politicalliberalism-theresulting conception still fails to address more than the most blatant 
difficulties, and in so doing leaves problematic gaps which undermine its viability. The success of 
political liberalism is significantly dependent upon its ability to prevent the perversion of political 
power for the benefit of certain individuals, groups, or segments of society. Though political 
liberals generally acknowledge the potential for political power to be corrupted, and concede that 
there is really no sure way to preclude this possibility completely, the ability of political hberalism 
to provide a purely political conception of justice and thereby secure the basis for the required 
overlapping consensus is contingent upon the validity of the assumption that political power will 
not be abused. 
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In order to achieve the type of overlapping consensus that political liberals suggest is 
necessary to establish and sustain a just and stable hberal democracy, all reasonable citizens 1 must 
believe that the political process, 2 including the use of political power, is neutral: that is, fair to the 
adherents of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. If political power is perverted for 
"individual" gain, then it ceases to be neutral. It is important to note that such perversion, or abuse, 
occurs not only when political power is purposely misused-i.e., knowingly employed 
unreasonably-but also when the conception of justice unnecessarily prevents any person or 
group from having an equal opportunity to secure political power. Political liberals' failure to 
respond effectively to the full range of potential difficulties arising from the possible perversion of 
political power produces an unstable foundation for a number of fundamental assumptions upon 
which the viability ofpoliticalliberalism rests. It is the task of this chapter to identify the problems 
generated by this deficiency and the consequences that they pose for the concept of political 
liberalism. 
IT. The Neutrality of Political Liberalism 
Proponents of political liberalism contend that it offers a conception of justice that contains no 
controversial moral, religious, or philosophical presuppositions. In other words, political liberalism 
represents a neutral doctrine, at least insofar as it refrains from purposely favouring a particular 
conception of the good or comprehensive doctrine that contains any controversial view(s) 
concerning the character and content of the good life. As noted in chapter four, political liberals 
commonly distinguish between a number of different understandings of the notion of 
neutrality-notably, procedural neutrality, neutrality of aim, and neutrality of effect or 
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injluence3-and then conclude to what degree, if any, political liberalism satisfies the demands 
of each type of neutrality. However, the benefit of such an exercise remains uncertain. That is to 
say, the result of efforts to clarify the idea of neutrality with respect to its particular application to 
the concept of political liberalism, is unclear. 
Political liberals merely propose that political liberalism obtains, and need only achieve, 
a certain degree of procedural neutrality and neutrality of aim, but can legitimately forsake 
neutralityofeffectorintluence(Rawls 1993: 191-94; Lmmore 1996: 126,n.6; Shklar 1989:30-
31, 33). They also argue that the inability of political liberalism to secure a broader or more 
all-encompassing neutrality, in the familiar sense of the word,4 in no way undermines its liberal 
character. More often than not, however, the basis for these conclusions appears in the form of 
a matter-of-fact statement suggesting, as does Rawls, that "[ w ]e must accept the facts of 
commonsense political sociology'' (Rawls 1993: 193). Little (if any) further explanation is offered 
as to how exactly the distinctive yet limited neutrality secured by political liberalism either 
alleviates or eradicates any potential arguments questioning its neutrality. It seems that only when 
circumstances are such that it is beneficial or conducive to their arguments do political liberals 
assert that we must accept certain impossibilities (e.g., it is unrealistic to expect to achieve a 
broader or more all-encompassing neutrality than that offered by political liberalism). 
Perhaps most detrimental to the overall consistency and strength of existing arguments 
proclaiming the doctrinal neutrality of political liberalism is the admission that in certain 
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circumstances there will be no alternative except to transgress the public neutrality upon which the 
very foundation and viability of political liberalism rests. As Rawls notes, 
in affirming a political conception of justice we may eventually have to assert at least 
certain aspects of our own comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine .... This will 
happen whenever someone insists ... that certain questions are so fundamental that to 
ensure their being rightly settled justifies civil strife .... At this point we may have no 
alternative but to deny this, or to imply its denial and hence to maintain the kind of thing we 
had hoped to avoid (Rawls 1993: 152).5 
Political liberals attemptto limit the damage which such a confession inflicts upon their theories by 
suggesting that while certain aspects of a particular doctrine may have to be advanced, only those 
aspects that are necessary to secure or maintain an overlapping consensus-e.g., whatever is 
necessary to ensure equal respect for all ''reasonable" persons-need be publicly "asserted" 
(Rawls 1996: 153; Larmore 1987: 68). 
Rawls, for example, uses the concept of rationalist believers-a concept he "adapted 
from Joshua Cohen's discussion, 'Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus'" (Rawls 1996: 153, 
n.18}--to illustrate the type of individuals who may force us to assert certain aspects of our own 
comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine publicly. Rationalist believers are individuals 
who contend that the beliefs contained within their respective comprehensive doctrines "are open 
to and can be fully established by reason," and therefore it is quite proper to use state power to 
enforce their views (Rawls 1993: 152-153; see also Shklar 1989: 25; and Larmore 1987: 66). 
The suggestion is that rationalist believers and others like them will be a small minority, at most. 
However, the character of rationalist believers would not seem to be all that alien or unusual 
among citizens of contemporary democratic regimes (e.g., Nazism, McCarthyism, the Moral 
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Majority, etc), and thus this example may actually strengthen the argument that the type of public 
assertion in question will not be all that uncommon, even within contemporary liberal democracies. 
Moreover, if: as political liberals acknowledge, it is not only possible but probable that 
throughout the course of one's life a person will revise his conception of the good, then it is also 
possible (however unlikely) that each such alteration will result in the need to assert certain aspects 
ofthedominantreasonabledoctrine(s)publiclyinordertodenythepublicacceptabilityofcertain 
views or beliefs. Indeed, each time an individual's circumstances change in any significant manner, 
he may feel the need or desire to alter his conception of the good. Hence, it is quite possible that 
individuals will modify their conceptions of the good a number of times throughout the course of 
their lives. If this is true, who will decide when it is necessary to "assert" certain aspects of the 
ruling conception of justice? Likewise, who will determine exactly what must be asserted in order 
to maintain the overlapping consensus? Unfortunately, political liberals remain largely silent in 
response to these questions, and this silence brings into doubt the true neutrality of the conception 
of justice insofar as it leaves unclear precisely who is to determine what aspects of which 
doctrine( s) are to be asserted, how much of said doctrine( s) need be advanced to maintain the 
overlapping consensus, 6 and under what circumstances it is both necessary and just to initiate such 
an action. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that decisions regarding what is to be asserted 
and when it is necessary to make such assertions will be the strict province of those who hold 
political power. And it is guaranteed that in a well-ordered society based upon political liberalism, 
only those who accept the conception of political morality embodied in political liberalism and 
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satisfy the corresponding definition of"reasonable" will obtain any degree of effective political 
power. This fact is important because, as Shklar argues, an unbalanced dispersion of political 
power will inevitably produce injustice and, subsequently, political instability (e.g., Shklar 1989: 
27, 30-31). By limiting the opportunities for certain individuals to secure political efficacy, political 
liberalism would seem to be tempting the realisation ofShklar's fears and severely undermining 
its ability to achieve its stated goals. 
The primacy dilemma posed by such a situation is not so much whetherpoliticalliberalism 
is denying the truth of other doctrines when it allows certain aspects of a particular doctrine to be 
publicly asserted thereby precluding the potential influence of other beliefs (although, this is 
certainly a fundamental concern). Rather, the principal problem is that in purposely and publicly 
denying certain components of a particular comprehensive doctrine, one violates the key tenet and 
foundation of political liberalism: namely, public neutrality. Indeed, not only is such an act a direct 
violation of the guiding principle of political liberalism, it is an intentional transgression which 
thereby undermines even the arguably limited degree of neutrality which political liberals require 
their conceptions to obtain in order to be considered doctrinally neutral. 
The point is this: the qualification that only "certain aspects" of a particular comprehensive 
doctrine may need to be publicly advanced does nothing to change the fact that there may be 
numerous instances when we are required to deny the truth of opposing moral judgments publicly 
and, in tum, employ an unacceptable degree of state coercion in order to maintain obedience to 
the conception of justice, thereby notably undermining its neutrality. Moreover, the belief that the 
proposed qualification can somehowminimse or eradicate the potential conflict generated by the 
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intentional public denial of the validity of certain beliefs or values is itselfbased upon an extremely 
debatable and fragile presumption: namely, that in a well-ordered society political power will not 
be perverted for partisan purposes. The proposed qualification offers an effective means for 
reducing or eliminating conflict only insofar as one assumes that in those instances in which certain 
beliefs or values must publicly be given primacy over conflicting beliefs or values, those who are 
assigned the task of determining exactly what needs to be done will not use the opportunity to 
promote certain beliefs unnecessarily or in a manner that extends beyond that which is required 
to maintain an overlapping consensus. 
This exclusive and surrealistic political world envisioned by political liberals further 
compounds the doctrinal bias of political liberalism. In effect, only adherents of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines will be likely to endorse the political conception of justice freely and 
willing!/ and voluntarily participate in the overlapping consensus. In tum, only those who are 
members of the overlapping consensus can hope to secure any real opportunity to acquire any 
noteworthy degree of political efficacy. In essence, then, decisions regarding what aspects of 
which doctrine(s) are to be "publicly asserted" will be, for all intents and purposes, the sole 
province of those who control political power, and the ability to obtain political power will be 
restricted to only those who endorse reasonable comprehensive doctrines. If this is true, then how 
neutral is political liberalism in tenns of access to political power and opportunity to influence the 
publicpolicydecision-makingprocess?Becausepolicydecisionswillbemadewithreferenceto 
only reasonable comprehensive doctrines, such decisions will necessarily express a myopic 
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view-one that is biased towards the interests of those who affirm comprehensive doctrines that 
are considered "reasonable" according to political liberalism. 
Political liberals emphasise that the political conception ofjusticemay promote certain 
beliefs and values-namely, ''reasonable" ones--without undennining its neutrality (e.g., Rawls 
1988: 263; 1996: 194; Larmore 1987:44-46, 67; Larmore 1996: 139-41, 145; Shklar 1989: 
29). Thus a bias in favour of reasonable doctrines is quite legitimate, assuming that all ''reasonable" 
doctrines remain free of controversial beliefs and values. Yet, even if one were to accept this 
questionable proposition, such an approach is itself premised upon an unrealistic assumption: 
namely, the presence of a universal agreement among rea.Sonable people as to the precise 
character and application of''reasonable" political values and principles, including the reasonable 
use of political power. 
III. The Reasonable Use of Political Power 
In essence, political liberals believe that it is reasonable to limit access to political power to 
"reasonable" people-i.e., those who accept the conception of political morality embodied in 
political liberalism and satisfy the corresponding definition of''reasonable." Though this approach 
has the effect of requiring that all who wish to obtain political power affirm comprehensive 
doctrines that are considered reasonable according to the political conception of justice, political 
liberals do not perceive this stipulation to be problematic. Rather, it is argued that a reasonable 
political conception may legitimately "shape" other doctrines without violating orundennining its 
neutrality or engaging in an illiberal use of state power (e.g., Rawls 1993: 246; see also Larmore 
1987: 54, 67). 
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Moreover, political liberals contend that we need not feel obliged to accommodate those 
who refuse to adopt ''reasonable" comprehensive doctrines (e.g., Rawls 1996: xix; Lannore 1987: 
60, 66-68). That is to say, it is not an abuse of political power when we exercise it over those 
who continue to affirm unreasonable doctrines. Arguing that "the political power exercised within 
a political relationship is always coercive power backed by the state's machinery for enforcing its 
laws," political liberals contend that it is acceptable for those participating in the overlapping 
consensus to exercise their political power over those outside of the consensus, provided that this 
power "is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable 
tothemasreasonable"(Rawls 1993: 217; seea1soLarmore 1999: 606;and Shklar 1989: 37). 
The principal problem with this understanding of the appropriate or acceptable use of state power 
is that such an understanding demands the a priori acceptance of the conception of moral 
personality promoted by political liberalism. In other words, citizens can legitimately exercise 
political power over others only if said citizens are "reasonable" as defined by the public 
conception of justice, and this is impossible if they do not affirm the notion of moral personality 
embraced by political liberalism. 
As previously remarked, political liberals acknowledge that, even were it desirable, it is 
impossible to accommodate all ways oflife; they also note that there will inevitably be some 
unreasonable people who are unwilling to accept the demands ofpoliticalliberalism. Given these 
facts, political hberals maintain that thepoliticallegitimacy obtained bypoliticalliberalism is based 
not upon its ability to secure the support of all individuals, but rather on its capacity to engender 
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its own support by enabling all those who hold reasonable doctrines to affirm the political 
conception of justice from within the framework of their own particular doctrine (e.g., Rawls 
1989: 247; Larmore 1987: 64). Theabilityofpoliticalliberalism to accommodate all reasonable 
doctrines in this manner is said to ensure that it is not merely an "account ofhow those who hold 
political power can satisfy themselves, in light of their own convictions, ... that they are acting 
properly" (Rawls 1989: 247). 
However, such an explanation of the political legitimacy of-and, by extension, the degree 
of stability offered by-political liberalism remains premised upon obtaining a public basis of 
justification which refers to only a linrited spectrum of citizens: namely, adherents of those 
doctrines considered reasonable according to political liberalism. A comprehensive doctrine that 
fails or refuses to not only accept as valid the conception of persons as free and equal (for 
example), but also to embrace it as nothing more than a fundamental idea, will be considered 
unreasonable8 and, subsequently, all adherents of such a doctrine will be effectively precluded 
from obtaining any significant degree of political power or influence. 
As already noted, political liberals do not perceive this restriction to be a problem; indeed, 
they emphasise that the public conception of justice must make such a distinction if it is to serve 
as the basis for a viable overlapping consensus. Not surprisingly, the crucial consideration here 
is the reasonableness of the restriction: as far as political liberals are concerned, if the majority 
ofcitizensrejecttheprinciplesofpoliticalliberalism ''unreasonably,"thatistheirproblem,notthe 
problem ofpoliticalliberalism (Holmes 1993: 46). However, if one must affirm a "reasonable" 
comprehensive doctrine in order to have even the hope of securing any effective degree of political 
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power or influence, then how politically neutral is political liberalism? Moreover, if only those 
affirming reasonable comprehensive doctrines are, in effect, able to obtain any significant degree 
of political efficacy, then why should those who are excluded from the sphere of political power 
consider the political conception of justice to be anything other than the unjust enforcement of the 
comprehensive views of those who affirm (certain) reasonable comprehensive doctrines? (e.g., 
Rawls 1996: 153-55) 
More importantly, why should individuals who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
that are unable to survive and/or thrive not also believe that they are being unjustifiably forced 
to adopt a comprehensive doctrine different from that which they would otherwise choose to 
affirm? Insofar as such individuals perceive the constraints of the political conception of justice to 
have precipitated or facilitated the demise of their originally chosen doctrine and in so doing 
necessitated that they affirm an alternative doctrine, such a reaction seems both likely and 
understandable. Political liberalism fails to provide a satisfactory answer to either of the above 
questions. In the final analysis, the practical consequence of the restriction of political power to 
reasonable people is, at minimum, the generation of what amounts to a forced doctrinal 
homogeneity, necessitated and legitimated by the political conception ofjustice9-precisely the 
t)rpe of outcome that political liberalism is meant to prevent. 
IV. The Reality of Political Power 
As previously suggested, generally speaking, political liberals proceed from the assumption that 
those in political power will normally refrain from any purposeful attempt to advance and entrench 
the particular beliefs and values of their respective comprehensive doctrines to the detriment of 
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the adherents of competing or conflicting doctrines. However, surely empirical reality would 
suggest that such a fear is part of the liberal tradition and cannot easily be alleviated. Political 
liberals try to allay this fear by arguing that so long as members of the overlapping consensus 
continue to respect the demands of reasonable disagreement and adhere to the precept of 
avoidance, ''the political conception will still be supported regardless of shifts in the distribution 
of political power" (Rawls 1996: 148; see also Larmore 1996: 132-33), and under such 
circumstances there will be, in effect, little inclination to abuse political power (e.g., Rawls 1996: 
252). According to political liberals, the empirical reality of contemporary liberal democracies 
makes it reasonable to expect the continued satisfaction of such conditions. 
However, to accept the possibility that a group may begin to question its sense of moral 
obligation to, and, subsequently, withdraw its support for, the principle of reasonable disagreement 
when it found itself in a position where to do so would be advantageous, requires no deviation 
from or expansion of the framework ofliberal thought (Neal1990: 45), nor does it necessitate any 
misrepresentation of current empirical reality. As Bruce Ackerman has noted, "It is remarkably 
easy form en and women to forget their political principles in their eagerness to use state power 
for their own aggrandizement-and then write up fancy pieces of paper proclaiming their public 
virtue" (Ackerman 1994: 377). 
Given the political history of democratic regimes, it does not seem overly pessimistic or 
unduly skeptical to fear that a group which finds itself comprising the political majority will seek 
to dominate the legislative process and shape public policies and practices to better accommodate 
its particular comprehensive view( s ). And, as Rawls notes, "in the long run a strong majority of 
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the electorate can eventually make the constitution confonn to its political will" (Rawls 1993: 233). 
Subsequently, the emergence of a "strong majority'' could and probably would result in illiberal 
policies and practices, at leastto the extent that political liberals consider the public policies and 
practices generated by a political conception of justice based upon the doctrines ofKant and J .S. 
Mill to be illiberal. In turn, the emergence of a "strong majority" would seem to be not only a 
possibility but indeed a likelihood if one accepts the argument that citizens will eventually and 
logically gravitate towards those doctrines that, for whatever reasons, seem to provide the 
opportunity for a better life. Surely when individuals realise that certain doctrines or conceptions 
of the good are afforded a better opportunity for "advancement"-in particular, through the 
acquisition of political power or influence-then those who believe that they are being deprived 
will naturally and logically be inclined either to alter their personal comprehensive doctrine 
accordingly or simply adopt a completely new doctrine, one that has already proven itselfto be 
extremely compatible with the political conception of justice.10 However, as the pluralistic 
character of the electorate decreases, the potential for a tyranny of the majority and illiberal 
policies increases. 
In essence, political liberals respond to this dilemma by suggesting that the potential for 
such a perversion of political power "is simply a fact about political power as such. There is no 
way around this fact" (Rawls 1993: 23 3; see also Shklar 1989: 28). While this conclusion may 
indeed be true, such a response offers no resolution to the problem, but simply provides a 
statement that we are expected to accept unquestioningly. If at some point in time a society 
foundeduponpoliticalhberalismevolvesintoatyrannyofthemajority, thenitwillhavefailedto 
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make good on its principal promise: namely, to produce a well-ordered liberal democracy. In tum, 
nothing short of a purely prudential argument could provide an effective, persuasive justification 
for those in the political minority to continue to endorse the public conception of justice and 
adhere to those public policies and practices that are incompatible or conflicting with their views. 
However, the public agreement secured under such circumstances constitutes what Rawls has 
labeled a modus vivendi-an agreement of convenience and circumstance--and as such it, too, 
is unable to generate the conditions required to establish and sustain the type of just and stable 
polity sought by political liberals. 
Political liberals argue that, among other safeguards, the restrictions imposed by the 
demands of public reason will generally prevent the adoption of illiberal policies and provide 
effective security against the emergence of a tyranny of the majority. However, if, as political 
liberals concede, all potentially controversial and divisive political questions cannot be settled by 
appealstopublicreasonalone(Rawls 1993: 244-46; Lannore 1996: 157-58), andiftherecan 
be no assurance that the answers produced by public reason will always be "reasonable" (Rawls 
1993: 240), then how successful should one expect public reason to be in terms of precluding 
either the implementation of illiberal policies or the emergence of a tyranny of the majority. In the 
final analysis, political liberals can offer no guarantee that strict adherence to the tenets of public 
reason will provide the type of security that they suggest. 
V. The Protection Offered by a Political Conception of Justice 
Political liberals argue that a ''properly laid out" (Rawls 1996: 386)political conceptionofjustice 
will ensure, to the extent that its is humanly possible to do so, that the political process-that is, 
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not only the right to vote, but also the "opportunity to hold public office and influence political 
decisions" (Rawls 1982: 42)-remains equally accessible to all. In so doing, said conception of 
justice will effectively protect against such things as the adoption of illiberal policies and the 
establishment of a tyranny of the majority. Such protection will be secured insofar as the 
conception of justice guarantees certain basic rights, liberties and opportunities to all individuals. 
However, the ability of the conception of justice to achieve this goal is predicated upon the 
existence of a common conceptual basis among all reasonable comprehensive doctrines: namely, 
a belief that all reasonable conceptions of the good contain "a shared idea of rational advantage" 
(Rawls 1993: 180; see also Larmore 1996: 150; Larmore 1999: 602; andShklar 1989:29, 35). 
A "shared idea of rational advantage" is the belief that 
citizens affirm the same political conception of themselves as free and equal persons; and 
... that their (permissible) conceptions of the good, however distinct their content and their 
related religious and philosophical doctrines, require for their advancement roughly the same 
primary goods, that is, the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and the same all-
purpose means such as income and wealth, with all of these supported by the same social 
bases of self-respect (Rawls 1993: 180; see also 181). 
The presumed presence of this "shared idea" serves as the justification for the belief that a political 
conception of justice can provide a publicly acceptable means of determining the validity of 
citizens' claims in relation to questions of political justice. This shared idea is premised upon a 
universal desire among reasonable people for certain ''primary goods" -basic rights, liberties and 
opportunities-which are then secured by the political conception of justice. However, this means 
that in order for all citizens to obtain the maximum or even the same benefits from the conception 
of justice, it will be necessary for all to adopt an identical list of preferred primary goods. 
221 
Despite the obvious questions concerning the neutrality of such a requirement, political 
liberals do not seem to be troubled by such a restriction. Indeed, it is suggested that a "reasonable 
and effective" political conception of justice may shape comprehensive doctrines in order to 
change them from unreasonable to reasonable, without jeopardising its neutrality (Rawls 1993: 
246; see also Larmore 1987: 54, 67). By default, such "shaping" would also necessarily extend 
to the list of preferred primary goods. Furthermore, political liberals accept that the "index" of 
primary goods, to use Rawls' terminology(Rawls 1996: 178-82), securedbytheconceptionof 
justice can "reasonably'' be altered through constitutional, legislative, and judicial amendments 
(Rawls 1996: 188; seealso290,298). Despite the obvious opportunities fortheperversionof 
political power made possible by these features of the conception of justice, political liberals 
maintain that the principles of justice specified by political liberalism effectively preclude such a 
perversion of political power. Yet, in adopting such a position, political liberals fail to prepare 
adequately for the possibility that those who hold political power may purposely "shape" the index 
of primary goods-and, by extension, the conception of justice-to their advantage without 
necessarily considering the consequences which their actions may have on others who hold 
differing comprehensive views. 
To further complicate matters, political liberalism accepts that the specific value or worth 
of the primary goods secured by the conception of justice will not be the same for everyone. 
Though political liberalism provides each citizen with an identical catalogue ofbasic liberties, the 
worth or usefulness of these liberties will differ among members of the citizemy (Rawls 1982: 41 ). 
The value that an individual derives from a specific primary good directly corresponds to the 
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means which that individual has at his disposal to take maximum advantage of said primary good 
In the case of political liberalism, means refers not merely to material or financial wealth, but 
rather to one's overall ability to utilise the primary goods secured by the conception of justice. 
Accordingly, those with greater means will be better able to take advantage of the primary goods 
guaranteed by the conception of justice. 
Political liberalism places the onus on the individual by suggesting that in regards to 
· primary goods, citizens should adopt preferences which adequately reflect ''the all-purpose means 
they can expect, given their present and foreseeable situation" (Rawls 1993: 189). Subsequently, 
if an individual lacks the all-purpose means needed to take advantage ofhis chosen preferences, 
then it is that individual's responsibility to adjust his preferences to better correspond to what he 
can (reasonably?) expect. The conception of justice is therefore not unfair or unjust simply 
because individuals fail to attain unrealistic goals. However, the requirement that individuals 
adjust their preferences to coincide with the all-purpose means they can expect supports the 
argument that citizens, in an effort to obtain the maximum benefits possible from the conception 
of justice, will be strongly inclined (and logically so) to adopt the conception of the good whose 
goals are best accommodated by the primary goods secured by the conception ofjustice. 11 
Hence, political liberalism, in this case via the index of primary goods secured by the 
conception of justice, actually engenders a doctrinally homogeneous society, but a homogeneity 
that surely cannot be considered freely and willingly adopted. If the index of primary goods 
secured by the conception of justice can be shaped by those in power, and only those whose 
conception of the good affirms the "shared idea of rational advantage" can hope to gain any 
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degree of political efficacy, then the index of primary goods, and, by extension, the conception of 
justice, rather than securing the basis for doctrinal heterogeneity, engenders and legitimises what 
amounts to a forced doctrinal homogeneity. Thus the index of primary goods secured by the 
conception of justice works in conjunction with the concept of"limited space"12 and the notion 
of reasonable, to restrict the conceptions of the good that can survive and prosper, by 
guaranteeing equitable treatment-i.e., equal opportunity-to only those citizens whose 
conception of the good affirms the shared idea of rational advantage. Yet, even if one were to 
arguethattheresultinghomogeneitywasnottheconsequenceofanunacceptabledegreeofdirect 
or indirect coercion, as Rawls acknowledges, "a ... doctrine, whenever widely, if not universally 
shared in society, tends to become oppressing and stifling" (Rawls 1992: 597, n.3). Hence, 
whether doctrinal homogeneity emerges as a consequence of explicit coercion or "reasonable" 
persuasion, the result is the same: an "oppressive" and "stifling" environment whose effects are 
frighteningly similar to those of a tyranny of the majority. 
Additionally, for those who lack the means necessary to take equal advantage of the 
primary goods secured by the conception of justice, the lesser worth of the index further serves 
to make possible a tyranny of the majority by effectively preventing such individuals from obtaining 
any significant degree of political efficacy, thereby ensuring their impotence in terms of influencing 
the public policy decision-making process. Political liberalism seeks to preclude this possibility by 
guaranteeing that, regardless of an individual's socioeconomic status, the ''basic liberties" secured 
by the conception of justice will be of"approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal" worth 
to all citizens (Rawls 1996: 327). It is argued that by guaranteeing this "fairvalue"(Rawls 1982: 
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41-42), political liberalism prevents"[ t ]hose with greater responsibility and wealth ... [from 
controlling] the course oflegislation to their advantage" (Rawls 1982: 43). However, though 
political liberals recognise the need to guarantee the fair value of the basic liberties secured by the 
conception of justice, they fail to explain exactly how political liberalism can ensure such a 
condition; they are unable to provide any concrete suggestions as to how such an assurance could 
be practicably obtained. The end result is this: the primary goods secured by the conception of 
justice favour those conceptions of the good that affirm the shared idea of rational advantage, and 
those individuals who have the greatest means for utilising the basic liberties contained in the index 
(indeed, it is necessary to affirm the shared idea of rational advantage in order to acquire greater 
means). Consequently, those who affirm a conception of the good that embodies the shared idea 
of rational advantage will be better able than others to both capitalise on the basic liberties 
contained in the index and, by extension, to secure political power. 
So while it is supposed that all citizens will have "a fair opportunity to hold public office 
and influence political decisions" (Rawls 1982: 4 2), there is no clearly identified mechanism to 
ensure the realisation of this goal, and, subsequently, no effective way to guarantee that political 
power will not become primarily the province of those citizens who are best able to take 
advantage of the primary goods secured by the conception of justice. In tum, ''those with relatively 
greater means can combine together and exclude those who have less" (Rawls 1982: 43). Thus, 
there can be no adequate assurance that those who hold political power will not use it to promote 
and entrench their own beliefs and values, regardless of the consequences for others who affirm 
different views. Hence, in practical terms, the concept of"fairvalue" does little (if anything) to 
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redress the bias produced by the choice of primary goods and prevent the political 
· ghettoisation13 of the least advantaged. Such being the case, those who are able to take 
maximum advantage of the basic liberties secured by the conception of justice will undoubtedly 
secure the greatest political power and therefore be able, for all practical purposes, to direct 
public policies and practices to the detriment of others. In the final analysis, then, the notion of 
universally desirable primary goods fails to compensate for the fact that those who control political 
power may intentionally use that power to "shape" the index of primary goods to better reflect the 
needs of their own comprehensive doctrines, thereby disadvantaging those with either competing 
or conflicting views. 
VI. Addressing the (Apparent) Anomaly of Shklarian Political Liberalism 
It might be argued that given Shklar' s explicit and overwhelming concern with protecting citizens 
from the abuse of political power, many of the above noted criticisms are inapplicable to her 
conception. While it is certainly true that Shklarian political liberalism aclmowledges and confronts 
theproblemofthepotentialabuseofpoliticalpowerinamuchmoredirectandfulsomemanner 
than do most (if not all) other conceptions of political liberalism, it, nevertheless, succumbs to 
certain of the various difficulties that undermine other less attentive conceptions. In particular, 
Shklar' s conception, like those ofRawls and Larmore (for example), allows for the perversion 
of political power by knowingly permitting, facilitating and legitimising unequal access to such 
power. Shklarian political liberalism purposely seeks to prevent certain individuals from even 
having the opportunity to obtain any significant degree of political power or influence, and thereby 
enables other "chosen" (e.g., reasonable) individuals to secure a greater influence in the public 
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policy decision-making process. While its is undoubtedly true that most citizens would prefer to 
prevent certain individuals or groups from acquiring any dangerous degree ofpolitical power or 
influence (however that may be defined), surely, if citizens are to be treated as free and equal 
persons able to exercise the basic capacities of reason as such are understood by political liberals, 
then it must be their decision as to who should be allowed to acquire political power. In other 
words, treating citizens in the manner advocated by political liberalism would seem to render 
invalid any a priori attempt to limit access to political power and influence. 
Recall that the abuse of political power as it is defined above includes not only the 
intentional use of state power to further the goals or values of a particular comprehensive doctrine 
or conception of the good to the detriment of others, but also the adoption of a public conception 
of justice that purposely allows for the favouring of one comprehensive doctrine over others in 
terms of access to political power and influence. In the case ofShklar' s conception, only those 
who are reasonable according to the public conception of justice will be assured the opportunity 
to acquire any significant degree of political efficacy; and only those with access to political power 
will be able determine what constitutes an (un)reasonable application of that power. 14 _ 
Nevertheless, it is argued that political liberalism maintains its doctrinal neutrality and continues to 
be just, so long as its conception of justice allows for "different and even antagonistic conceptions 
ofthe good to be affirmed and pursued" (Rawls 1993: 199; see also 194-200; Larmore 1999: 
624, n.27; Larmore 1987:60, 66-68; and Shklar 1989: 24). Indeed, as already noted, political 
liberals contend that the public conception of justice ''may ... affirm the superiority of certain forms 
of moral character and encourage certain moral virtues" without undemrining its neutrality (e.g., 
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Rawls 1988: 263). This feat is possible, it is claimed, because the political virtues associated with 
politicalliberalismarecompatrblewithapoliticalconceptionofjusticeinsofarastheyassistinthe 
attainment and maintenance of fair social cooperation and do not "lead to the perfectionist state 
of a comprehensive doctrine" (Rawls 1993: 194). 
However, for Shklar and other political liberals, beyond the general restriction of 
reasonableness lies a greater problem: namely, not all those who affirm "reasonable" 
comprehensive doctrines will enjoy equal access to political power and influence. Even among 
those who affirm reasonable comprehensive doctrines, there will be some who will possess greater 
means than others and will thus have privileged access to political power. In tum, such individuals 
will be in a position to determine what constitutes the(un)acceptableuse of political power. This 
situation might be relatively unproblematic if it could be guaranteed that all supporters of political 
liberalism will affirm the same beliefs and values. However, as political liberals readily 
acknowledge, it can be expected that even ''reasonable" political liberals will at times disagree 
with one another. Indeed, not only will political liberals inevitably disagree over the correct 
response to any number of questions of political justice, these disagreements will likely concern 
those matters for which it is most difficult to secure a consensual resolution-e.g., matters of 
"supreme importance" or "first significance." In instances of such disagreement, it does not seem 
unreasonable to suggest that those possessing political power might use that power to secure a 
resolution that supports their particular beliefs and values. If the use of state power to implement 
such resolutions is questioned, it will, once again, be those who possess political power, the very 
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individuals who proposed and supported the adoption of said resolutions, who will determine the 
(un)acceptability of the use of state power for the purpose(s) in question. 
Like otherpoliticalliberals, Shklar seems problematically unconcerned with the possibility 
of"reasonable" people abusing political power. Though she does not explicitly differentiate 
between reasonable and unreasonable people, the safeguards she suggests assume that most 
citizens of contemporary Western hberal democracies will share certain '1-easonable"belie:fs, 15 and 
insofar as some individuals do and others do not, one can distinguish between reasonable and 
unreasonablepeople,andtakeprecautionstopreventunreasonablepeople:fromacquiringpolitical 
power. If, however, it is inevitable that certain individuals will have a greater ability to secure 
political power and influence public policy, and ifreasonablepeople will disagree over matters of 
the first significance, then despite whatever general beliefs all reasonable people may share, the 
potential abuse of political power by '1-easonable" people would seem to be a problem that needs 
to be directly addressed in a much more thorough manner than has thus far been the case. Though 
Shklar'sconceptionarguablygoes:furtherthanmany,ifnotall,otherversionsofpoliticalliberalism 
in terms of focusing on the need to protect citizens from the abuse of political power, it, 
nevertheless, shares certain problematic features with its philosophical siblings. In particular, 
Shklar' s conception, like those ofRawls, Larmore, and otherpoliticalliberals, is problematically 
biased in terms of its provisions concerning access to political power and influence, while 
simultaneously failing to provide adequate protection against the possible abuse ofpolitical power 
by reasonable individuals. 
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
Surely the hberal egalitarian character ofpoliticalliberalism is severely undermined by its approach 
to the problem of the abuse of political power, and its refusal to address the full range of possible 
abuses. Though political liberals acknowledge the inevitable presence of self- and group-interests 
and recognise the potential associated dangers, they believe that the safeguards demanded by 
political hberalism (e.g., guaranteeing certain basic liberties, requiring adherence to public reason, 
and ensuringthattheindex of primary goods is fair to all "permissible" conceptions of the good) 
will counteract the possible detrimental effects which would normally result from the presence of 
such interests. Political liberals generally believe that the potential for such purposive abuse of 
political power is limited in a democratic republic such as the United States (the type of 
institutional paradigm which arguably provides the principal source of reference for political 
liberals). It is commonly argued that the "checks and balances" secured by the U.S. Constitution 
provide a good example ofhow to prevent the abuse of political power. However, aside from 
being extremely debatable, such an argument is itself conditional inasmuch as its viability is 
dependent upon its application to only those polities that maintain an institutional paradigm identical 
tothatofthe United States. Suchan argument would, for example, belargelyinapplicable(or, at 
the very least, significantly less so) to constitutional democracies based upon a Westminster-type 
parliamentary system, in which there is the ever-present potential for "majority" governments in 
which one group of representatives has, in effect, complete control over the legislative process. 
Importantly, even m those instances in which the potential for the abuse of political power 
is accorded prominence, such as in Shklarian political liberalism, significant problems remain. 
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Perhaps most noteworthy in this respect is the failure of political liberalism to consider seriously 
andrespondeffectivelytothepossibilitythat''reasonable"peoplemayabusepoliticalpowerwhen 
they believe it advantageous or necessary to do so. The general assumption seems to be that when 
certain circumstances obtain, reasonable people can be relied upon to refrain from abusing 
political power. Yet, empirical evidence would suggest that such an assumption is unfounded, or, 
at best, extremely questionable. In turn, the inability ofpoliticalliberalism to guarantee that political 
power will not be used to promote or advance the interests of the adherents of a particular 
comprehensive doctrine makes more dangerous the political prejudice generated by the notion 
of reasonable employed by political hberals. The practical limitations-in tenns of one's freedom 
to affirm a comprehensive doctrineofhis choosing and design-created by this understanding of 
reasonable and the concept offundamental ideas, coupled with the selective and unique 
character of the political neutrality generated by these notions, essentially precludes the possibility 
ofrecognisingpoliticalliberalism as a metaphysically innocent(Neal1990: 42), and therefore 
purely political, concept. 
The failure of political liberalism to respond effectively to a problem as serious as the 
abuse of political power, severely limits its practicability. While the practical implementation of 
political liberalism may not be the fundamental concern of many of its proponents, by dismissing 
the potential influence of personal moral, religious, and philosophical views when considering 
questions of political justice, and refusing to acknowledge the reality of political power-i.e., it will 
be used to promote a particular viewpoint when it is considered viable and desirable to do 
so-. political liberalism relegates itself to a strictly hypothetical existence and theoretical 
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application. Under such circumstances, the efforts of political liberals become mere exercises in 
philosophical discourse. While such discourse can be engaging and thought -provoking, arguably, 
political liberalism is animated by greater (practical) ambitions. However, "serious political 
proposals ... demand [a] feasibility" (Hilll994: 338) that is currently absent from existing 
conceptions of political liberalism. 
AB the analysis presented in this chapter suggests, the problematic character of political 
liberals' approach and subsequent response to the potential abuse of political power is a flaw that 
is intimately related to the problem of reasonableness discussed in chapter five. Combined, these 
two features criticallyundennine the viability of the conceptofpoliticalliberalism, at least as it has 
thus far been articulated. Given this conclusion, the obvious question would seem to be: Are the 
difficulties identified in the preceding two chapters insoluble? Unfortunately, a thorough response 
to this question would require an entirely separate study. However, it is possible to offer some 
general remarks regarding what is suggested by the preceding analysis in terms of the future of 
political liberalism and the direction in which political theory should proceed, especially if we are 
to address the problems identified in this study. It is to this task that I now tum. 16 
232 
Notes 
1 I am here and henceforth using the term reasonable in the same sense in which it is employed in chapter five. 
2 The political "process" encompasses not only the right to vote, but also "a fair opportunity to hold public 
office and influence political decisions" (Rawls 1982: 42). 
3 For corresponding definitions, see chapter four (pp. 101-02). 
4 By familiar idea of neutrality, I mean the "[h]istorically ... common theme of liberal thought ... [which 
suggests] that the state must not favour any comprehensive doctrines and their associated conception of the 
good" (Rawls 1993: 190). 
5 A similar if differently phrased argument is used by Larmore: In essence, Larmore argues that in those 
instances in which the pursuit of any of the "constitutive ideals" of a person's conception of the good 
generate a conflict with the norm of equal respect, the former must give way (e.g., Larmore 1996: 139; see also 
Shklar 1989: 24). 
6 It is worth emphasising that maintaining an overlapping consensus requires sustaining justice. Thus the 
character and frequency of "public assertions" are (theoretically, at least) determined by considerations of 
justice. 
7 Recall that citizens freely and willingly endorse the political conception of justice insofar as their decision 
to do so is based upon "free public reason"-i.e., the reasoning of free and equal citizens "in the public forum 
about constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice" (Rawls 1993: 10). 
8 To use Rawlsian language, any doctrine which suggests that the notion of persons as free and equal 
"presupposes, or in some way involves, certain metaphysical theses about the nature of persons as ... moral 
agents," should be considered unreasonable (Rawls 1993: 29, n.31). 
9 For more on this point see this chapter (pp. 222-25). 
10 Rawls, for example, acknowledges that it is quite possible that certain individuals will totally forsake their 
"originally" chosen comprehensive doctrine in favour of a new doctrine which they believe will offer them the 
chance for greater "power'' or "wealth and status" (Rawls 1982: 26; see also Rawls 1993: 185-86, 314). 
11 Similarly, see this chapter (pp. 216-17). 
12 By "limited space" I am referring to the argument that "there is no social world without loss: that is, no 
social world that does not exclude some ways of life that realize in special ways certain fundamental values" 
(Rawls 1993: 197, n.32; see also Larmore 1999: 624, n.27). 
13 By political ghettoisation I am referring to the marginalisation of individuals who would be relegated to 
the fringes of political existence as a consequence of their political inefficacy. Even if political liberals could 
provide a viable plan by which the ideal of "fair value" could be formally institutionalised, it is debatable as 
to whether any such formal entrenchment would or could eliminate, or even substantially alleviate, the problem 
of political ghettoisation. As Katherine Fierlbeck has noted: "Despite the success of most Western 
democracies in providing formal institutions of political justice for their citizens, it remains distressingly clear 
that some groups within these polities have not experienced the same level of social or material (and sometimes 
even political) benefits enjoyed by dominant groups within the same societies" (Fierlbeck 1996: 3). 
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14 I do not here mean to question the validity of the suggestion that "there is no social world without loss" 
(Rawls 1993: 197, n.32). 
15 For example, the belief that all people have the right to be free from the fear of fear and cruelty, and, by 
extension, the belief that a government is acting illegitimately when it uses fear and cruelty to secure 
obedience from its constituents. 
16 The material presented in this chapter has previously appeared in a marginally different form in Young 
(2002). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
I. Introduction 
The aim of the preceding chapters has been to provide a general description of the character of 
a purely political conception ofliberalism and in the course of doing so identify and analyse certain 
of the fundamental problems confronting such a concept. It has herein been argued that in its 
current manifestations the concept of political liberalism suffers from a number of flaws that 
effectively impede its ability to achieve its stated objectives. In particular, it is troubled by an 
extremely problematic reliance on human reason( ableness) and a deficient response to the danger 
of the potential abuse of political power. Regrettably, a thorough discussion ofhow existing 
conceptions of political liberalism might be modified to eliminate the problems identified in this 
thesis would require a separate study. However, it is possible to offer some general remarks 
concerning the viability of the notion of a purely political liberalism, and the direction in which 
political theory should proceed if it is to respond pragmatically to the problems noted in this study. 
Prior to engaging in such a discussion, it will be useful to summarise the principal arguments and 
conclusions presented in this thesis. 
II. The Concept of Political Liberalism 
Until relatively recently, liberal political philosophers generally proposed theories of justice the 
validity of which rests upon the presumed affirmation of a given ''moral ideal to govern all oflife" 
(Rawls 1985: 245). Such theories assume that the majority of the citizenry either already 
voluntarily endorse certain beliefs and values or could be convinced through reasonable dialogue 
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to do so. In the latter part of the twentieth century, liberal theorists such as John Rawls, Charles 
Larmore and Judith Shklar-to name a few-began to argue that the expanding and increasingly 
complicated moral, religious and philosophical diversity confronting contemporary liberal societies 
rendered deficient and untenable previous liberal responses to problems of justice and stability in 
pluralistic societies. Modern experience, it was claimed, had revealed that the long-held liberal 
belief that all reasonable people will freely and willingly support a conception ofjustice that assigns 
primacy to liberty or autonomy, for example, was mistaken. Disagreement among reasonable 
people over matters of the "first significance," it was argued, is not merely a possibility, it is an 
inevitable and ineliminable feature of all democratic societies. This fact of "reasonable 
disagreement" effectively precludes the possibility of securing widespread voluntary support for 
a conception of justice based upon the dictates of a single "comprehensive" vision of the good life. 
However, barring such support, reliable adherence to the public conception of justice can be 
secured only through a degree of state coercion that makes justice and enduring political stability 
impossible. 
Rawls, Larmore and Shklar argued that the only way to obtain the necessary dependable 
public agreement on a conception ofjustice to regulate society's basic structure, and thereby 
secure the basis for a just and stable liberal society, is to offer a conception of justice that 
effectively recognises and accommodates the religious, moral, and philosophical diversity inherent 
in contemporary liberal polities. Satisfying such a caveat demands that the conception of justice 
refrain from presenting a "moral ideal to govern all oflife," and instead restrict its scope of 
regulatory concern to only those matters upon which all reasonable people can agree. In an 
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atmosphere of diversity such as that found in contemporary liberal societies, it can reasonably be 
assumed that reasonable people are unlikely to agree on the appropriateness or validity of anything 
other than certain "fundamental ideas" innate to such societies. As identified by Rawls, Larmore, 
and Shklar (among others), the fundamental ideas common to liberal democracies are the notion 
of society as a "fair system of cooperation" and the conception of persons as free and equal 
beings, ideas that are "central to the democratic ideal" and, thus, inevitable components of the 
political culture of such societies (Rawls 1993: 167). These ideas are not merely metaphysical or 
psychological constructs, rather they are "fundamental political ideas" that are empirically based 
and widely supported within contemporary liberal democracies (Rawls 1993: 167; see also Rawls 
1989: 240), and as such they comprise asharedfond of accepted beliefs and norms. Importantly, 
because these ideas are generally accepted by the citizens of contemporary liberal democracies, 
they neither constitute nor are they perceived as partisan or contentious ideas (Rawls 1985: 
233). 
However, if only nonpartisan or uncontentious ideas can be expected to secure 
widespread, voluntary support among the citizenry of contemporary pluralistic societies, and if the 
fundamental political ideas innate to such societies are alone in their ability to achieve a nonpartisan 
and uncontroversial status, then the public conception of justice must embody only said ideas if 
it is to obtain and maintain the conditions needed to achieve and sustain a just and stable liberal 
democracy. In other words, in order for a conception of justice to provide the basis for a well-
ordered society, said conception must possess a purely ''political" character. If it is to secure and 
preserve such a character, the conception of justice must confine its sphere of concern to 
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"political" matters: that is, it must refrain from proposing the type of" comprehensive" moral 
guidelines common to other conceptions of justice and restrict its scope of application to matters 
of public interest. Only by doing so, it is argued, can a conception of justice make possible the 
achievement of a widespread, voluntary public agreement-i.e., an overlapping 
consensus-among the citizenry of contemporary pluralistic societies, and thus secure the 
conditions required to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal polity. Its ability to achieve 
such an outcome is what distinguishes a "political" conception from other conceptions. According 
to its prominent proponents, the concept of political liberalism represents the realisation of a 
political conception of justice as presented above. 
Though the concept of political liberalism is normally associated with John Rawls, a 
number of eminent political theorists have also engaged the project of developing a viable liberal 
political conception of justice. Aside from Larmore and Shklar, theorists such as Bruce 
Ackerman, George Klosko, Jiirgen Habermas, and Ronald Dworkin have also produced their 
own conceptions of political liberalism. However, despite protestations to the contrary, the 
prominent conceptions of political liberalism reveal themselves to be sufficiently similar in all 
important respects to enable their contlation for the purpose of analysis; and when subjected to 
a thorough analysis, the idea of a purely political liberalism proves itself to be untenable. 
lll. The Role of Reasonableness in Political Liberalism 
As noted in chapter five, the idea of reasonableness is a fundamental feature of all forms of 
liberalism; it is, however, particularly important to political liberalism. The notion of 
reason( ableness) exerts an unequalled degree of influence in terms of informing and regulating the 
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character and content of conceptions of political liberalism. The analytical and behavioural 
demands that the concept of political liberalism places upon individuals are a reflection of its 
understanding and use of the idea of reason(ableness). The overriding significance of 
reason( ableness) forpoliticalliberalism is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that reasonableness 
serves as the supreme standard against which all citizens are expected to judge the acceptability 
and legitimacy of the public conception of justice and all associated political claims and decisions. 
Political liberals contend that only by assigning such a role to reasonableness-as opposed to 
truth, for example-is it possible to achieve and preserve the type of public agreement necessary 
to establish and sustain a well-ordered liberal democracy. 
Foremost among the demands accompanying adherence to the dictates of political 
liberalism is the requirement that individuals be able to distinguish between the reasonable and the 
unreasonable and separate the two when making decisions concerning questions ofpublicimport 
(i.e., political justice). If individuals cannot effectively satisfy this requirement, then it becomes 
impossible to secure the conditions necessary to achieve and sustain an overlapping consensus 
and, by extension, a just and stable liberal democracy. The reasons for this conclusion are as 
follows. 
Whereas the moral, religious and philosophical diversity inherent in contemporary liberal 
societies precludes the possibility of the entire citizenry of such societies voluntarily endorsing as 
true a single conception of justice, it is possible for the majority of citizens to affirm as reasonable 
a political conception of justice (Rawls 1993: 128). In turn, a political conception of justice 
remains "reasonable" so long as reasonable people can support it without having to compromise 
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or abandon any of their fundamental beliefs. It satisfies this caveat insofar as it embodies only 
those values that can reasonably be expected to secure the voluntary support of reasonable 
persons-i.e., political values-and confines its application to matters of public import. 
In adopting such an approach a political conception of justice makes only reasonable 
demands upon those who must abide by its rules. In other words, it uses reasonableness rather 
than truth as the ''final court of appeal" for questions concerning political justice, and in so doing 
does not require any reasonable person to transgress, forsake, or otherwise compromise his 
fundamental beliefs and values. Such flexibility and accommodation allows individuals to endorse 
a political conception of justice as morally compatible with their own comprehensive visions of the 
good life, and thereby maintain a constant level of moral support for the public conception of 
justice, regardless of any changes to their personal circumstances or shifts in the distribution of 
political power. Were truth made the ultimate standard against which the validity of all public 
claims is to be measured, the inelim:inablereligious, moral, and philosophical disagreement present 
in contemporary liberal democracies would significantly limit the number of citizens that could or 
would freely and willingly support the adoption of a given conception of justice, and thereby 
negate any hope of said conception achieving the widespread, voluntary support needed to 
establish and sustain a well-ordered polity. By making reasonableness the final court of appeal and 
thereby placing only reasonable demands upon those subject to its dictates, a political conception 
of justice ackno~ledges and effectively accommodates the fact of reasonable disagreement and 
in so doing enables the majority of citizens to support the conception of justice freely and willingly, 
thus making possible the overlapping consensus necessary to protect justice and stability. 
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As noted above, ifit is to secure and maintain a reasonable character, a conception of 
justice must embody only reasonable, which is to say political, demands and restrict its scope of 
concern to matters of public import. Satisfying such conditions necessarily requires that one be 
able to separate the ''political" from the "comprehensive," or ''nonpolitical." According to political 
liberals, such a feat is possible because each citizen's "overall view" consists of two distinct yet 
related parts, one corresponding to ''the publicly recognized political conception ofjustice," the 
other "a (fully or partially) comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in some 
manner related" (Rawls 1993: 38, 140). This cognitive schizophrenia, if you will, allows citizens 
to apply only certain viewpoints to specific questions, and thus to refrain from incorporating 
controversial and potentially divisive views associated with their respective comprehensive 
doctrines when publicly discussing questions of political justice. Failure to secure such a selective 
application of views will effectively preclude the possibility of adequately insulating the political 
from the nonpolitical, and thereby prevent the development of a conception of justice which can 
offer the basis for a public agreement that can secure the degree of political stability required to 
establish and sustain a well-ordered society. 
In separating the political from the nonpolitical, citizens are, within the context of political 
liberalism, separating the reasonable (i.e., political) from the unreasonable (i.e., nonpolitical). The 
ability to render such a separation enables the development of a purely political conception of 
justice, and in so doing allows for the establishment of a regulatory framework that makes only 
reasonable demands on those who must live within its parameters. Only a system of justice that 
uses reasonableness as its supreme standard of acceptability can hope to avoid divisive, 
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destabilising conflict and expect to obtain the free and willing support of the majority of the 
citizenry of a contemporary liberal democracy, and thus secure the basis for a well-ordered 
society. 
According to political liberals, the willingness to support a conception of justice that 
assigns primacy to reasonableness is a fundamental characteristic of reasonable people. 
Reasonable people, it is argued, will voluntarily affirm comprehensive doctrines that recognise the 
fact of reasonable disagreement and accept its associated demands. In so doing, reasonable 
people will understand that reasonableness must be the standard used to judge the validity of all 
public claims if a just and stable polity is to be secured and sustained. Only by making 
reasonableness the penultimate consideration in relation to decisions concerning questions of 
political justice is it possible to exhibit the requisite degree of respect for one's fellow citizens. To 
employ a different standard would be to disrespect and degrade others' beliefs, and thereby 
effectively preclude the achievement of a society in which all citizens are able to cooperate with 
others on terms all can accept-the very foundation of a well-ordered liberal society. 
Thus, the viability of the concept of political liberalism is dependent upon its providing an 
unmistakably clear distinction between the ''reasonable" and the ''unreasonable" and somehow 
ensuring that responses to questions of political justice are not "contaminated" by unreasonable 
views. Political liberalism, however, is unable to satisfy such conditions. Principal among the 
obstacles impeding the realisation of the necessary distinction and surety is the caveat that the 
conception of justice need be affirmed only as reasonable. If, as political liberals argue, the degree 
of political stability provided by the overlapping consensus directly corresponds to the depth of 
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its members' moral affirmation of the conception of justice, and if we are to believe that the 
strength of this a:ffinnation will not cfuninishfollowing a change in members' personal circumstances 
or shifts in the distribution of political power, then it would seem that ensuring the necessary 
political stability requires that members of the overlapping consensus unfailingly support the 
conception of justice with an equal or greater conviction than that which they maintain for the most 
valued aspects of their respective comprehensive doctrines. 
In the absence of such unfailing support, individuals may find themselves confronted with 
a situation in which they believe it to be either morally appropriate or necessary to abandon their 
support for the overlapping consensus, and in so doing unacceptably compromise its stability and 
that of their society. Such a situation could occur whenever a conflict emerges between citizens' 
fundamental values and the political values of the conception of justice. Political liberals 
acknowledge as much when they concede that, "For many the true, or the religiously and the 
metaphysically well-grounded, goes beyond the reasonable" (e.g., Rawls 1993: 153). Such being 
the case, it would seem that in the event of a conflict between one's fundamental values and the 
political values of the conception of justice, it is quite possible that many reasonable individuals 
will assign primacy to the former rather than the latter; insofar as this is a valid assumption, the type 
of unwavering moral support required to maintain the overlapping consensus is unlikely to be 
realised. 
Political liberals, however, do not believe that the threat of such conflict and the 
subsequent abandonment of the overlapping consensus is sufficient to warrant significant concern; 
this conclusion is based on the belief that reasonable people will disavow those values that conflict 
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with the goals of a political conception of justice. According to political liberals, reasonable 
persons recognise that in contemporary liberal societies a diversity of competing, conflicting and 
irreconcilable views is an ineliminable inevitability, and given this fact, respecting the human dignity 
of one's fellow citizens will necessitate accepting the continued existence and public 
accommodation of views with which one disagrees. In other words, reasonable people freely and 
willingly accept the notion of reasonable disagreement and its associated demands, including the 
requirement that they faithfully adhere to what Rawls has labelled the precept of avoidance. 
Recall, adhering to the precept of avoidance requires that one refrain from publicly asserting or 
denying the validity of"anyparticular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral view, or 
its associated theory of truth and the status of values" (Rawls 1993: 150; see also Larmore 1987: 
68). Reasonable people agree to accept such a constraint in order to obtain the overlapping 
consensus needed to establish a well-ordered democratic society. They also understand that 
satisfying the demands of reasonable disagreement requires accepting that it is unreasonable to 
use state power to enforce adherence to the dictates of a single comprehensive doctrine. Any 
attempt to do so necessarily entails the excessive use of state coercion to secure obedience to the 
conception of justice, and the use of such force is both an unacceptable insult to the human dignity 
of reasonable persons and incompatible with liberal ideals. 
Reasonable people as presented above recognise that given the fact of reasonable 
disagreement an overlapping consensus is not only appropriate but necessary if one hopes to 
establish the conditions that will enable all reasonable individuals to realise the personal freedom 
necessary to pursue a life-plan of their own choosing and design-the only type of freedom that 
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adequately respects one's dignity as a person(Shklar 1989: 30; Larmore 1996: 123-24; Larmore 
1999: 607-08; and Rawls 1996: 48-50, 53-54). Such accommodation and freedom can be 
achieved only if the conception of justice can secure and preserve an overlapping consensus. 
Reasonable people understand that satisfying such a caveat requires that there always be a 
respectful degree of accommodation and freedom, which necessitates that in the case of a conflict 
between the political values ofthe conception ofjustice and the values embodied in citizens' 
comprehensive doctrines, the former always be assigned primacy. Hence, the maintenance of a 
viable overlapping consensus, and, by extension, the preservation of a just and stable polity, 
demands that the majority of its members voluntarily and faithfully endorse the political values 
associated with the public conception of justice. 
However, the arguments of political liberals suggest that only reasonable people can be 
relied upon to maintain their commitment to the political values comprising the conception of 
justice. Yet, if the establishment and preservation of a viable overlapping consensus is dependent 
upon its securing and sustaining the free and willing support of a majority of the citizenry, and if 
only reasonable individuals can be relied upon to maintain their support for the conception of 
justice, then the perpetuation of a viable overlapping consensus would seem to require that the 
majority of the population be reasonable in the sense understood by political liberals. Political 
liberals believe that such a condition already exists, and thus this criterion is not considered an 
obstacle to the achievement of an enduring overlapping consensus. 
Political liberals contend that their depiction of the characteristics and capacities of a 
reasonable person is not only plausible, but is grounded in empirical fact: it aoo,rratelyreflects the 
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qualities ~d faculties of the majority of citizens who inhabit contemponuy liberal democracies. 
Such being the case, it is neither unrealistic nor improbable to suggest that in instances of a 
potentially divisive conflict of values, individuals will be willing to assign primacy to the political 
values of the public conception of justice. However, empirical evidence concerning the attitudes 
of the citizens of a number of contemporary liberal democracies would seem to suggest that the 
validity of such a claim is extremely questionable. In particular, citizens' willingness to adhere to 
the demands of the precept of avoidance seems to be much less assured than political liberals 
suggest. A noteworthy amount of social science research completed over the past fifty years not 
only undermines the suggestion that citizens are willing to subordinate their fundamental values in 
the manner required by political liberalism, but also, more damagingly, reveals that when feeling 
threatened, many individuals are quite willing to accept and, indeed, publicly demand the 
abridgement of any number of the basic liberties promoted by political liberalism (Klosko 1993: 
352; see also Klosko 2000: 42-115). The horrific and tragic events of September 11,2001, 
have, like McCarthyism in the 1950s (for example), prominently exposed and reignited this 
tendency and willingness to sacrifice individual liberties in the name of national security. 
The reality is that life in contemponuypluralistic societies is and always will be fraught with 
moral, philosophical, and political complexities that produce irreconcilable conflict between 
''private" and ''public" values. Issues will regularly arise which generate emotionally-charged and 
controversial questions--e.g., involvement in foreign conflicts, the use of nuclear weapons, 
governmental policies on abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, capital punishment, etc-that produce 
disputes that cannot be resolved by an appeal to public reason( ableness ). Such being the case, 
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there would seem to be no effective way to prevent divisive conflict between individuals' 
fundamental values and the political conception of justice. However, when such conflict occurs, 
support for the political conception of justice will likely fluctuate, and when it does, the overlapping 
consensus may be unacceptably undermined. 
The principal problem with the approach advocated by political liberals is that it makes 
the establishment and preservation of an overlapping consensus and, by extension, a just and 
stable polity dependent upon the reasonableness both of citizens and of the public conception of 
justice. However, as has been noted by a number of theorists, the specific characteristics and 
demands of"reasonableness" are likely to be a source of debate and disagreement among citizens, 
especially in contemporary liberal societies (e.g., Neal1995; and Bohman 1995). Subsequently, 
depending upon the definition of''reasonable" that is employed, the majority of a polity's citizenry 
may or may not qualify as reasonable persons. But if it is to provide the political stability required 
to establish and sustain a well-ordered society, the overlapping consensus must maintain the 
voluntary support of a majority of the population, and this can be assured only if said majority is 
reasonable. Yet, even if the requisite number of citizens already were or became reasonable, there 
could be no guarantee that they would always remain so. Reasonability is too dynamic and fickle 
a basis upon which to premise citizens' continued support for the prevailing definition of 
"reasonable." Ifreasonability is to provide the basis for a stable overlapping consensus, then all 
reasonable citizens will have to affirm and maintain the same definition of 
"reasonable"-specifically, that propounded bypoliticalliberalism. Only by ensuring such a 
homogeneity can one be assured of securing the type of unwavering moral support required to 
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guarantee the continuation of the overlapping consensus. However, given the unavoidable 
heterogeneity and fluidity of reasonability, it seems improbable and, indeed, implausible to suggest 
that all reasonable people will voluntarily endorse and remain faithful to any single definition of 
"reasonable" and its associated demands. 
Furthermore, if individuals' initial and continued affirmation of the conception ofjustice 
is, as suggested by political liberals, predicated upon their belief that it condones only reasonable 
behaviour, then maintaining a constant level of moral support for the conception of justice and, by 
extension, the overlapping consensus, would seem to require that all decisions justified by 
reference to it be considered reasonable by all participants in the overlapping consensus. But even 
if we assum~ that all citizens define ''reasonableness" as the willingness to adhere to the demands 
of public reason as defined by the conception of justice, political liberals acknowledge that there 
can be no guarantee that every decision produced by the political conception of justice will be 
reasonable in the required sense (Rawls 1993: 240). 
Subsequently, by itself, citizens' willingness to assign primacy to reasonableness when 
confronted with a conflict between the truth of their fundamental values and the demands of the 
political conception of justice does not resolve all significant problems. If it isto provide the basis 
for a reliable overlapping consensus and, by extension, a well-ordered society, then political 
liberalism must somehow ensure that 1) all participants in the overlapping consensus possess and 
maintain an identical understanding of what constitutes reasonableness; and 2) the political 
conception of justice avoids generating any unreasonable decisions. Thus far, at least, political 
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liberals have been unable to produce a conception of justice that satisfies either of these two 
criteria effectively. 
In the final analysis, the viability ofpoliticallibemlism is sabotaged by what might be called 
the "paradox of reasonableness." The concept of political liberalism can fulfill its stated 
ambition-i.e., to provide the means by which to establish and preserve a well-ordered 
society--only if it respects the reasonableness of those subjectto its demands. However, insofar 
as it respects and relies upon the reasonableness of those involved, it allows for the emergence 
and rule of unreasonableness, and in so doing impedes its ability to accomplish the task for which 
it has been developed. Contrary, then, to the hope and suggestion of political liberals, 
reason( ableness) cannot fulfill the role it has been assigned in political liberalism: it is unable to 
ensure the type of public behaviour required to establish and preserve an overlapping consensus 
on a single conception of justice to regulate society's basic structure, and this fact critically 
undermines the viability of the idea of a purely political liberalism. 
IV. Political Power in Political Liberalism 
Political liberalism presents a very specific understanding of what constitutes the legitimate exercise 
of political power. According to political liberals, the coercive use of political power is legitimate 
only when it "is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as 
reasonable and rational" (Rawls 1993: 217). This understanding of the necessary constraints on 
the use of political power is accompanied by an equally noteworthy vision of the character of 
those who wield political power: namely, that such individuals will not pmposelypervert political 
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power to further a specific partisan agenda-whether their own or that of a particular group or 
segment of the citizenry-to the detriment of other competing reasonable interests. 
According to political liberals, if we are to ensure that all citizens are treated with the 
respect they deserve as free and equal persons, then the conditions regulating the exercise of 
coercive political power must be acceptable to all those subject to said power. To establish 
conditions that lack such voluntary acceptance would be to treat individuals "merely as means, 
as the objects of coercion, and not also as ends" (Larmore 1999: 607). By demanding that the 
principles informing the use of political power be the object of reasonable agreement among those 
they are to govern, political liberalism recognises individuals as beings capable of thinking and 
acting on the basis of reasons-in other words, both as means and ends-and in so doing 
respects individuals' distinctive capacity as persons. Only by adopting such an approach is it 
realistic to expect reasonable people to support the conception ofjustice freely and willingly, 
thereby securing the political stability required to establish and sustain a well-ordered society. 
Political liberals believe that such an understanding of the proper exercise of coercive political 
power is shared by all reasonable persons and, indeed, generally accepted by the citizens of 
existing liberal democracies. 
Achieving and preserving the respect necessary to establish and sustain the sought after 
political stability also requires that the political process secured by the conception of justice be 
perceived to be neutral by all reasonable citizens. In order to exhibit the respect needed to gamer 
and maintain the voluntary support essential to establishing the type of enduring political stability 
necessary to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy, all reasonable citizens must 
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believe that the political process, including the coercive use of political power, is fair to the 
adherents of all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. If political power is perverted for 
"individual" gain, then it ceases to be neutral or fair insofar as it purposely benefits some more than 
others and in so doing fails to be equally respectful of all citizens.1 
Political liberals argue that the conception of justice they promote is neutral to the extent 
humanly possible and to the degree necessary to secure the desired overlapping conserisus among 
the citizens of a contemporary pluralistic society. Political liberals generally distinguish between 
three different understandings of the term "neutrality''-nam.ely,procedural neutrality, neutrality 
of aim, and neutrality of effect or influence-and contend that political liberalism achieves and 
need only maintain a certain degree of procedural neutrality and neutrality of aim in order to be 
correctly considered neutral. What this means is that the public conception of justice must refrain 
from purposely favouring a particular vision of the good or comprehensive doctrine that contains 
any controversial view( s) concerning the nature and content of the good life; to do otherwise 
would be to fail to provide the equal respect due to all reasonable persons. Proponents of political 
liberalism contend that it offers a conception of justice that embodies the necessary neutrality and, 
by extension, exhibits the degree of fairness required to secure the conditions needed to establish 
and preserve a just and stable liberal democracy. 
However, the arguments used by political liberals to justify their conclusions regarding the 
neutrality of their understanding of the proper exercise of coercive political power are premised 
upon a number of extremely questionable claims and demands, the close examination of which 
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brings into serious doubt the ability of political liberalism to achieve and preserve the type of 
neutrality it requires if it is to secure and maintain the support of all reasonable citizens. 
A particularly problematic claim concerns the suggested effect-or, more correctly, lack 
thereof-of a public denial of the acceptability of certain beliefs. Political liberals acknowledge 
that there may be instances when it is publicly necessary to deny the acceptability ofbeliefs that 
conflict with the political conception of justice. Such a public denial will be required when a 
conflicting belief also deems it acceptable to use political power to force all citizens to act in a 
manner that is consistent with the demands associated with the belief in question. Somewhat 
amazingly, though, political liberals do not believe that such a public denial unacceptably violates 
or undermines the neutrality of the political conception of justice; they contend that so long as such 
"public assertions" deny only what is necessary to maintain the overlapping consensus, the 
conception of justice remains sufficiently neutral. 
Unfortunately, political liberals remain largely silent with respect to identifying precisely 
who is to determine what aspects of which doctrine( s) are to be asserted, how much of said 
doctrine( s) need be advanced to maintain the overlapping consensus, 2 and under what 
circumstances it is both necessary and just to initiate such an action; and this silence brings into 
question the neutrality of the conception ofjustice. In the absence of any declaration as to who 
will make such decisions, it seems logical to assume that such decisions will be the strict province 
of those who hold political power. However, if such is the case, and if the ability to obtain any 
noteworthy degree of political power is restricted to those who voluntarily affirm the notion of 
political morality embodied in public conception of justice and satisfy the corresponding definition 
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of"reasonable," then how neutral is political liberalism in terms of access to political power and 
opportunity to influence the public policy decision-making process? Furthermore, by limiting the 
opportunities for certain individuals to secure political efficacy, political liberalism allows for an 
unequal distribution of political power and in so doing tempts the emergence of injustice (whether 
real or imagined) and political instability, and thus significantly jeopardises the ability of political 
liberalism to achieve its stated goal(s). 
Politicalliberalsarguethatitisquiteacceptabletoplacesuch''reasonable"restrictionson 
the access to political power. Given that there is "no social world that does not exclude some 
ways oflife that realize in special ways certain fundamental values" (Rawls 1993: 197, n.32; see 
also Larmore 1999: 624, n.27), the fact that political liberalism is unable to accommodate equally 
the totality of views that will exist in a contemporary liberal democracy is not, political liberals 
maintain, proof of an unacceptable degree of bias or exclusion. Indeed, by making 
''reasonableness" the standard of inclusion and access, political liberalism, it is claimed, provides 
for the greatest degree of accommodation and, by extension, access to political power, and thus 
represents what is arguably the least biassed regulatory framework possible under conditions of 
extreme diversity like those found in contemporary liberal democracies. Such being the case, not 
only is it quite legitimate for political liberalism to ''reasonably" limit access to political power, but 
doingsoinnowayunderminesitsneutrality(e.g.,Rawls 1988: 263; 1996: 194;Larmore 1987: 
44-46, 67; Larmore 1996: 139-41, 145; Shklar 1989: 29). In essence, then, according to 
political liberals, it is an unfortunate(?) fact of pluralistic societies that the public conception of 
justice cannot help but allow for unequal access to political power, but in doing so, it is doing 
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nothing unusual or unacceptable insofar as the resulting inequality is an inevitable and unavoidable 
feature of any society. Hence, so long as it minimises such inequality to the degree humanly 
possible, political liberalism does nothing to jeopardise its neutrality. 
However, even if one accepts the above justification for allowing unequal aecess to 
political power and disregards the potential questions and problems associated with the 
accompanying exclusion, problems remain. In particular, the validity and viability of such an 
approach is itself premised upon an unrealistic assumption: namely, the presence of a universal 
agreement among reasonable people as to the precise character and proper application of 
reasonable political values and principles, including the reasonable use of political power. If 
reasonableness is the benchmark for determining what constitutes acceptable public behaviour, 
then each citizen's interpretation of what qualifies as the legitimate exercise of coercive political 
power will be intimately and inextricably connected to his understanding of the demands of 
reasonableness. In turn, if the conception of justice is to secure the political stability needed to 
establish and sustain a well-ordered society, then, according to political liberals, it must be able 
to obtain and maintain the voluntary support of the majority of the citizenry, which it can do only 
if it is considered reasonable by most citizens. Hence, securing and preserving the sought after 
sociopolitical conditions will require thatthe majority of citizens affirm and maintain an identical 
definition of' 'reasonable," including what constitutes both the legitimate (i.e., reasonable) exercise 
of coercive political power and a reasonable inequality of access to such power. Yet, surely it is 
unrealistic to suggest that such a prerequisite could ever be effectively satisfied, even among 
reasonable people. While it might be possible to secure a widespread, public agreement on the 
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general character of a reasonable political demand-in this case, the acceptable exercise of 
coercive political power-such an agreement becomes much more difficult to maintain once one 
is forced to apply general principles to specific questions of political justice, especially when said 
questions concern matters of"the first significance." 
Perhaps even more problematic for the viability of political hberalism is its asSlUilption that 
reasonable persons possessing political power will voluntarily and faithfully refrain from using that 
power for partisan purposes to the disadvantage of other citizens. Though different variants of 
political liberalism acknowledge and respond in varying degrees to the problem of the potential 
perversion of political power, all fail to adequately protect against the abuse of political power by 
"reasonable" people. Even when the problem of the abuse of political power is given centre stage, 
as it is in Shklarian political liberalism, the resulting conception neglects to provide effective 
security against such abuse by reasonable people. Arguably, the history of politics in 
contemporary liberal democracies suggests that even ''reasonable" people are not immune to the 
corrupting influences of political power and the temptation to use it for their own advantage. The 
unfortunate consequence of this reality is that reasonable people, too, pose a threat against which 
citizens must be protected. Political liberalism, however, fails to provide for such protection. 
Thus, while emphasising its practical and empirical character, political liberalism adopts 
a surprisingly unrealistic approach to the problem of the possible abuse of political power. Though 
political liberals acknowledge the potential for political power to be perverted and concede that 
there is really no sure way to preclude this possibility completely, the ability of political liberalism 
to provide a neutral conception of justice and thereby secure the basis for the required overlapping 
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consensus remains contingent upon the validity of the assumption that political power will not be 
abused. Political,liberals, however, seriously consider only the most blatant difficulties associated 
with the abuse of political power. In so doing, political liberalism fails to respond to the full range 
of potential dilemmas associated with thepossibleperversion of political power. This failure 
effectively prevents political liberalism from adequately protecting citizens against such perversion. 
Such a vulnerability critically undermines the ability ofpoliticalliberalism to ensure the neutral 
exercise of coercive political power and thereby secure all of the conditions necessary to establish 
and sustain an overlapping consensus and, by extension, a well-ordered polity (as defined by 
political liberalism). In other words, the ability of the concept of political liberalism to achieve its 
stated goals is unacceptably jeopardised by its inadequate response to the problem of the potential 
abuse of political power. 
V. Can the Ills of Political Liberalism be Remedied? 
While the difficulties confronting the concept of political liberalism are both normative and 
empirical in character, arguably, it is the latter type that pose the greatest obstacle to its success. 
In particular, its dependency on the reasonableness of citizens places the viability of the concept 
of political liberalism effectively beyond the control of political theorists. Though a number of 
politicalliberalshaverespondedtothisandsimilarproblemsbytyingtheviabilityoftheirclairns 
to the presence of an "ideal situation" such as the assumed existence of widespread, stable 
support for certain beliefs and values, by itself, this caveat does not negate all of the difficulties 
resulting from the various explicit and implicit empirical claims used to validate certain fundamental 
components of political liberalism. 
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To explain: In an effort to maintain its practicality, ideal situation caveats, when employed 
by political liberals, are often followed by arguments claiming that a survey of existing empirical 
realities justifies the presumption of the proposed ideal insofar as historical and contemporary 
features ofliberal democracies make possible its realisation. In tum, political liberals argue that 
given the presence of such empirical support, presuming an ideal situation does not threaten the 
practicality or viability of political liberalism. A prominent example of this approach is the claim 
that citizens of contemporary liberal democracies are able to abandon the "cult of wholeness" 
(Larmore 1996: 141) and refrain from responding to questions of political justice with answers 
that are justified by reference to controversial private beliefs, or "nonpublic" reasons. Yet, as 
already noted, empirical evidence makes extremely dubious any such claim. If empirical evidence 
does not support the claims of political liberals concerning the existence or likely emergence of 
such a capacity or inclination, then, according to the terms established by political liberals, not only 
is the presumption of the proposed ideal rendered invalid, but the practicality and, in tum, the 
viabilityofpoliticalliberalismiscriticallyl.Uldermined.Hence,inthemannerinwhichitiscommonly 
employed by political liberals, the presumption of an ideal situation does not protect political 
liberalism against the problems posed by empirical realities that bring into question the validity of 
certain of its fundamental claims upon which its viability rests. 
Pemaps more importantly, the difficulties identified in this study-i.e., an unsol.Uldreliance 
on the reason( ableness) of individuals, and the assumption that in a society regulated by the 
dictates of political liberalism those occupying positions of political power will generally refrain 
from any attempts to abuse it to further their own interests-are not merely matters of detail, but 
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rather are inherent and elemental consequences of the very idea of a purelypoliticalliberalism, and 
as such, its viability is dependent upon their resolution. Lamentably, the problems noted in this 
thesis are impossible to resolve in a manner that would allow the character of political liberalism 
to remain true to the vision of its founders. 
Not surprisingly, then, theprincipalconclusionofthis studyisthattheconceptofpolitical 
liberalism represents an untenable paradigm that is, consequently, unable to provide a viable 
response to the problem of political stability as it presents itself in contemporary liberal 
democracies. In the final analysis, the idea of a purelypoliticalliberalism collapses under the 
weight of its own demands: it fails to satisfy its self-defined requirements for securing the basis for 
astable overlapping consensus and, subsequently, a well-ordered society. Though proponents 
ofpoliticalliberalism have explained the benefits and indeed the necessity of a purely political 
conception of justice and detailed why their proposals should be received as such, their arguments 
"constitute more a ... statement of what a political conception must amount to than an explanation 
ofhow such an account can be given" (Neal1990: 34). 
This is not to suggest that the liberal response to the problem of political stability in 
pluralistic societies is philosophically unreasonable or illogical. Indeed, a quick review of the 
fundamental arguments animating the liberal outlook, both in its general and purely political forms, 
suggests just the opposite. The proposition that any regulatory framework that hopes to secure 
and sustain political stability must gain the voluntary support of those subject to its demands not 
only makes eminent sense, but has been validated by history. It is also quite logical to insist that 
achieving and sustaining such support is possible and likely only if the individuals in question 
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believe that the regulatory framework treats them fairly, or justly. It is equally sensible to suggest 
that fulfilling such a condition will require that those who live within the parameters of the 
regulatory framework be given a reasonable opportunity to realise their respective visions of the 
good life. And in a polity characterised by a diversity of competing, conflicting and often 
irreconcilable beliefs, satisfying such a requirement will necessitate the establishment and 
preservation of a regulatory framework capable of accommodating a variety of comprehensive 
doctrines. By providing for the establishment and preservation of such a framework, then, the 
concept of political liberalism offerS the means by which to secure and sustain political stability in 
contemporary pluralistic democracies. 
Not only do the preceding propositions seem quite reasonable and logical, but one could 
also argue that when combined they form a sound syllogistic argument, the conclusion of which 
is represented by the concept of political liberalism. Political liberalism could thus be said to offer 
a sensible and philosophically sound response to the problem of political stability in pluralistic 
polities. However, the soundness ofpoliticalliberalism obtains only insofar as one approaches the 
problem from the hypothetical perspective of an ideal world that denies certain empirical rea1ities 
concerning human behaviour-e.g., humans are problematically unpredictable, illogical, 
unreasonable, and irrational. Once one abandons the "party ofhope" (Shklar 1989: 26) andre-
enters the world of existing societies, the ability of political liberalism to provide an effective 
response to the problem of political stability is critically undermined. 
Given the threat to social unity and political stability that is posed by the ever-increasing 
sociopolitical cleavages in contemporary societies, the failure of political liberalism to offer an 
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empirically viable response to existing problems precipitates a number of pressing questions. 
Perhaps most prominent among such questions is whether it is really possible to develop a single, 
viable conception of justice that can adequately accommodate the potential diversity of demands 
associated with the plurality of comprehensive doctrines that is likely to exist in contemporary 
liberal democracies? Unfortunately, the concept of political liberalism does not provide a 
satisfactory answer to this question. If anything, a close examination of the principal arguments 
supporting the concept of political liberalism may leave one more doubtful than ever regarding the 
prospects for realising its objectives. 
The failure ofpoliticalliberals to produce an empiricallyviableregulatory framework that 
can secure the conditions needed to establish and sustain the sought after well-ordered society 
should not dissuade others from rising to the challenge: while success is the goal, its absence does 
not negate the usefulness of such exercises. Indeed, to the extent that each "failure" helps to 
highlight the problems that remain and must be addressed before the ultimate goal can be 
achieved, it brings us one step closer to reaching a solution to the problem of political stability in 
contemporary pluralistic societies. In this context, the concept of political liberalism has much of 
value to offerpolitical theory. Particularly noteworthy in thisrespectaretheinsights gained from 
political liberals' discussion of the problems posed by reasonable disagreement. 
In light of the ineliminable ethnocultural, religious, moral and philosophical pluralism that 
characterises contemporary national and international politics, the fundamental values animating 
the idea of a purely political liberalism-e.g., toleration, reciprocity, and equal respect-would 
seem to be essential components of any conception of justice whose aim it is to secure the type 
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of sociopolitical environment that will publicly allow for the pursuit and realisation of a diversity 
of competing, conflicting and irreconcilable conceptions of the good. Political liberalism's 
discussion of the complex character of these values and their relationship to justice and political 
stability helps us to better understand the problems associated with their operationalisation. 
Indeed, it is the insights gained from the debate between proponents of political liberalism and their 
critics that suggest that the concept of political liberalism could never successfully move beyond 
the philosophical realm. 
The conclusions of this study suggest that the only way one can be assured of establishing 
and sustaining the conditions necessary to achieve the sociopolitical environment sought by 
political liberals is to develop a conception of justice that publicly supports and protects the values 
in question, rather than relying upon the reasonableness of individuals, as does political liberalism, 
to secure and nourish the necessary conditions. A cursory review of contemporary history reveals 
the potentially horrific consequences associated with merely presuming that the majority of citizens 
will reliably act in a reasonable manner-i.e., freely and willingly subordinate their fundamental 
aspirations to the demands of public reasonableness in order to obtain and maintain a 
sociopolitical environment that is equally respectful to those views with which they disagree. If we 
are to avoid the dangers associated with such an expectation, we must be more proactive in terms 
of ensuring adherence to certain values and safeguarding their primacy in the public realm. 
Accordingly, what is needed is a conception of justice that forcefully supports and 
protects the liberal values embodied in political liberalism. If it is true that there is ''no social world 
without loss," and if it is also true that many of the citizens of contemporary liberal democracies 
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already support the values embraced by political liberalism, then taking the additional step of 
publicly and actively endorsing and protecting such values should not constitute an unacceptably 
onerous or offensive imposition on those concerned. The only notable difference between such 
an approach and that of political liberalism is that the former is willing to declare publicly the value 
of what the latter requires to achieve its goals but is explicitly unwilling to demand of its adherents. 
It is in this respect that the concept of political liberalism falters by forsaking practicality for 
philosophical continuity. Though the concept ofpoliticalliberalismhas certainly embraced the 
concerns ofboth philosophical liberalism and empirical practicality, 3 engaging and attempting to 
address the real-world problems found in existing liberal democracies, it has, nevertheless, failed 
to achieve a realistic balance between these two concerns. Such a balance requires that the 
frailties of human nature-e.g., unreasonableness, irrationality, egoism, etc-not only be 
adequately recognised, but also effectively protected against. 
The operationalisation of such an approach would seem to require that the liberal belief 
in the justness of the principles of toleration and equal respect explicitly guide all public policy 
and, subsequently, the activities of all public institutions, including the public education system. If 
the goal is to establish and preserve a sociopolitical environment that offers the greatest 
opportunity for each citizen to pursue his (freely) chosen vision of the good life and thereby realise 
self-fulfilment, then a regulatory framework that unequivocally demands that primacy be given to 
the principles oftoleration and equal respect would seem to offer the best possible option. Given 
that the boundaries of accommodation must be drawn somewhere, such an approach not only 
secures the greatest practical degree of accommodation, it also provides the most effective means 
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for its protection by explicitly requiring that public behaviour, both on the part of individuals and 
the government, adhere to the demands oftoleration and equal respect, thereby significantly 
reducing the need to rely upon human reason(ableness) to achieve the desired results. 
Though the resulting regulatory frameworktransgresses the boundaries of neutrality 
advocated by political liberalism, and insofar as it does is more ''perfectionisf' in character, it is, 
arguably, no more illiberal or exclusionary in its practical effect than is the framework generated 
by the concept of political liberalism. Hence, the proposed alternative approach offers a paradigm 
thatisabletoprovidegreatercertaintywithrespecttogeneratingandsustainingthetypeofpublic 
behaytour necessary to secure and preserve the sought after sociopolitical conditions, while 
maintaining an actual degree of accommodation equal to that available from political liberalism. 
Both in terms of its practical consequences and its fundamental character, then, the proposed 
alternative does not represent a significant departure from the approach promoted by political 
liberalism. However, insofar as the above recommended alternative approach more fully 
acknowledges and responds to the frailties ofhuman nature and in so doing secures greater 
protection against unreasonable public behaviour, it presents a more practical and, by extension, 
useful response to the problem of political stability than does that offered by the concept of 
political liberalism. (Unforttm.ately, a thorough discussion of this argument cannot be entertained 
within the confines of this study.) 
Of course, not all political theorists, liberal or otherwise, will agree that the type of 
''practical" approach being recommended is either desirable or useful. Indeed, there are those who 
argue that practicality should be purposely avoided. Ronald Beiner, for example, contends that 
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the drive to develop "practical" conceptions of justice has produced an undesirably "modest" 
approach to theorising that has effectively buried the heroic and essential "spirit" of political 
philosophy (Beiner 1997: xii). According to Beiner, focussing one's efforts on producing practical 
theories that seek to address concrete sociopolitical problems unduly and detrimentally restricts 
the scope of theorists' investigations. Beinermaintains that this narrowing of"analytical horizons" 
generates a pervasive intellectual conservatism and philosophical myopia that render political 
philosophy incapable of providing the type of extreme, penetrating critique that he "associate[ s] 
with the very enterprise of theory" (Beiner 1997: 3). 
In precluding such critiques, practical theorising is, Beiner claims, depriving political 
philosophy of the "intellectual resources" needed to identify what is "sordid, empty, mechanical, 
and dispiriting," or, conversely, what is valuable, laudable and inspiring about our existing social 
order (Beiner 1997: xii). In other words, practical theorising leaves political philosophy unable to 
provide the analytical tools that theorists require if they are to "pass judgment" on the value of 
contemporary life-the raison d 'etre of political theory (Beiner 1997: 6). Practical theorising thus 
betrays the "essential mission" of political philosophy: namely, to help us "understand ourselves 
at a deeper fathom by exposing ourselves to the challenge of ... alien thought -worlds" (Beiner 
1997: xiii). Such an objective can be achieved, Beiner argues, only if theorists abandon the goal 
of practicality and embrace the type of' 'intellectual extremism" (Beiner 1997: ix) or philosophical 
radicalism, that is the hallmark of the "grand tradition of political philosophy'' (Beiner 1997: x). If 
it is to regain its once robust and heroic character, political philosophy must first be emancipated 
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from the chains of modesty that currently constrain it. According to Beiner, nowhere are these 
chains more evident or forcefully promoted than in contemporary liberal theorising. 
In essence, Beiner maintains that liberals' overwhelming concern with developing 
doctrines that can provide the basis for a public agreement on a single conception of justice that 
can effectively resolve many of the sociopolitical problems currently confronting existing liberal 
democracies represents the bastardisation and debasement of the true aim of political philosophy. 
He argues that true political philosophy neither requires nor supports the search for compromise 
and consensus that consumes liberalism. More specifically, true political philosophy does not seek 
"to offer sensible guidance on the conduct of social life, but rather to probe the normative 
adequacy of a given vision of social order by pushing that particular vision as far as it will 
go"(Beiner 1997: ix). True political philosophy is "radical, extravagant, probing, biting, and 
immoderate" (Beiner 1997: x), and it is impossible to achieve these qualities and simultaneously 
seek to address practical questions. According to Beiner, by focussing on producing practical 
conceptions of justice, theorists take the once noble and inspiring practice of political philosophy 
and transform it into "narrow, uninspiring, pragmatic squabbling over details" (Raz 1990: 5). 
Yet, i±: as Beiner acknowledges, theorists have little hope of"prevent[ing] ... [their] well-
intentioned theorising from being drawn into the whirlwind of political practice" (Beiner 1997: 
150), then surely it makes perfect sense for theorists to adopt a ''practical" approach to theorising 
and avoid, rather than champion, "intellectual extremism" and its fantastical visions of utopian 
societies that, as Shklarwell understood, have often served as the justification for unthinkable acts 
ofterror and cruelty.4 Indeed, given the horror and misery that have been visited upon the world 
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in the name of the realisation of radical philosophical visions of the perfect society, can anyone 
sincerely suggest that the expansion of analytical horizons is more important than securing 
sociopolitical stability and human safety? If one is genuinely interested in and committed to the 
betterment ofhumankind' s existence, and if it is likely that despite efforts to the contrary, theory 
will influence practice, then it would seem that theorists should consciously seek greater, not less, 
practicality in their theories. 
Though theoretical aspirations need not be limited to the immediately achievable, the 
problems of modernity generate urgent practical demands that justify a focussed and pragmatic 
approach. The challenge confronting contemporary political theorists is not to re-establish the 
"intellectual extremism" which Beiner associates with the true calling of theory, but rather to 
develop a political philosophy that more directly and realistically confronts the concrete problems 
which continue to jeopardise the exceedingly fragile sociopolitical stability of the new world 
(dis )order. Accordingly, the most valuable contribution that political theorists can make is to 
develop theories from which we can at least hope to generate viable solutions to existing 
problems. From this perspective, the problem with contemporary liberal theory is not that it is too 
practical in its orientation, but rather that it is not practical enough: ''the main problem with liberal 
theory ... is ... with closing the gap between liberal theory and the real world" (Bel11998: 572). 
To this end, political liberalism serves as an excellent example of the direction in which theorists 
should be heading, even though it does not quite "close the gap." 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
Given the multitude andmagnitudeoftheproblems currently confronting humanity, it seems quite 
reasonable to suggest that a worthy goal for political theorists is to develop theories which offer 
possible resolutions to these problems. This is not, however, to suggest that "answers" themselves 
are the only gauge of success; certainly the thought and discussion stimulated by the development 
and promotion of a particular idea are also a valid measure of its success. Regardless of whether 
it provides a map to the "promised land," intense philosophical inquiry and speculation-such as 
that undertaken by political liberals-offers one of the principal means by which we can hope to 
develop the theoretical tools with which to improve our practical condition (for those of us who 
believe that there is still room for, and the possibility of, improvement). But as with any 
investigation that hopes to generate sound conclusions and useful suggestions, philosophical 
speculation needs to take place within well-defined parameters if it is to produce viable solutions 
to concrete problems. Accordingly, as Shklar suggests, political philosophers must avoid 
convenient conjecture and utopian theorising and accept and confront the often unpalatable 
sociopolitical realities which are the offspring of modem liberal-democratic capitalist societies, 
even though doing so may necessitate that we also accept that the most practical solutions to our 
problems may conflict with firmly entrenched traditional and contemporary liberal ideals.5 
In light of the conclusions of this study with respect to the untenable character of the 
concept of a purely political liberalism, one might reasonably question the value of continued 
efforts to develop a viable liberal conception of justice, at least in the sense that such an entity is 
currentlyunderstood.Afterall,iftheconceptofpoliticalliberalismisanimatedbymanyofthe 
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same fundamental principles and beliefs that enliven all other forms ofliberalism, then surely 
deficiencies undenllining the former are likely to have an identical (or, at least, very similar) effect 
on the latter. While it is certainly true that in various instances the difficulties troubling political 
liberalism are also likely to pose problems for the theory ofliberalism in general, I am not 
convinced that the untenability of existing conceptions ofpoliticalliberalism necessarily translates 
into a similar fate for the more general philosophical doctrine ofliberalism. Regrettably, a thorough 
analysis of this question cannot be undertaken within the confines of this study. 
What I would suggest is that even if the criticisms herein levelled against the concept of 
political liberalism are also significantly or equally applicable to the general theory ofliberalism, 
such a fact does not negate the value of continued "liberal" theorising. 6 Indeed, given the 
ever-increasing sociopolitical fragmentation of the citizenry ofliberal-democratic societies, any 
conceptionofjusticewhichhopestogainthe.freeandwil/ingsupportofevenasimplemajority 
of the citizenry, will likely have to embody liberal principles. Subsequently, the need for liberal 
theories of justice is perhaps more acute than at any other point in time in the history of the world. 
What is needed, however, is a liberalism that accurately reflects and is ''practically relevant to the 
actual political problems of the world" (Neall994: 84). Hopefully the inability of the concept of 
political liberalism to sustain its viability under close scrutiny will help to further accentuate the 
distance that must yet be covered if we are to satisfy this need. 7 
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Notes 
1 To reiterate: such perversion, or abuse, occurs not only when political power is purposely misused-i.e., 
knowingly employed unreasonably-but also when the conception of justice unnecessarily prevents any 
person or group from having an equal opportunity to secure political power. 
2 It is worth emphasising that maintaining an overlapping consensus requires preserving justice. Thus the 
character and frequency of "public assertions" undertaken to maintain the overlapping consensus are 
(theoretically, at least) determined by considerations of justice. 
3 Arguably, George Klosko's Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus (2000) represents the best 
example thus far of an attempt to produce a conception of political liberalism that embodies this approach. 
4 Even Beiner recognises the potentially detrimental impact of the type of "radical" theorising that he 
advocates: "To be sure, one has little reason to doubt that our political world of the last two centuries would 
have been a decidedly safer place if Rousseau, Marx, and Nietzsche had practiced theory in more or less the 
way that John Stuart Mill practiced theory" (Beiner 1997: xi) 
5 As Rogers Smith has noted: "there are deep tensions among richly valued liberal goals, and liberals lack any 
means of resolving those tensions without sacrifice. These problems are chronic and important; they must 
always be addressed" (Smith 1994: 652) 
6 Moreover, I want to emphasise that my critique of the work of Rawls, Larmore, Shklar, and other political 
liberals, should in no way be understood as a dismissal of its value or usefulness. The importance of their 
contribution to our understanding and analysis of liberal theories of justice and the problems confronting 
contemporary liberal democracies is, I believe, beyond question. In particular, if"success discloses faults and 
inftrmities which failure might have concealed from observation" (Mil11993: 72), then political liberals have 
indeed been "successful." 
7 A noteworthy amount of the material presented in this chapter has appeared previously in Young (2002). 
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